Below is the third of several parts of a summary of prosecutor Alberto Nisman’s much longer report on the 1994 bombing of the AMIA center in Buenos Aires, which was released at the end of May. The Foundation for Defense of Democracies issued the 31-page summary (pdf) when the larger report was published. (Previously: Part 1, Part 2)
This section deals with the dual functionality of Iranian institutions — including embassies, consulates, cultural centers, mosques, etc. — in Latin America. The ostensible purposes of such institutions are used to conceal the fact that they are being used to gather intelligence as well as plan and coordinate terrorist attacks.
The following sentence seems anomalous in this report:
“The prosecutor made clear that his office has always been aware of the importance of religious issues, indicating that the conclusions arrived at in all of his indictments have nothing to do neither with the Islamic faith nor with people who professes that religion.”
Either the translation from the Spanish is less than adequate, or the writer of this summary (or even Alberto Nisman himself) felt compelled to include a politically correct disclaimer at odds with the rest of the report.
Dual use of institutions related to the Iranian regime
The cultural and religious cover to hide illegal actions turned out to be a milestone of the infiltration strategy developed by Teheran. Precisely the investigation of this case uncovered the use of legal activities, as for example the cultural and religious diffusion and commercial and diplomatic activities, as a cover for intelligence tasks and, mainly, it evidenced the fact that this duality paved the way for the establishment of Iranian espionage structures that, if necessary, are able to facilitate and support terrorist acts. In sum, during the course of the investigation it was possible to collect different probing elements that showed a methodology which consist in the use of legitimate activities to hide criminal objectives and actions.
This methodology was not limited to South America. Thus, in the former Federal Republic of Germany, Kazem Darabi, who occupied a similar position to the one hold by Sheik Rabbani in Argentina, had also been implicated in criminal activities, when he participated in the murder of four Iranian dissidents committed in September, 1992, in Berlin by order of the then Islamic Republic of Iran government (known as “Mykonos case”).
This has been highlighted by the Higher Regional Court of Berlin, which affirmed in its ruling: “Under the veil of a religious activity, he made contact with his fundamentalist fellows of Lebanese origin and verified their ideas and levels of trust. These qualities allowed Darabi, both personally and logistically, to organize the attack against the representatives of the DPK-I in Berlin, with such a detail that the act could be executed with the support of other forces from Iran, with a high level of success probability and with the lowest risk of being discovered”.
Not less important is the fact that Kazem Darabi, who took advantage of his religious position to connect the different participants of the “Mykonos case”, was arrested by the German police and convicted to life imprisonment by the judiciary of that country. This constituted a true lesson for the Iranian authorities who had ordered the assassination of their opponents. So, for the AMIA bombing, they decided deliberately and with premeditation to protect from justice their agent in Argentina, by granting Mohsen Rabbani diplomatic immunity designating him Cultural Attaché of the Iranian Embassy, four months before the attack.
In this same line should be read the dual use of Islamic centers, as it has been exposed by the French judiciary, regarding the murder of the former Iranian Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar, when affirmed: “Jaffar JALALI arrives to France in 1980 as a student; he rapidly calls the attention for his political-religious fanaticism. In 1981 he becomes an employee of the Iranian Embassy in Paris […]. In 1983, as Political Commissar at the Embassy, he actively participated of the Khomeinist propaganda from the Iranian Cultural Center in Paris […] and exercised an “intense information activity” about the movements leaded by Shapour Bakhtiar”.
This matter can be perfectly noticed, once again, in the “Mykonos case”, not only for the categorical statements of the pronouncement but especially for the authority that rules the matter, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin. While studying Kazem Darabi’s activities — identified as the “local connection” of that terrorist act — the Berlin Court detected this duality by declaring that the Islamic Center of Berlin “functions, in a similar way as the Islamic Center of Hamburg, for the diffusion of the Islamic thought in the sense of an authoritarian “State-God” and for the recollection of intelligence information…”.-
Hans Vorbeck, Government Director of the former Federal Republic of Germany and expert in the terrorism, when asked about the investigation of the “Mykonos case”, revealed that the Islamic centers, mosques and businesses of its followers were the meeting points of Hezbollah members.
In addition, Bernard Millerat, then Chief of the Middle East Department of the “Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire” (DST), Ministry of Home Affairs, informed, on September 3rd 1997, that his department detected Iranian intelligence elements in the Islamic Center of Paris, when assessing the patterns of the different crimes in which it had been proved the participation of Islamic fundamentalist extremists.
The same duality, but in reference to mosques, has been publicly proclaimed by one of the top leaders of the Iranian Revolution, the Ayatollah Montazeri, who stated that mosques should not only be centers of praying but also centers of cultural, political and military activity. In fact, Mohsen Rabbani, in charge of the “At Tauhid” mosque of Buenos Aires, used this institution to spread fundamentalism. Even one of his acquaintances, without being an expert in international security affairs or having any particular study on Islamic religion, was able to notice the Iranian agents’ double game and therefore he mentioned that Rabbani’s religious activity was a “mask”.
Furthermore, the qualified witness Abolghasem Mesbahi said: “Regarding the transfer of information, religious ceremonies or cultural meetings are generally used in order to hand over a telephone number, for example”.
Embassies follow this same pattern. Former Iranian President Abolhassan Bani Sadr declared: “In the countries where Iran conducts terrorist operations, most of the embassies members are Iranian intelligence service agents, VEVAK, or from the Revolutionary Guards”.
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