On Friday night I broached the subject of pragmatic and temporary alliances among diverse anti-jihad groups who may disagree with each other on many other issues, but share the primary goal of resisting Islamization.
The paradigmatic problem is the rift between the BNP and other groups in Britain, including the English Defence League. Imnokuffar, one of the commenters on the second thread, voiced a sentiment that seems common among BNP supporters: they feel the BNP has been treated so badly in the past that they want nothing to do with any other organizations:
Theory is great but it must inform action. The problem is that those constructing the tent will define who enters it and for what reasons they are allowed to enter.
So for instance my party the BNP would never enter the tent if it were to be merely “tolerated”. We wound find such toleration to be insulting and demeaning to our members. I think that other groups labeled as “far right” would hold the same opinion though of course I cannot speak for them.
I am not going to enter a tent full of people who have already branded me a racist, a bigot and a fascist but who have decided to hold thier noses in the name of the common good. [emphasis added]
Your stance, Imnokuffar, is the problem. You won’t enter the tent because of a perceived slight. Doesn’t that make you exactly the same as “offended” Muslims?
If you would prefer that your female grandchildren (even daughters) must wear a burka , be treated as 2nd class citizens, possibly be forced to become sex slaves then feel free in your tunnel vision. Talk about cutting off your nose to spite your face.
I despair and thank God that I’ll be gone by the time this nightmare matures. I would so wish that Islam really was a Religion of Peace but it isn’t.
BNP members often express scorn for the English Defence League. To an outsider such as myself, a temporary alliance of expedience between the BNP and the EDL would seem natural and desirable. Although the two groups differ on the topic of race, among other things, they are in broad agreement on the most important issues that face them: the rapid Islamization of Britain and the need to reverse the suicidal policy of mass immigration. Those issues are so urgent, and so potentially catastrophic for the English nation, that it would seem prudent for the two organizations to overlook their differences on other issues and combine forces to resist Islam.
Since the BNP is a political party, and the EDL is a community action organization, there need not be any great rivalry between the two groups over their general functions, which could complement one another. Differences of political opinion on topics other than those of Islam and immigration could be reconciled through the normal sausage-making process that goes on within any political coalition.
Yet it is not to be — the BNP seems staunchly opposed to the EDL, even though the distaste may not be entirely mutual.
Looking at the broader picture presented by Imnokuffar, it’s clear that much of his antipathy towards potential allies is motivated by the feeling that his party has been treated in an “insulting and demeaning” manner.
But why should that be the basis for a decision on whether or not to forge temporary and pragmatic alliances with other popular groups?
Why not put aside feelings of personal slight and calculate the most expedient course of action?
Which approach does more to improve the long-term electoral prospects of the BNP?
To be open to a coalition does not imply that one should be indiscriminate in forming such alliances. Each possibly ally should be assessed individually to determine whether its advantages outweigh its disadvantages.
As an example, consider the earlier post about Douglas Murray, Maryam Namazie, and “One Law For All”. Ms. Namazie’s group is blatantly Communist, which means that its participation in any alliance should be regarded with the utmost skepticism. Communists have an extensive track record of entering alliances with the long-term goal of co-opting their ostensible partners and then overpowering and destroying them when their usefulness is at an end. Simple prudence would favor avoiding any alliance with any Communist group, no matter how temporary it might be.
And Mr. Murray, conservative or not, is himself prone to flinging the “racist” or “fascist” epithets fairly indiscriminately at anyone who seriously attempts to grapple with a solution to the imminent destruction of Great Britain by its rapidly growing Muslim population. If I were a British anti-jihad activist, I might well be reluctant to enter the tent with him — I would never know when he might turn on me as a “fascist”.
However, such calculations need to be made on a case-by-case basis. Is this person or group likely to be accommodating within a Counterjihad alliance? Can we expect cooperation, or are sniping, sandbagging, and infighting the more likely outcomes? Do our potential allies have assets to offer the coalition that outweigh their liabilities? And so on.
Imnokuffar mistrusts “those constructing the tent”. Well, who is constructing the tent? As a general rule, no one in an established and successful organization wants to hand over control of tent-formation to another group.
Under current circumstances, however, the proper course is for the tent to form itself. No one group need be the controller — different groups could come together as equals and agree to mutually acceptable terms for cooperation and coordination. All participants could decide to put aside their mutual antipathy for the time being for the sake of their common objectives.
Consider what is happening right now in Egypt — no one constructed that tent. It formed quite spontaneously, when the time was right. The Muslim Brotherhood did not create the insurrection, but it is shrewd enough to exploit it for its own purposes, just as the Communists would.
Consider also the various traditional branches of Islamic zealotry. The Shiites and the Sunnis hate each other more than do the BNP and the EDL (or even the BNP and Labour). Yet they often work together for the cause of jihad. Hamas is a Sunni organization, yet it is armed, funded, and at least partially controlled by Iran, a Shiite theocracy. The two factions are willing to put aside their ancient and substantial differences to make common cause against the infidel. After the kuffar have been totally defeated there will be time enough for a Sunni day when the Shiite hits the fan — or vice versa.
We need to learn from the Islamic example. Throughout its history, Islam has successfully expanded by exploiting the differences between groups of non-Muslims, who are as fractious as petroleum in a refinery tower. Pitting infidel against infidel has been a winning strategy for Muslims ever since the 7th century.
Not to raise a big tent over the shared goals of the Western Counterjihad would be a catastrophic failure. If we can’t put aside our feelings of insult and resentment for the duration, and make common cause against our common enemy, we are likely to meet the same fate as the formerly vibrant Christian nations of the Persian Gulf, Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor.
And this time there’s no guarantee that there will be a 21st-century equivalent of Jan III Sobieski to turn back the tide at the gates of Paris, or Oslo, or Sydney, or Ottawa, or San Francisco.