Karl-Olov Arnstberg is a Swedish writer, ethnologist, and retired university professor. His essays are posted at his blog, Invandring och mörkläggning. Below is today’s installment of his “Sunday Chronicle”. Many thanks to our Swedish correspondent LN for the translation:
Sunday chronicle: Liberal hegemony
by Karl-Olov Arnstberg
At the international level, the liberal order is characterised by economic openness, i.e. low barriers to trade and investment, relations between states being regulated by laws and institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and multilateral alliances such as NATO.
At the national level, the liberal order is synonymous with:
- Democratically elected leaders
- The rule of law
- Market economy
- Religious and social tolerance
- Human rights
Proponents of a liberal world order do not believe that this dream society arises spontaneously or automatically sustains itself. On the contrary, they believe that the liberal order requires active leadership. They also agree the United States, as the only superpower, is uniquely qualified to take the lead. Because it faces no threats in the Western Hemisphere and is shielded from the rest of the world by two vast oceans, it can intervene in distant countries without jeopardising its own survival. The two fundamental beliefs of liberal hegemony:
- The United States must remain far more powerful than any other country.
- It should use its superior military power to defend, spread and deepen liberal values around the world.
In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, history seemed to be moving in the US direction and it was considered easy to spread the American version of liberalism. The victory in the Cold War, the so-called Velvet Revolutions in Eastern Europe and a wave of democratic transitions in Latin America convinced many that liberal democracy was the only logical end point for modern or even postmodern societies.
US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the United States ‘the indispensable nation that sees beyond what others do.’ The Washington Post hailed US foreign policy as ‘the landmine that protects civilisation from barbarism.’ Only so-called rogue states, led by dictators and international troublemakers, opposed the exercise of US power, but they were comparatively weak and politically isolated. In any case, they were assumed to be heading for the dustbin of history.
The political scientist Francis Fukuyama captured the zeitgeist perfectly when he argued that the great ideological battles of the past were now behind us and that humanity had reached the end of history. In the future, he said, there would be no struggle or conflict over major issues and consequently no need for generals or statesmen. Fukuyama warned that boredom could be the greatest danger of the future.
The enlargement and deepening of the EU in 1992, and the introduction of the euro as the single currency, fitted into this optimistic narrative. The EU was further proof that democracy, and the gradual development of international institutions, could bring lasting peace between countries that had previously fought bloody wars with each other. Overall, the future seemed bright not only for the United States but also for much of the world. Liberal values were on the rise and seemed to be inexorably pulling the world in the direction American leaders wanted it to go.