This is the third and final installment of El Inglés’ three-part essay “On the Failure of Law Enforcement”. For earlier installments, see Part 1 and Part 2.
On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
by El Inglés
Sealing the Victory — Grappling with the Human Substrate Problem
In part two of this essay, we considered how we might overcome the Dynamic of Escalation. Now we must consider where we would stand if we were to succeed in doing so. After all, as I discussed in detail in the first installment of this essay, in solving the Dynamic of Escalation we will only have exchanged one problem for another, somewhat lesser one. We will now have a massively over-incarcerated and substantially disproportionately criminal Muslim population, which exists in an extremely polarized and tribally antagonistic relationship with its host society whilst inflicting huge costs of various sorts upon it. Moreover, this population will continue to grow as a fraction of the whole, even if only by virtue of higher fertility.
It is essential to understand here that, unless we rid ourselves of some fundamental taboos, this outcome, exceptionally difficult to arrive at and deeply unsatisfactory in every way, is still the best that can be hoped for, in perpetuity. A question needs to be put here: are the peoples of Western countries prepared to accept that their countries will be forever blighted by the criminality, dysfunctionality, and ideological hostility of Muslim populations imported into those countries against the will of the host population? If the answer to this question is no, then we need to ask what the non-acceptance of this state of affairs implies.
Here we must revisit the Human Substrate Problem. I claimed that the Human Substrate Problem leaves us with no good options for dealing with a problematic human substrate, only bad and worse. However, this is only true under prevailing political paradigms, which prohibit the large-scale deportation and/or internment of the worst elements of problematic populations. Given that there are few restraints on what human beings will feel entitled to do to protect themselves when faced with existential threats, we need not concern ourselves with these paradigms here. Instead, we will assume that they have been discarded when we seek to implement solutions to the Human Substrate Problem.
So, we consider these matters from the perspective of peoples who are faced with crime of a type and magnitude that fundamentally threatens their societies and ways of life. After stating this up front, what follows? In essence, the only way of overcoming the Human Substrate Problem is to physically exclude the worst elements of a problematic substrate so that their unpleasantness cannot spill over onto unfortunate members of the host society.
There are two ways of doing this: internal exclusion and external exclusion, more conveniently referred to as internment and deportation. They need not be implemented independently of each other, but any solution to the Human Substrate Problem will consist of a combination of them. I have discussed internment, deportation and related topics at length in other essays (most obviously Surrender, Genocide, or What and follow-ups) with a different emphasis, and do not propose to revisit these discussions in any detail here. Instead, I will concentrate on the use of internment and deportation in attempts to grapple with the Human Substrate Problem and its implications for crime. The significance of these measures for the de-Islamization of European countries is something that I will then touch on briefly at the end, to explain why they may well be of greater utility in this regard than I have suggested in the past.
The key distinction to be made between internment and deportation is that the former can be carried out without the consent or cooperation of external parties, whereas the latter can not. Deportation requires the immigration authorities of the destination country to accept the deportee, and this restriction on how widely it can be applied is likely to be an important factor in developments in European countries vis-à-vis the most criminal parts of their foreign populations. For this reason, we will discuss it first, and then move onto internment, about which there is more to say.
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Deportation is the most effective and final way of dealing with the Human Substrate Problem. A system could quite easily be devised under which Muslims (by which I mean people of Muslim background, irrespective of how devoutly they practice their religion) acquired some number of points each time they were convicted of a crime, with the accumulation of some number of points being considered grounds for deportation. Needless to say, any country attempting to implement such a program would have to have complete control over its own borders and extremely strict border checks. Biometric identity checks and pre-flight screening would have to suffice to make sure that people were never allowed back in once deported. This would all be simple enough. However, there are two absolute barriers to this process and one conceptual difficulty of note.
The first of the two barriers is citizenship. If a given criminal of foreign origin has dual citizenship, say between the UK and Pakistan, then it would be a simple matter to revoke his British citizenship. However, if he had only British citizenship, then it is difficult to see how he could be deported back to his ancestral country. Some countries, such as, I believe, Morocco, do not allow their citizens to renounce their citizenship, and will continue to treat such people and their children as full citizens irrespective of any other considerations. This has the potential to be a great boon for a country such as the Netherlands, badly afflicted as it is by a shockingly criminal and parasitic Moroccan population.
Here, however, we run into the second barrier. As I have discussed in previous essays, it is entirely possible that certain Muslim countries could refuse entry to flights attempting to deport people in this manner, or refuse to allow them to enter the country in some other fashion (severing diplomatic relations and all transport links, for example). I do not wish to revisit this in detail here. Suffice it to say that it is a potentially serious problem that may, in some cases, make large-scale deportations virtually impossible.
The conceptual difficulty referred to above is as follows. If we decided that we wanted to exclude blacks in the UK once they had acquired the requisite number of points, we would be faced with the difficulty of deciding who exactly was black. This would be a difficult task now that a significant degree of interbreeding with other populations has taken place, and one that would involve a great deal of unpleasantness and arbitrariness. Would the same be true if we targeted Muslims instead of blacks?
It seems to me that the very strong tendency of all Muslim groups to marry and have children within their own communities would make the determination of foreign origin relatively straightforward for the Muslim population, by which I mean that the extremely fuzzy boundary between those of foreign and native origin when we look at blacks and whites is replaced by a relatively clear boundary when we concern ourselves with Muslim and non-Muslim. Furthermore, a history of Islamic religious observance could be taken as proof of ‘Muslimness’ and grounds for exclusion even if a given criminal was only partially of foreign origin. On these grounds, I conclude that this problem is surmountable, though the problems it throws up would have to be considered very carefully.
Under a system of internment, the points system for determining who was to be excluded would be identical to that for deportation, as the problem and the end goal would be the same in both cases. Once exclusion had been decided upon, the criminal would be interned until it was determined whether or not he could be deported. If deportation proved not to be an option, internment would then become permanent until the criminal left the country in whatever fashion.
Internment has great disadvantages relative to deportation. It creates the constant possibility of riots, breakouts, hunger strikes, and the like. Moreover, it would result in constant political opposition from Muslim fellow-travellers and ‘human rights’ activists at home and abroad, which is to say that these people would try to reverse it. Lastly, it would be extremely expensive and require the construction of some number of large internment facilities somewhere off in the countryside of the country in question, and undoubtedly the stationing of army units nearby to quell possible disturbances.
These caveats notwithstanding, internment may well become necessary, so it needs to be discussed. Let me state up front that I take it as given that the ultimate objective of internment would be to convince the interned to leave the country, relinquishing, in the case of the UK, their British citizenship and handing over their British passports. To this end, it would have to be impressed upon them that they had absolutely no future in the UK and no prospect of returning to British society under any circumstances whatsoever.
One can think of this as an internal exile that we would be trying to convert into an external exile. Needless to say, it would make most sense for the interned to leave for their country of ancestral origin, Pakistanis to Pakistan, Somalis to Somalia, and so on. From the perspective of European peoples, however, the crucial thing is that they leave the UK after biometric data had been taken to facilitate their future identification and continued exclusion.
The camps themselves would have to be sufficient to hold, in total, at least several thousand people at any given time. I predict a fairly rapid throughput once it can properly be impressed upon inhabitants that their exclusion from British society is indeed permanent. They should be as unlike prisons as possible to impress upon all concerned that they are not prisons, and that their inhabitants have passed beyond the criminal justice system as it is conventionally understood. Within and without the camps, it will need to be understood that the camps are settlements for Muslims who have made it clear that they cannot be allowed to be a part of British society. They will have prison cells to be temporarily inhabited by those who break their rules, but the underlying notion is that inmates should have as much freedom of motion and action as is possible within the camps, as would be the case in any other settlement.
That said, segregation of men and women into separate camps would be absolutely essential. Exclusion must be a reproductive dead end unless and until the excluded leave for their countries of origin. There is no particular reason to allow rough equivalents of the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon and other countries to spring up on European soil. Note that this is no different to the reproductive dead end that is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Since the vast majority of the excluded would be male, this sexual segregation would not be too much of an issue anyway.
Given that the camps would aim to allow inhabitants as normal a life as possible under the circumstances, there would be opportunities for inhabitants to engage in productive labour, and enjoy the fruits of that labour. However, these would not extend to visits from anyone outside the camps. Exclusion means exclusion. Of course, considering the character of the people going into these camps, there would undoubtedly be a certain amount of unpleasantness directed from inmate to inmate, and from inmate to guard. Such behaviour would not be tolerated and would result in punishment up to and including indefinite periods of solitary confinement. It would also be advisable to have separate areas for those of different racial, religious, and/or national backgrounds to minimize tensions within the camps.
I touched earlier on the subject of how large the camps would have to be, and what the expected rate of throughput might be, i.e. the rate at which the interned left Britain for good. Examining this issue in any detail would require legal and other expertise that I do not possess, so I will restrict myself here to a brief observation concerning the rate of flow of the interned out of the country. If the decision had been made to intern, in the UK, a given Pakistani pending deportation, it is of no interest to the British people where that person ends up. If it can somehow be arranged for him to get transit to a third country (Turkey, say), then he can be provided with whatever travel documents are necessary to allow him to get that far, where he would no longer be our problem. This could allow the partial circumvention of restrictions imposed on the deportation of, say, Pakistanis by the Pakistani government. Turning back flights from the UK for political reasons would be one thing, but attempting to turn back a Turkish airline carrying an excluded Pakistani would simply bring the Pakistani government into conflict with the Turkish government, the Pakistani in question, and his friends, family and supporters in Pakistan. Either way, it has nothing to do with us once the person in question has left. Why the Turkish government should allow transit through their country in this matter is a difficult question to which I have no answer. Indirect deportation may well prove to be an important part of the exclusion process nonetheless.
The Left of the Incarceration Point
We have now laid down the bare bones of a solution to the Human Substrate Problem posed to us by criminal, hostile, and parasitic Muslim populations. It should be clear to readers that the overlap between this problem and the basic problem of Islamization is very significant, as is the overlap in the solutions. I have tried to keep this overlap in the background throughout the three parts of this essay for the sake of conceptual clarity. Here, however, I would like to step outside this constraint and highlight, in closing, how the exclusion system outlined above could be used not only with the objective of crime reduction, but with the specific intent of de-Islamizing our countries. It should go without saying that the following discussion assumes that Muslim immigration has already been permanently halted.
An application of the exclusion system to fight crime can be considered a reactive application, whereas the avid de-Islamizer would be looking to adopt what we might call a proactive application instead. This consists of doing everything we have already discussed, but also using the exclusion system to hack away at the Muslim population on the left-hand side of the incarceration point. This hacking will not be arbitrary; rather, it will consist of putting into the exclusion system a portion of the problematic substrate to the left of the incarceration point, who we might consider to be those who have come into contact with the law enough to impress their criminal nature upon us, but have not yet been convicted of anything.
Muslim men who abuse their wives and children, Muslims who intimidate Europeans in public, Muslims who justify Muslim terrorism, Muslims who advocate the adoption of sharia law in European countries: it is not difficult to think of people who would fit the bill. Such people could go straight into the exclusion system without ever being exposed to the criminal justice system. Given that the people in question would not have been convicted of criminal offences, there would have to be a separate process for deciding who was to be excluded, but it should not be particularly difficult to devise one. Peremptory hearings, with magistrates pronouncing their verdicts whilst applying hammers to gavels, sounds about right to the current author. Others will have their own thoughts.
We would then have an exclusion system which is heartily funnelling the most seditious, criminal, and dangerous Muslims out of British society, whether to internment camps or beyond. As impressive an achievement as this would be, one is forced to return to the looming difficulty, to wit, that many countries will not cooperate with the deportation of large numbers of their nationals from European countries. In my essay To Push or to Squeeze, I presented an extremely pessimistic analysis which suggested that, rather than the push of deportation, the squeeze of a gradually tightening brutality and oppression of Muslims within European countries would be likely to be relied upon, sooner or later, to de-Islamize European countries. I still consider this analysis to be largely correct, but certain aspects of it can be reconsidered in light of the exclusion system we have now devised.
If European countries were to play host to the type of genocidal tribal violence I have predicted in other essays, it seems probable that internal pressure on Muslim governments around the world would force them to readmit their nationals overseas even if they were not particularly keen to do so. However, it seems that a better solution for all concerned would be for these same Muslim governments to make the same decision without such a descent into savagery in Europe. The beauty of the exclusion system presented above is that it could, in principle, do much to facilitate this.
Imagine a Lebanese-origin youth recently convicted of rape in Germany, for which he has been sentenced to five years in prison and subsequent exclusion. Five years pass, at the end of which he is cast into the exclusion system, which is to say he is interned pending deportation. Though he himself is prepared to be sent back to Lebanon, the Lebanese government refuses to allow his repatriation. He is not a citizen of their country; he is a convicted criminal; his treatment is a breach of his human rights: it is not difficult to imagine the reasons the German government would be presented with.
However, after another year passes, it starts to dawn on the German-resident family of this unhappy rapist that the German government is serious. The fruit of their loins is never getting back into German society. Furthermore, they are never going to see him again and he is never going to have any semblance of a real life unless he can get out of the internment camp and back to Lebanon. How could we then expect them to act?
If the only barrier to his deportation and, therefore, to his eventual reunion with his family and return to a real life, is the uncooperative attitude of the Lebanese government, it is surely to be expected that his family will exert pressure on that government to allow him into Lebanon. It is also at least reasonably likely that they will decide to live in Lebanon themselves, both to better exert that pressure and to be together as a family once it has paid dividends. Even if the young criminal is not himself a Lebanese citizen, his parents almost certainly will be, and their demands, in-country, for their son to be able to join them will not be easily ignored, even by a relatively despotic and callous government.
In this manner does the exclusion system allow the greatest single potential barrier to a relatively non-violent de-Islamization of Europe to be undermined. A situation will be created in which Muslim parents living in European countries will be:
|a)||willing to have their children deported,|
|b)||keen to apply pressure to their home governments to allow that deportation, and|
|c)||likely to go home themselves, for reasons already explained.|
To say that this makes the exclusion system a useful tool for de-Islamizers would be something of an understatement. Indeed, it is probably the single best option for any government wishing to de-Islamize its country in the least bloody and unpleasant manner for all concerned.
In essence, the exclusion system can be considered an extremely fiendish squeeze of the Muslim population of any given European country, in the sense that I used the term in To Push or to Squeeze. It has the potential to overcome all sorts of opposition to the deportation of problematic Muslims that only raw brutality would otherwise be able to deal with.
Contrary to certain charges levelled at me in the past, I am not keen to see my country and its neighbours descend into widespread tribal violence. It is for this reason that I am so delighted with the broader potential of the exclusion system, which, I reiterate, holds out the possibility of being a tool of great utility in the hands of those who are keen to ensure that the worst elements of the Muslim populations of their countries go back where they come from.