Some Comments on the Future Scenarios for Britain
In a series of posts lasts week ( Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3), El Inglés presented three different scenarios for the near future as Islamization proceeds in Britain. Below is his explanation of his source data, and how he came to his different conclusions.
Some Comments on the Future Scenarios
by El Inglés
As regular readers of Gates of Vienna will already be aware, the Baron has recently posted three scenarios I wrote, in which I envisaged various ways in which the already troubled relationship between the UK and its Muslim population might develop. Certain commenters mentioned that they found the scenarios to be entertaining reads. I am glad that they were not dull in this regard, but must confess that they were not written as entertainment per se. Here, I propose to try and explain exactly why I did write them.
A couple of months ago, I found myself becoming increasingly frustrated with the inexactness of my grasp of what Islam in the UK was, and what it was likely to be in the future. I refer here not to the interminable debates about whether Islam itself is the problem, or what fraction of Muslims are ‘moderate’ and what fraction ‘extremists,’ but to brute demographic, geographic, economic and social realities. How many Muslims (which I take to refer to all people who can be considered at least nominally Muslim) are there in the UK? How many will there be in ten years’ time, or in twenty? How much of a burden are they economically speaking? How over or under-represented are they in our prisons? Where do they live?
At the same time, though I am as concerned about the pernicious effects of Islam in the UK (and, indeed, in other countries as well) as anyone else, I had begun to feel a certain exasperation with throwaway comments to the effect that Muslims were outbreeding us and will have taken over by the end of the century, by which time we will all be paying the jizya. There were a number of reasons for this.
Firstly, the long-term trajectories of key variables in complex systems such as nations simply cannot be predicted with any degree of reliability.
Secondly, this type of comment, which one can see with great frequency on any website examining these issues, and more generally, the type of attitude it conveys, is something that will prevent at least some people of good will from taking us seriously. Even to someone as opposed to Islam as myself, it seems dangerously close to worrying about being abducted by aliens and carried off to another galaxy.
Thirdly, I think that the paths European countries are walking with respect to Islam and Islamization have now diverged to the point that it is simply not meaningful to make general claims as to where ‘we’ are headed. Any ‘we’ that includes Italy, Denmark, France and Belgium is a ‘we’ that cannot be meaningfully analyzed, as it is not in any sense a single unit, subject to being guided in a single direction by a single decision-making process. On the contrary, I think we will very soon see serious diplomatic ruptures between EU states as they try to grapple with the existential threat of Islam in wildly different fashions.
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It occurred to me eventually that I could address all these issues by simply continuing in the vein I had earlier started to explore in ‘The Danish Civil War’ and ‘Surrender, Genocide or What?’. Investigating the above demographic and socio-economic issues in the context of the UK would allow me to construct a fact sheet for Islamization in the UK, on the basis of which I would then be able to generate reasonably plausible best and worst case scenarios for the growth trajectories of the UK Muslim population. By sketching out a scenario in which worst-case demographics combine with worst-case social trends, and another in which best-case demographics combine with best-case social trends, the outer limits of the likely development of the relations between Islam and its host society in Britain would hopefully come into view over the time frame in question. In addition to these two scenarios, I could throw in a curve ball in the form of an ‘off-the-wall’ scenario, which would introduce conceivable yet highly improbable factors in a dramatic fashion.
In this manner, I hoped to introduce a level of realism to my thinking about the likely future of the UK vis-à-vis Islam. How realistic the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios (scenarios one and two) are in their own rights is something that people will doubtless disagree on. But anyone who believes (and such people are legion) that things will somehow ‘work out’ between Islam and the kuffar in my increasingly hopeless and degenerate country should at the very least be required to explain how things will so ‘work out.’ For they will not work out arbitrarily. On the contrary, there will have to be specific developments that make this possible, and I have outlined some of the contenders in the optimistic first essay. If they seem laughably improbable (and most of them do, as Dymphna kindly pointed out), then what conclusions must we draw? If, on the other hand, much of what is observed to take place in the pessimistic scenario seems plausible if the key conditions (i.e. largely unrestricted Muslim immigration on existing lines) are satisfied, then we can hopefully develop a keener idea of what awaits us. I am convinced that the greater the detail with which we imagine the future, the better prepared we will be for it.
I am also hopeful that scenarios of the type I recently devised can give us surprising new perspectives on what we think we know about how the future is likely to unfold. I was surprised to note that, in the pessimistic scenario, the demographic situation in the UK in 2022 looks quite similar to the situation in the Netherlands at present. This is actually a far more optimistic outlook than I expected. Others can, and probably will, take issue with the population projection involved. But even if it errs on the low side, and the relative Muslim population in 2022 should in fact be a couple of percentage points higher, that puts us in, at worst, a French-type situation. Given that things will almost certainly have exploded (forgive the expression) between Muslims and their host society in at least one European country by then, the prospect of a long, slow, demographic takeover of the UK by Islam seems to be virtually nil. The tension surrounding the subject of Islam grows every day. Despite the spinelessness and cluelessness of our politicians, I do not believe things can continue as they are past 2022.
In a similar vein, the optimistic scenario, unlikely though it is, holds out the possibility of the Muslim population of the UK virtually plateauing in the coming years if Muslim immigration is drastically reduced. Though it is too early too tell what type of immigration reform might be forthcoming under the proposed points system currently being discussed, and though the chances of being disappointed in this regard are high, it is not out of the realm of possibility that the future might be brighter than many have feared in this respect. Note that this is specific to the UK, which is predicted to see a notable population rise over the next few decades, much of it due to immigration. Whether this is good or bad in its own right can be debated, but it will certainly serve to dilute the Muslim population of the UK more than in a country like Germany, whose population is predicted to move in the opposite direction over the same time period. I firmly believe we are now at the point where specific details of this nature should be explicitly discussed.
On a slightly different note, as I was writing the pessimistic scenario, it occurred to me that the situation I was describing was vastly worse than the situation in the Netherlands at the moment (insofar as I understand it), despite the projected Muslim population of 5.8% for the UK in 2022 being lower than the current Dutch Muslim population of 6%. My pessimism in this scenario was semi-arbitrary, by which I mean that certain events, such as the Haringey Turkey Shoot, were included because I considered them representative of the type of thing that could happen rather than because I believed they were likely to. Does this mean I have over-egged the pudding slightly? Perhaps. But there is an interesting point to be made in this regard. Some readers may recall that I included the same Dutch military coup in each and every scenario. This was partly to try and conserve my rapidly depleting stores of imagination, but also to try and emphasise the potential importance of neighbour effects.
Let us imagine three different demographic situations for three different European countries with respect to Islam (it does not really matter how historically accurate the figures are):
|1.||Muslim populations of 6% for France, 3% for the Netherlands, 1% for Norway|
|2.||Muslim populations of 10% for France, 6% for the Netherlands, 3% for Norway|
|3.||Muslim populations of 16% for France, 10% for the Netherlands, 6% for Norway|
Every country has a Muslim population of 6% in one scenario. Concentrating on this underlying demographic reality and ignoring any and all other differences between the countries in question and their Muslim populations, let us ask the following: are France in the first scenario, the Netherlands in the second scenario, and Norway in the third scenario in essentially the same situation with respect to Islam? I think the answer is clearly no. France, in scenario one, has the option of trying to convince itself that things will ‘work out’ somehow (to use the expression) between itself and Islam, as there are no clear examples of Islam-induced collapse before it. This option is, in our grossly oversimplified set of scenarios, not as available to the Dutch, who will have their eyes fixed firmly on the French example, and even less available to the Norwegians, who will probably have collapsing countries not more than a few hundred miles away to teach them some hard lessons. It is for this reason that I think the seemingly unrealistic escalation in the pessimistic scenario might not actually be so divorced from reality, particularly if there is a crisis in some other European country. This is one of the reasons I very much hope others will consider speculative futures for their own countries. It may be that something unexpected emerges when we consider our respective futures in more concrete terms, and how they might look in light of each other.
For those who are interested, the fact sheet that I put together to base the scenarios on is included below. I only wish I knew more about the structure and doctrine of the British police and army, and about their likely ability to contain various sorts of civil unrest and violence. This would be hugely important information in fleshing out my grasp of how the British state will be able to respond to the problems Islam in the UK will undoubtedly continue to pose us.
The optimistic and pessimistic scenarios were based on the following assumptions, which will become clearer upon reading the fact sheet:
Muslim population of 2 million in 2008
1.25% per annum endogenous growth
Muslim immigration falls to 15,000 per year
Population is 65 million in 2022. Muslim population continues to climb, but only reaches 2,600,000, or 4.0% of whole and is therefore nearly stationary as fraction of whole.
Muslim population of 2.4 million in 2008
2% per annum endogenous growth
Muslim immigration stays the same, at 60,000 per year
Population is 65 million in 2022. Muslim population continues to climb, reaches an estimated 3,750,000, or 5.8% of whole.
Islamization Fact Sheet — UK
2001 census: 58,789,194
Mid-2006 estimate: 60,587,300
Estimate for right now: 61,000,000
Predicted to be 69 million in 2050 by the UN, 75 million in 2050 by the UK’s National Statistics Office
UK Muslim Population: 1,580,515 (according to 2001 census)
Now 2 million Muslims in the UK according to Home Secretary (2008)
Illegal Muslim Immigrants
Most up-to-date estimate of illegal immigrants is currently 500,000 to 750,000.
Illegal immigrants are overwhelmingly failed asylum seekers and visa overstayers.
Assume that illegal immigrants not included in census (seems reasonable).
Most rejected asylum-seekers are from Muslim countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, etc.
Legal Muslim Immigrants
In 2006, the UK received 115,000 immigrants from the New Commonwealth, 80% (approximately 95,000) of whom came from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The fractions of these populations in the UK that were Muslim in 2001 were as follows:
Sri Lankan: 7%
Now the breakdown for Asian and Asian British population in the UK in 2001 was as follows:
Indian: 1,053,411 (45.2%)
Pakistani: 747,285 (32.1%)
Bangladeshi: 283,063 (12.1%)
Other: 247,664 (10.6%)
Assuming that Other is essentially the same as the Sri Lankan population (which would overestimate the Sri Lankan population), we now split 95,000 up in these ratios:
India — 40375
Pakistan — 30495
Bangladesh — 11495
Sri Lanka — 6650
Now multiply by the Muslim fractions of each of these populations based on 2001 figures:
India — 5128
Pakistan — 28055
Bangladesh — 10633
Sri Lanka — 466
This means that 44,282 Muslims came to the UK in 2006 from the Indian sub-continent. Now immigrants of all generations from this part of the world accounted for 73.7% of the UK Muslim population in 2001. Taking this ratio as being representative of the national backgrounds of all Muslim immigrants in 2006, we can estimate that 60,084 Muslims (net, not gross) came to the UK in this year. If we assume that this number held true for every one of the seven years since the last census, we derive a total of 420,584 new Muslim immigrants net.
Current rates of population growth are 1.8% and 2.1% for Pakistan and Bangladesh. Assuming a very conservative rate of endogenous population growth for the Muslim community in the UK of 1% per annum, the 1.6 million figure for 2001 would have become 1,715,000 through reproduction alone. A slightly more realistic estimate of 1.5% per annum, the 1.6 million figure would have become 1,775,000. Assuming that fertility rates in Muslim communities are not significantly different in the UK to the countries of origin of said communities (i.e. an endogenous growth rate of 2%), the Muslim community would now be 1,838,000 ignoring immigration subsequent to 2001.
Taking the middle figure of 1,775,000 for the expanded 2001 population, the estimate of 420,000 for new immigrants and the guess of 200,000 for illegal immigrants, we generate an estimate of 2,395,000 Muslims in the UK today, ignoring growth in the gradually entering Muslim immigrant population. Taking the population of the UK to be 61 million, this gives a figure of 3.9% for the Muslim population of the UK.
Around two fifths of Muslims (38 per cent) live in London. After London, the regions with the next biggest share of the Muslim population are the West Midlands (14 per cent), the North West (13 per cent), and Yorkshire and the Humber (12 per cent). Even within these regions, Muslims were highly concentrated spatially.
GDP per capita on a nominal basis was $45,845 in the UK in 2007 according to the IMF estimate (the World Bank estimate is lower, but the CIA estimate is very close). Taking an exchange rate of two dollars to the pound for the year, let us call this 23,000 pounds after rounding up slightly. In 2008, the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith claimed that the economic contribution of the Muslim community in the UK (which she estimated to be 2 million) was £31 billions. Taking 2 million as being correct (and I note that is different to my own estimate above, but use it so as to use both figures provided by her), we can see that GDP per capita for Muslims was £15,500, barely more than two thirds of the national average.
This significant gap can be attributed in part to the age profile of the Muslim community, which, though not that different from other religious groups in terms of the fraction of the population of working age, has a larger fraction of its population of working age in the 16-34 age bracket than in the 35-64 age bracket. However, it is clear educational, vocational and professional achievement is, statistically speaking, much less frequent for Muslims even if this factor is controlled for.
In April 2008, a report published by the Select Committee on Economic Affairs in the House of Lords concluded that there was no evidence to suggest that GDP per capita had been significantly affected one way or the other by immigration overall. Given the very considerable number of other immigrants the UK and the poor economic performance of Muslims in general, it must be concluded that, in their own right, they simply depress GDP per capita by some as yet unknown amount.
This does not include the disproportionate burden they place on the criminal justice system. At present, 11% of the prison population is Muslim (this is discussed further below). The combined annual budget of the Police, the Prison Service, the Crown Prosecution Service is approximately £13 billion. If we (very crudely) take 11% of this figure as representing the cost incurred to the country through Muslim criminality (excluding terrorism), we derive a figure of £1.43 billion, as opposed to the £468 million cost that would be incurred if they made up the same fraction of the prison population as the above estimate of the fractional Muslim population for the whole country (3.6%). It is also worth pointing out that MI5, the domestic intelligence agency, spent 87% of its £200 million budget (£174 million) on counter-terrorism in 2006, the overwhelming majority of which would have been dedicated to the fight against Muslim terrorism. The direct and indirect economic costs of Muslim terrorism itself are not easy to ascertain at present, but presumably run into the hundreds of millions of pounds in the last few years alone.
Using 2006 data from the Offender Management Caseload Statistics, Jack Straw revealed in the same year that there were 8,243 self declared Muslim inmates. The number represents 11% of all prisoners. If the common figure of 3% given for the Muslim fraction of the UK population is correct, we can see that Muslims are therefore four times more likely (3.996) to be in prison than non-Muslims (on basis of 3% population figure). If the 3.9% estimate I generated above is accurate, then the disproportion falls to a factor of approximately 3.05, which is still fairly considerable.
It has been suggested that the higher number of Muslims in prison may partly reflect the age profile of Muslims in the UK. However, the key demographic in this regard is the 18-34 demographic, and it is not clear that is much larger for Muslims than for other ethnic minorities. In 2001, the 16-34 demographic represented approximately 38% of the Muslim population, 33% of the Hindu population, and 34% of the Sikh population. Though it does not overlap exactly with the prevalent prison demographic of 18-34, it is close enough to make it clear that the problem does not seem to be primarily one of age profiles (assuming the 2001 figures are still reasonably reliable).
The disproportionate financial burden placed on the Police, the Prison Service, and the Crown Prosecution Service by the UK’s Muslim population has already been alluded to, as has the as yet unknown economic cost of terrorism. This leaves unaddressed the economic costs of Muslim crime incurred directly by its victims, be they individuals, corporations, or other types of organization. It would be educational to have a figure here so the disproportion and the excess cost could be calculated in the same manner as above. Lastly it should be mentioned that the disproportionate number of Muslims in prison is accounted for to at least some extent by some unknown number of conversions to Islam inside prison itself. It is not thought that this phenomenon explains more than a small fraction of the difference in incarceration rates.
In 2006, police strength in England and Wales stood at 141,381 police officers, 13,179 special Constables (full police powers, no pay, under authority of regular police when present) and 6,769 PCSOs (very limited powers, largely restricted to patrol, observation and support roles).