Karl-Olov Arnstberg is a Swedish writer, ethnologist, and retired university professor. His essays are posted at his blog, Invandring och mörkläggning. Below is today’s installment of his “Sunday Chronicle”. Many thanks to our Swedish correspondent LN for the translation:

Sunday chronicle: Liberal hegemony

by Karl-Olov Arnstberg

At the international level, the liberal order is characterised by economic openness, i.e. low barriers to trade and investment, relations between states being regulated by laws and institutions such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and multilateral alliances such as NATO.

At the national level, the liberal order is synonymous with:

• Democratically elected leaders
• The rule of law
• Market economy
• Religious and social tolerance
• Human rights

Proponents of a liberal world order do not believe that this dream society arises spontaneously or automatically sustains itself. On the contrary, they believe that the liberal order requires active leadership. They also agree the United States, as the only superpower, is uniquely qualified to take the lead. Because it faces no threats in the Western Hemisphere and is shielded from the rest of the world by two vast oceans, it can intervene in distant countries without jeopardising its own survival. The two fundamental beliefs of liberal hegemony:

• The United States must remain far more powerful than any other country.
• It should use its superior military power to defend, spread and deepen liberal values around the world.

In the 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, history seemed to be moving in the US direction and it was considered easy to spread the American version of liberalism. The victory in the Cold War, the so-called Velvet Revolutions in Eastern Europe and a wave of democratic transitions in Latin America convinced many that liberal democracy was the only logical end point for modern or even postmodern societies.

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called the United States ‘the indispensable nation that sees beyond what others do.’ The Washington Post hailed US foreign policy as ‘the landmine that protects civilisation from barbarism.’ Only so-called rogue states, led by dictators and international troublemakers, opposed the exercise of US power, but they were comparatively weak and politically isolated. In any case, they were assumed to be heading for the dustbin of history.

The political scientist Francis Fukuyama captured the zeitgeist perfectly when he argued that the great ideological battles of the past were now behind us and that humanity had reached the end of history. In the future, he said, there would be no struggle or conflict over major issues and consequently no need for generals or statesmen. Fukuyama warned that boredom could be the greatest danger of the future.

The enlargement and deepening of the EU in 1992, and the introduction of the euro as the single currency, fitted into this optimistic narrative. The EU was further proof that democracy, and the gradual development of international institutions, could bring lasting peace between countries that had previously fought bloody wars with each other. Overall, the future seemed bright not only for the United States but also for much of the world. Liberal values were on the rise and seemed to be inexorably pulling the world in the direction American leaders wanted it to go.

Over time, more and more countries would become democratic, respect human rights and participate in an ever-expanding global economy. US-led international institutions would facilitate cooperation and increase transparency, further strengthening liberal norms and the rule of law. US power was the foundation on which globalisation would rest.

Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama were all outspoken defenders of US liberal hegemony. Assuming that US leadership was essential for global progress, all three sought to use US power to spread democracy, expand US influence and security commitments, and reinforce a liberal world order.

After 9/11, George W. Bush said that ‘the terrorists hate our freedoms.’ Or, as he later put it, he was ‘surprised that people hate us… because I know how good we are.’ Insisting that opponents ‘hate our freedoms’ conveniently absolved Washington of any responsibility and implied that nothing could be done to reduce the hatred. If America’s enemies were unreasonably hostile no matter what the US did, the only option was to eliminate them. Or as Vice President Dick Cheney put it in 2003: ‘We don’t negotiate with evil, we defeat it.’

The US has had the luxury of being able to intervene wherever it wants and then withdraw when it is necessary.

It did so in Vietnam, Iraq, Somalia, Libya and Afghanistan. They left behind millions of dead, huge refugee flows and badly damaged countries. This never led the US to do any soul-searching. Key members of the US foreign policy elite have never had to face any consequences for their mistakes. As the American writer Walter Lippmann once observed: When everyone thinks alike, no one thinks very much.

It went spectacularly wrong. By almost any measure, and in almost every major area of foreign policy, the United States and the world are worse off today than they were thirty years ago. It was the height of hubris for Americans to believe that they had invented the only workable model for a modern society. It was naïve of them to believe that military power could create stable and successful democracies in deeply divided societies that had never been democratic before.

Between 2000 and 2015, democracy broke down in 27 countries. The invasion of Iraq led to the rise of ISIS, whose brutality and online recruitment not only inspired terrorist attacks in a number of European countries, but also led to the refugee crisis that hit Europe in particular in 2015. Several global organisations have been politicised, with the consequence that they are falling apart. As I write this, support for Hamas is being discussed within UNRWA, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Terrorism and nuclear weapons have spread despite US efforts to contain them. During Nobel Peace Prize winner Barack Obama’s last year in office, the US military dropped more than 26,000 bombs in seven different countries.

None of this is helped by the fact that the US itself fails to uphold the ideals it so eagerly preaches to others. US officials have authorised both torture and political assassinations, as well as abuses of prisoners in Iraq, Afghanistan and the US prison at Guantanamo. American criticism of the human rights record of other states is hypocritical.

Some regions — notably the Middle East — are now mired in conflicts that could take decades to resolve. Israel is at war with Hamas and the US is supplying them with weapons. Russia invaded Ukraine because the US repeatedly ignored Russian warnings and threatened the vital interests of the Moscow regime. The risk of the world being drawn into a nuclear war is increasing.

Liberal democracy is in decline in many places and the image of the United States as a model of stable and competent governance had lost its credibility long before Donald Trump appeared on the scene. But he did.

According to Donald Trump, the ‘false song of globalisation’ has cost millions of Americans good jobs and made the US economy much weaker. Globalisation has also encouraged immigration that threatens America’s identity and made it possible for dangerous criminals and violent extremists to enter the United States. Trump’s 2016 election promises included tearing up trade deals, building a wall with Mexico and stopping extremists from entering the country. He wanted to leave the Paris Agreement on climate change, claiming it was a Chinese scam aimed at stifling American businesses, and above all, he wanted to bring back the jobs lost to globalisation and ‘Make America Great Again’ (MAGA).

Trump also praised Putin as a ‘strong leader’ and refused to condemn Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Additionally, he openly questioned the value of NATO and did not think it was at all obvious that the United States should deploy forces to the defence of small NATO countries, as many of them did not meet the 2% of GDP requirement for defence. He said it might not be a bad idea for countries like South Korea and Japan to acquire their own nuclear weapons, instead of relying on the US. He criticised US support for the Assad regime in Syria, which has killed hundreds of thousands of civilians in a long and bitter civil war.

In March 2016, 122 former national security officials signed an open letter condemning Trump’s views on foreign policy. Trump was described as ‘fundamentally dishonest’ and ‘totally unfit for office’.

I don’t think everyone fully understands that what was initially a power struggle between Donald Trump and Hillary Clinton, and by all accounts will continue to be a struggle between Trump and Biden, is not just a struggle between two political blocs. It is above all a battle between liberal hegemony and American isolationism. Those who defend US liberal hegemony are convinced that if Trump wins, evil will take over the world.

They do not realise that it has already happened. US liberal hegemony risks leading the world into a third world war.

— Karl-Olov Arnstberg

Previous posts by Karl-Olov Arnstberg: