

Ethno-Religious Diversity and the Limits of Democracy

by El Inglés

Part One: An Outline of the Model

Introduction

In this document, we present a conceptual model for understanding and predicting the effects that ethnic and religious diversity must have on the ability of democratic government to deliver what are widely considered to be its natural fruits: political stability, civil order, and harmonious relationships between different groups in a society. We do not mean to imply by this that democracy is, or is thought of as being, a panacea for all ills in a polity, nor that no such desirable states of affairs can exist at any time in non-democratic polities. We simply make the unremarkable observation that systems that allow the formation of governments strongly reflective of the political desires of the people of a country are often thought, with some justification, to be more likely to produce these fruits than systems that produce governments unreflective of these desires.

This claim notwithstanding, we will argue that democracy, being a mechanism for achieving a certain end under certain circumstances, suffers from the same fundamental problems as any other mechanism devised by man, to wit, that it is finite in its potency and that, exposed to stresses that it was not designed to deal with, it will fail. This failure can be sudden or protracted, but it will certainly occur eventually when the stresses exceed its ability to withstand them, just as a column will buckle or a beam will snap when the loads they are required to bear become too great.

This document consists of two main parts. In the first, we will develop our model and lay out the core ideas that underlie it. In the second, we will attempt to apply the model to our own country, Britain. We will then offer a few concluding thoughts.

Outline of the Model

We commence by pointing out that human beings' political desires can be very complex, as complex as the political world itself. Even a brief, off-the-cuff list of those matters that exercise human beings politically could quickly become rather long: the minimum wage, environmental policy, immigration, the size of the military, state control of utilities, and gun control all spring quickly to mind, not to mention abortion, state regulation of the economy, diplomatic relations, tax rates, housing, education, and healthcare. The entries in this initial list could themselves be furthered refined, parsed, quibbled over, and the relationships between them discussed *ad infinitum*. Diplomacy and the military are hardly unrelated, nor are tax rates and the size of the healthcare system. To all intents and purposes, the variety of political beliefs a person can hold is infinitely large.

Nonetheless, as all those who would attempt to model and understand complex phenomena understand, whatever field they work in, a great deal of the complexity of the real world must be stripped away and discarded if one wishes to model phenomena of interest within it. One must pull away and remove that which is non-essential, that which is not determinative with respect to the key characteristics and behaviours of the system, and retain that which is. In this document, we attempt to do just this in the context of democratic political systems, particularly those undergoing or likely to undergo political polarization as a consequence of ever-greater ethnic diversity.

Let us begin by stipulating that we aim to construct an imaginary 100-dimensional space in which every single member of the electorate in a given democratic polity is represented by a single point. Dimension 1 represents their attitudes towards foxhunting, Dimension 2 their beliefs with respect to the NHS, dimension 3 their position on the importance of the Royal Navy, and so forth. We have now distilled all the political complexities of the UK down to 100 variables varying continuously between 0 and 10, so all positions are now simple linear values of certain variables. If one believes that funding the Royal Navy is categorically more important than anything else in UK political life, then one's Navy variable is 10. If one believes the Royal Navy should be disbanded with all haste, then one's Navy variable is 0. One's opinion on the new aircraft carriers commissioned by the Navy does not have an independent existence in this model, it is simply wrapped up somehow in one's Navy variable, which is to say it is part of the complexity we have discarded.

We said above that all members of the electorate are now points in 100-dimensional space. Talk of more than three dimensions may well come across as being opaque or even meaningless. However, in this and similar contexts, the term 100-dimensional space has a straightforward meaning. Consider a 2-dimensional space with two points on it:




Diagram 1

We understand intuitively that this is a two-dimensional space, but do not perhaps appreciate that this means a point within this space needs two, and only two pieces of information to describe it: an x-coordinate and a y-coordinate. Once we know these two pieces of information, we know exactly where the point is, and, because it has no attributes other than its position, we know everything about it.

In a three-dimensional space, a point is defined by three pieces of information: an x-coordinate, a y-coordinate, and a z-coordinate. Again, we recognize this intuitively when we see a 3D chart on the page or the screen. What about a four-dimensional point? Does the same apply to it? Many would complain that they cannot visualize a point in four-dimensional space, but it is important to understand that our ability to visualize it has no bearing on the coherence of the underlying concept.

Medical researchers might need to characterize people as, for example, four-dimensional entities, which is to say as entities described by four variables. Imagine a team of researchers investigating resting pulse rates in men over the age of 60, who are described by four variables: age (60 and upwards), height, weight, and resting pulse rate. As far as the model constructed by the researchers is concerned, these are the only four ways in which these men can vary. Everything else is either fixed (their sex), or irrelevant (their taste in music). This is a decision made by the researchers who build the model, as to what was important to know and what was not. Drawing a graph and positioning these men on it as four-dimensional points would not be possible, as we cannot depict a four-dimensional space. But there is nothing complex about the notion that there are four ways in which they can vary from one another, all of which information could be written down in a simple table.

Going back to our 100-dimensional space, we can now see that it is simply that conceptual space in which 100-dimensional entities are to be found, entities defined by us on the basis of our 100 variables. If we had the eyes to see this space and the points contained therein as clearly as we

can see two-dimensional space, we would undoubtedly see patterns similar to those we tend to see in scatter plots for other phenomena. Some areas of the space would have concentrations of points, some none or virtually none, and others would have moderate densities of points. We would likely see that those who placed great value on the monarchy also tended to believe in funding the military generously, and that those who were opposed to foxhunting believed in funding it rather less generously. Irrespective of the accuracy of these two specific claims, it is surely clear that certain political beliefs tend to correlate with each other, in that people holding one belief are likely to hold certain other specific beliefs as well.

Scholars seeking to model more rigorously the phenomena we discuss in this essay could create sophisticated computer models to keep track of many different variables for each elector in the model. Here we must discard nearly all of this complexity for two reasons: firstly, we cannot, given our limitations, and the limitations of this project, deal with 100 different variables, or even ten different variables, and secondly, we could not represent these models visually even if we could create them. As such, we are forced to discard 98 of the 100 dimensions that describe an individual politically in our system, and leave the remaining two undefined. They represent political diversity, but only the political diversity we ascribe to them in the context of particular diagrams and discussions. They do not represent left-wing vs. right-wing, authoritarian vs. libertarian or any other axis of political variation we might imagine, unless we define them as representing these positions in any given context.

Having reduced our system to a two-dimensional one, we can represent it visually with confidence, in a way we could not even in three dimensions. A brief look at a representative selection of three-dimensional scatter plots will make it clear that they are deeply imperfect representations of the phenomena they purport to depict. The best of them are at least somewhat confusing, the worst of them not remotely meaningful, apparently as a function of the density of points, the degree of overlap of separate points, and the specific graphic style used. For this reason, we use simple two-dimensional political spaces. As they depict specific polities (even if the polities are purely hypothetical) that can be considered systems of interacting parts, we will refer to them as system diagrams. All the system diagrams depicted in this essay will be shown to the same scale, so they can be directly compared with each other. They will be squares, with two undefined axes of variation, one vertical, one horizontal.

Simple Systems Diagrams and Their Analyses

Each standard system diagram will have on it a cross, which we shall call the Policy Point (PP). This point represents the suite of policies actually being implemented by a government at any point in time. It is itself a point in 100-dimensional space, collapsed down into two-dimensional space for the purposes of simplicity and visual depictability, the same type of entity as an individual's political preferences. Each circle represents an elector or electors, in that its centre corresponds to their policy preferences. We will call the circles Individual Policy Points (IPPs), in that they mark the policies that the individuals they represent would like to see implemented.

If we draw a straight line from the PP (which is to say, the cross) to any IPP (which is to say, any circle), and take the length of the line between them, we obtain a value that represents the distance between government policies and the favoured policy of the person or people represented by the circle. We will call this the Discontentedness Index (DI) of the person in question with respect to the political status quo. An individual right on the PP will have a DI of 0, as the government implements policies they approve of in every way. Few people will ever be in this position, however. To all intents and purposes, everyone in the system is at least somewhat discontent with government policy, and some people will be very discontent.

If we add together all the DIs in the system, we obtain the total discontentedness in that system. More usefully, if we divide this by the number of individuals in the system, we obtain the Mean Discontentedness Index (MDI). This represents how unhappy, on average, individuals in the system are with the policies being implemented by their government. This is the first crucial concept in the analysis: there exists an MDI for a political system, and we can measure it and compare it to the MDIs in different systems or in different potential states of the same system. Needless to say, the lower the MDI, the more likely, all other things being equal, that there will be political stability and harmony in the system in question.

Below is our first system diagram. The length of each side of the square will be taken to eight units for all system diagrams in this document. The PP is exactly at the centre, and IPP1 and IPP2 are both two units away from it. We can easily calculate that the MDI for this system diagram is equal to 2.




Diagram 2

There is a peculiarity to this system diagram that allows us to develop a further conceptual tool. Let us imagine that a new government comes to power, one that shifts its policies one unit to the left, whatever exactly left represents here. This produces the diagram below.




Diagram 3

We see now that the person or people at IPP1 are happier with the new policies and their counterparts at IPP2 less happy with the. Yet the MDI is still $(3 + 1)/2$, which is equal to 2. So, if we think only in terms of the MDI, this system is just as likely to enjoy political stability as the system before. Indeed, we can slide the PP back and forth along a line between the two IPPs and not affect the MDI as defined, as the summed MDIs are simply equal to the length of the line, which does not vary as a function of the position of the PP.

Does this mean that the political system represented here is really likely to be equally stable after the PP has been shifted to the advantage of IPP1 and the disadvantage of IPP2? Intuitively, we must think that the answer is no, that the greatest stability is likely to be found in Diagram 2, where a situation approaching compromise has been found, rather than in Diagram 3, where one IPP has something close to what it wants and the other is seriously disgruntled. Can we add some new element to our model to reflect our intuitive unease over the apparent conclusion from this system diagram, to wit, that it makes no difference how discontentedness is distributed as long as the average discontentedness does not increase?

The way to do this is to introduce the concept of the Threshold Discontentedness (TD), which we can consider to be representative of a psychological boundary. If a person's DI is below or equal to the TD, that person considers the output of their political process to be legitimate, in that, however much they dislike it, they believe it has to be respected. Above the TD, people are so estranged from their government's policies that they consider the output of their political process to be, in key regards, illegitimate, in that it need not be respected, its adherents need not be respected, and those laws that protect it need not be adhered to. Our system diagrams will therefore be drawn with circles of radius two units, taking the PPs as their centres, which means that people represented by an IPP more than two units from the PP is discontented enough to start causing serious problems. The area within the circle we will call the Contented Zone (CZ), the area outside, the Discontented Zone (DZ). We will refer to the fraction of the population in the DZ as the Discontented Zone Fraction (DZF), and express it as a percentage.

In the CZ, political discontent will consist of and manifest itself as angry letters to newspaper editors and local MPs, a general sense of malaise and frustration, lower quality of life, poor relations between different parts of society, inefficient government beset by legal challenges and low-level political resistance, demonstrations, and general political rancour. To rephrase, it will consist of the normal unpleasantness of a world in which, even in the most prosperous and civilized countries, most people are unhappy with much of what the government does much of the time.

Discontent amongst those in the DZ will be quite different. They will include riots causing major damage to urban centres, widespread strikes and industrial action, sabotage of industrial and transportation infrastructure, violent strife between ethnic groups, and terrorist or paramilitary activity. To rephrase, it will look the way a great many unfortunate parts of the world look much of the time, being violent, dangerous, and destructive of peace, prosperity and civil order.




Diagram 4




Diagram 5

If we take Diagrams 2 and 3 and redraw them as Diagrams 4 and 5 with the CZ added as a circle centering on the PP, we gain a new insight. In Diagram 4, though both of our IPPs are right at the edge of the DZ, neither is in it, so our DZF is 0. In Diagram 5, however, IPP2 is indeed in the DZF, with everything that implies for the stability of the system, given that the DZF for the system would now be 50%, with that 50% engaged in all the behaviours typical of the DZ. In essence, we are saying that discontentedness has a non-linear relationship with behavior, and that people's behavior radically alters when psychological stresses reach a certain point.

Now that we have outlined the basic characteristics of our model, let us close this section by making a key observation. There has been no discussion of how competing political parties might contend for voter share on our system diagrams. This is deliberate. We make here a point

we will reiterate throughout this document: our analysis ignores party political considerations except insofar as they help us to make the far more important points that we wish to make as part of our own analysis. We cannot stress enough here that our analysis focuses on the underlying political tensions in a given society and on whether or not the democratic political systems in Western countries are likely to be able to deal with them. Whether or not a given political party can win power is not intrinsically of any interest.

Nearly all analysis of the political implications of Western demographic trends, certainly in the mainstream media and often beyond, seems to have a partisan focus, by which we mean simply that it focuses on the shifting fortunes of specific political parties. In the United States, for example, it would focus on the rapidly-increasing Hispanic vote, and how it could spell electoral doom for the Republican Party, at least in terms of its ability to win presidential elections. In this latter case, the analysis would try to determine exactly what the system diagram of the US looked like, in all its complexity, and then to decide where the competing parties would have to place their PPs to win a majority of Electoral College votes, as people will tend to vote for the party whose platform (its PP) is closest to their desired platform (their IPP). This is, of course, a huge simplification of an extraordinarily complex matter, but, at base, it must be what electoral analysts are trying to do. If not this, then what?

Whether any particular piece of such analysis is correct or incorrect is a matter for others to decide. Here, we must point out that ruminations of this sort do not give us any information pertaining to the underlying health of the polity in question, or the likelihood of it continuing to function as a polity. Whatever insight might be gained into the likely result of any particular US presidential election, vital questions pertaining to the political future of the US are only touched upon indirectly, if at all.

Our analysis is a mirror image of these analyses. Again, it does not touch upon the relative political fortunes of political parties at all, except insofar as doing so helps to illustrate its broader thesis. Rather, it concerns itself with the stability of the democratic systems undergirding the very existence and function of these party political systems. After all, a collapse of normal political function renders the standard political analyses meaningless anyway.

A naïve political analyst looking at Northern Ireland in 1965 could have noted the large Unionist majority in the province, noted also the slow rate of demographic change altering the population balance between Unionists and Nationalists, and predicted that Unionists would politically dominate the province for generations to come through their control of the Northern Irish Parliament at Stormont and the control of the executive it granted them. But, to put it mildly, that is not what actually happened. What happened is that, in 1969, civil order in the province started to disintegrate in a process that could be considered complete by January 1972 with the Bloody Sunday massacre in Derry. There followed an extremely vicious and sectarian low-level civil war of great complexity, featuring as it did the three sides of Irish Republicanism, Ulster Loyalism, and British Crown forces. This descent into outright conflict was soon followed by the abolition of the parliament at Stormont, and the conversion of Northern Ireland into an effectively autocratic polity, governed directly by the British government through the Northern Ireland Office, to the extent that it was governed at all. The restoration of a more-or-less democratic form of government to the province did not occur until 1998, and this government

was based on a power-sharing, which is to say, non-majoritarian, system. So much for the predictions of our naïve analyst!

If there were a legitimate concern as to the possibility of the walls of a house collapsing due to subsidence, the owner would be considered peculiar in the extreme if he were to obsess instead over how to get the coffee stains out of the rug in the living room. Yet this is what most analysis of this matter consists of, obsessing over minor details whose significance is not explained, while ignoring the crucial question of whether the roof is likely to come down on our heads. We do not make this mistake. Rather than perform a *partisan analysis* of our democratic systems, we perform a *structural analysis*. We will return to this theme again and explore it in some detail when we look at British politics in a later part of this essay.

More System Diagrams and Their Implications

Now that we have introduced the two concepts most crucial to our analysis, the MDI and the DZF, let us consider some more system diagrams. We will stipulate here that each of our systems, unless stated otherwise, consists of one million individuals, who will be represented by forty IPPs, each of which corresponds to twenty-five thousand individuals whose political positions are so close to each other as to be, for our purposes, identical. This seems like a reasonable way of representing large numbers of people without overburdening our system diagrams with outlandish numbers of points. Our introductory explanation of system diagrams out of the way, we will henceforth present them with crosses for PPs and larger green circles as IPPs, the centre of each circle being the exact position of the IPP.

Consider the following two systems:




diagram 6




diagram 7

Superficially similar in terms of shape, these two system diagrams actually represent quite different systems. Calculating precisely what the MDIs are for these systems would be time-consuming and difficult, but the important point is to give ballpark figures and make clear the direction of change when comparing multiple diagrams.

In Diagram 6, we see that five circles have their centres in the DZ, for a DZF of 12.5%. The MDI we will take as being 1.4, given our earlier stipulation that the side length of a system diagram is always eight units. In Diagram 7, we see that 13 circles are now in the DZ, for a DZF of 32.5%. The MDI we will take as being 1.9. That both the MDI and the DZF are higher for Diagram 7 is apparent at a glance, and we therefore understand that it represents a polity of much lower political stability than Diagram 6.

Let us focus on Diagram 7. The PP, intuitively seeking, seems reasonably well placed in that it is fairly central, and therefore constitutes a compromise position. Is this intuition correct? Calculating such things exactly would be time-consuming and is unnecessary for our purposes here anyway. Instead, we can use a visual-intuitive approach to discern general trends.




diagram 8

In this diagram we have shifted the PP and therefore the entire CZ upwards so as to put it roughly three quarters of the way up through the diagram. What effects does this have? We hope it is clear to readers that the MDI will increase as a consequence, which is to say the average distance from PP to IPPs has increased, as we are progressively moving further away from most IPPs and towards an ever smaller number.

What of the DZF? As we move from centre to periphery, it is clear that the number, and therefore the fraction, of our IPPs inside the circle falls, as it starts to include more and more empty space. We count 16 out of 40 circles as being in the DZ, for a DZF of 40%. This increase in both MDI and DZF makes this a radically unstable society, as we would expect of one whose PP has been positioned so as to please a subset of IPPs that is itself towards the fringes of the distribution.

The significance of this is as follows. In any system, there will be a position for the PP that minimizes the MDI for the system as a whole. As we see in the comparison between Diagrams 6 and 7, this minimum MDI may be higher or lower, but it will exist for any system diagram. Once the PP has been positioned there, there will be nothing else the government can do to bring the MDI down. The minimum MDI could only be reduced by moving the IPPs themselves around on the diagram, squashing them more closely into a single area. But this would consist, in the real world, of reengineering peoples' political beliefs, which we will assert here is not possible, least of all in non-totalitarian societies.

In any given system diagram then, the minimum value the MDI can take on is a function of the distribution of IPPs. In a polity represented by a system diagram with a more or less optimally placed PP and a high MDI, there will be a generally high level of political discontent and anger, and the government has no means of reducing it. Whether or not bringing the MDI to this minimum will also take the DZF to a minimum is a question of whether or not the IPP

distribution is symmetrical or not. In our examples so far, it has been, but consider the following system diagrams:




diagram 9




Diagram 10

Here, we see something quite different. The concentration of people on the left of the diagram, through their greater numbers, result in the PP being quite close to them if we stipulate that the MDI has been minimized. However, the spike of people on the right results in three IPPs being in the DZ, for a DZF of 7.5%. If we drag the PP to the right a little, as in Diagram 10, then we push the MDI up, but reduce the DZF to zero by bringing more people into the CZ. Now that we see this, we can ask ourselves whether a government is likely to try and reduce the MDI at the cost of the DZF increasing, or vice versa. Note that this is a conundrum that is likely to arise when political extremism is more prevalent in some segments of society than others, which will

result in the asymmetric distributions we mentioned. In the remainder of this document, we will be dealing with system diagrams that have fairly symmetrical IPP distributions and that therefore do not present many problems in this regard. It is still important to understand that this need not be the case.

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There is a parallel of sorts between the concepts we are introducing to try and understand political systems and those commonly used to try and understand economic systems. In both cases, it can be argued that for a given system, there exists a stable, equilibrium state which will tend to attract a key variable towards itself over time through the aggregate behavior of all the actors in the system. Though these actors act on the basis of their own perceived self-interest, the system exhibits a higher-level order that, in theory at least, creates a high level of net benefit across the system as a whole.

To take the most obvious example from classical economic theory, we can think of supply and demand curves varying as a function of price. Supply increases with price, demand decreases with price, and there is a point at which the two lines meet, at which supply exactly equals demand and exactly the right quantity of goods is produced. This is called the market clearance price.

At higher prices, supply is higher than demand, and some supply goes unsold. This puts buyers in a strong position, where they can choose their products with care. Some merchandise goes unsold, and producers cut production and cut prices to compete for customers. This pushes the price down, supply down, and demand up, the system shifting again towards the market clearance price.

At lower prices, everything produced sells, with surplus demand remaining. This motivates producers to produce more to tap into the unmet demand, and to increase their prices to take advantage of the competition for their products, as we now have not producers competing for customers, but customers competing for produce. This pushes the price up, supply up, and demand down, the system again shifting towards the market clearance price.

No actor in the system is trying to do anything other than maximize their own personal utility. Nonetheless, the system as a whole displays a higher-level order in which supply and demand come to perfectly match each other, at which there is no surplus production and no unmet demand. Any price higher or lower will tend, over time, to converge on this state despite the fact that no one within the system is interested in bringing about this end, or has even necessarily thought about it in these terms at all.

Similarly, in our system diagrams, if we ignore the CZ/DZ distinction (an important wrinkle), we can see the PP as a parallel to the price, the PP that minimizes the MDI as a parallel to the market clearance price, and a democratic political system as equivalent to a free market system. Here, in the political marketplace of ideas, in which each elector exerts their own pull on the PP, we can expect the PP to be pulled into a position at which the MDI is more or less minimized. Any party that proposes a PP a long way away from the optimal MDI will attract only that relatively small

number of voters closer to it than to any other party's PP. Such parties will alienate voters, fail to win elections, and remain unable to implement their policies. Their PPs therefore remain purely hypothetical.

Looking again at Diagram 8, we see that the MDI is high, and that the current PP is well away from the bulk of the electors. In a proportional representation electoral system with a universal franchise, these people would surely vote for political parties with political platforms (which is to say, proposed PPs) closer to their own IPPs. These parties would garner many votes, giving them some amount of political power, with which they would pull the PP away from its current, non-equilibrium position.

It should be noted that, just as the supply and demand model described above is only the very first step in understanding free market systems, this brief discussion of system diagrams as equilibrium-seeking systems is extremely rudimentary. In the same way that there is no guarantee that any market is either in equilibrium or converging on it at any moment in time, there is no guarantee that a democratic political system will be at or converging on its equilibrium PP. Electoral systems vary widely from one democracy to another. Some are designed relatively rationally, some have grown more organically, and some were designed quite carefully some time in the past only to find that political and demographic change have varied them less defensible today. Nonetheless, just as it is widely acknowledged that, in many contexts, much of the time, markets are at least reasonably good mechanisms for getting closer to market clearance prices, it seems that democratic political systems are likely to be reasonably good mechanisms for moving PPs around system diagrams so as to bring MDIs closer to their minima for any given system.

When people observe that, by and large, democratic political systems do a better job than their autocratic counterparts of creating political stability and harmonious relationships between groups in a society, it is this tendency of democracies to drift towards, and remain close to, the equilibrium PP that they are actually referring to. In the case of a dictatorship, we understand that the dictator is almost certainly not trying to find the equilibrium PP. He may well simply be trying to favour his own ethnic or religious group, and content to use brute force to keep everyone else in line, come hell or high water. In such a case, we would not be at all surprised to see a high MDI and high DZF, as in Diagram 8. However, even if we assume a dictator is a relatively benign figure trying to husband his country towards a prosperous, stable future, and even if the system diagram of his country is such that this is possible in principle, it seems clear that trying to make the right decision time after time without any way of knowing what people really want has the potential to be a very fraught process. There will be authoritarian successes, such as Singapore, and democratic failures, such as the US in the period immediately prior to its civil war. But democratic politics is likely to be a more reliable way of getting close to the equilibrium PP than authoritarian politics, assuming that a given authoritarian system is even trying to do so in the first place.

The Relationship Between Political Diversity and Ethnic Diversity

We claim here that increasing ethnic diversity in a polity will inevitably result in an increase in political diversity in that polity as well, and will attempt to justify this claim before considering its implications. Readers should understand that for the purposes of this section, we are taking all the cultural and religious differences that tend to exist between disparate ethnic groups and treating them all under the heading of ethnic diversity.

There are two different types of political diversity that can exist between ethnic groups in a polity: essential political diversity and non-essential political diversity. Essential political diversity is that which exists between groups due to the immutable characteristics of those groups, which is to say, for our purposes, their ethnic identities. Non-essential political diversity is that that exists between ethnic groups as a consequence of unequal distributions of characteristics shared between those groups. Let us describe the two in reverse order.

Non-Essential Political Diversity

If two different ethnic groups within a society are, on average, at different levels of professional, educational, and socioeconomic attainment, then they will tend to vote for different political parties as a consequence. Taking the example of white people and black people in the US, we see in presidential election after presidential election that there is an overwhelming tendency for black people to vote for the Democratic candidate, with 90%+ of the black vote going to the Democrats as a general rule.

If an ethnic group, such as black Americans, is disproportionately reliant on being subsidized by others, we must expect its members to tend to vote for parties that promise to continue, if not increase, those subsidies. However, we can also see that wealthier, more successful black Americans will not necessarily share this tendency, and that poor people who are not black may well share it for the same reasons. These political positions would constitute non-essential political diversity when set against those who wished to shrink the welfare state, be they white, black, or anything else. Note that we make no comment here on the source of the achievement, income, or wealth gaps between white and black Americans. Our definition of non-essential political diversity does not depend on whether black people are socioeconomically outperformed in the US due to the legacy of slavery or due to an intrinsic lack of ability on the part of black people as a whole. This is a separate matter.

Essential Political Diversity

Essential political diversity is political diversity that derives not from characteristics unevenly shared between two or more populations, but from the very identities of the members of those populations. A Mexican-American living in Arizona who argues for a full amnesty for illegal immigrants and lax border enforcement, and a white Arizonan campaigning for proper border enforcement, repatriation of illegal immigrants, and an end to birthright citizenship are not best characterized as two people who happen to have made different choices from the menu of available political beliefs. They are better characterized as people whose political positions derive from who they are and are therefore not liable to being changed in the way that, for

example, one might change one's opinion on whether the possession of small amounts of illegal drugs should result in a prison sentence. This is essential political diversity, and it will relate most obviously to important, perhaps even nationally determinative questions, such as those pertaining to immigration, language, citizenship, and affirmative action.

It will not necessarily be obvious where one type of diversity ends and the other begins. Following on from the above example of black Americans, they could tend to favour income redistribution in general as described above, which would be an example of non-essential political diversity, perhaps shared with poorer whites, Hispanics or Asians. Equally, they could favour income redistribution from white people to black people per se (such as reparations for slavery), which would be an example of essential political diversity, that rooted in ethnic identity. Or they could favour nationalized healthcare as a general principle, but also because they knew that it would disproportionately improve the lot of black people, which would perhaps be a hybrid case. This difficulty in determining the exact nature of an instance of political diversity is no particular problem for our analysis. It suffices here to observe that, in ethnically diverse societies, both types will exist to a significant extent and be relatively stable over time.

We should not expect, however, that all types of ethnic diversity will lead to the same magnitude of increase in political diversity. Let us consider here two different types of immigration into Western countries: Taiwanese immigration into the United States, and Somali immigration into the UK.

Taiwanese immigrants into the US and their descendants are relatively small in number. The strong socioeconomic performance that ethnically Chinese immigrants of whatever origin tend to display positions the Taiwanese well to prosper in US life. We would expect this to bode well for allowing the maintenance of high political stability in the face of this demographic change, as the Taiwanese are operating at essentially the same level as their majority-white host population and therefore create little non-essential political diversity with their presence.

However, it must be expected that the essential political diversity of the system will increase as a consequence of Taiwanese immigration. Taiwanese populations will surely have atypically strong opinions on those aspects of US foreign policy that have the potential to impact on Taiwan itself. They are also likely to be relatively hostile towards any notion of US identity as rooted in European ancestry, and in favour of a purely civic national identity unrelated to ethnicity or national origin, a position which will set them at odds with many white Americans who believe in an American nation that grew out of specifically European peoples. Lastly, it is highly improbable that they would look favorably upon attempts to restrict immigration into the US if such restrictions were to include restrictions on Taiwanese would-be immigrants, or Asians more generally. All of these points would constitute some amount of essential political diversity with respect to the historic, white-majority population of the US, and quite probably with respect to the black American population as well, even if not in exactly the same way.

Compare this mixed picture to the disaster that is Somali immigration into the UK. The Somalis arguably constitute that human population with the most meager civilizational achievements, and their country itself is the archetype of the failed state. The Somali diaspora in the West is typified by massive welfare dependency, exceptionally poor levels of cultural integration, high crime

rates, and a disturbing prevalence of appalling behaviors such as extreme violent and sexual crime, including female genital mutilation. Political elites in the United Kingdom, apparently unconcerned with the welfare of their countries and peoples, have allowed some number of Somalis to settle in the UK, with consequences largely predictable given the preceding description and their high fertility rates.

The exact legal status of Somalis in the UK is a complex matter, ranging as they do from British citizens to illegal immigrants. Nonetheless, these people are, at some rate, becoming part of the electorate, and therefore exist on our system diagram as individuals capable in principle of pulling the PP in their direction come election time.

Let us now consider exactly what sort of political diversity will be introduced into the system by the Somalis. The non-essential political diversity will be very considerable, in that the Somalis are as criminal and welfare-dependent a population as could be imagined. To the extent that they vote, they will vote for the party most willing to give them things, clustered as they are right down at the very bottom of the socioeconomic scale. To allow any substantial Somali population into a developed country is to create, at a stroke, a population which will simply exacerbate one of the key problems theorists of democracy have always had to deal with: how to stop the more numerous poor simply voting themselves the wealth of the less numerous wealthy.

Moving onto essential political diversity, it is clear that the Somalis, like any other ethnic group, retain a strong ethnic identity, and ties to their homeland and the Somali people more generally. As such, they must be expected to demonstrate essential political diversity in that they will advocate continued Somali immigration, greater political enfranchisement of Somalis actually in the UK, and lax border enforcement in general and with respect to Somalis in particular. Needless to say, it is not in the interests of the British that such a primitive, tribal, racially and culturally alien people constitute an ever larger fraction of the population of their country. Hence the drastic increase in essential political diversity that the Somalis will give rise to on a per capita basis.

This discussion hopefully makes it clear that it is difficult to generalize about different immigrant groups except insofar as we can say the following: that allowing alien ethnic groups into a country will certainly increase the essential political diversity and possibly increase the non-essential political diversity therein, with the magnitude of the changes being something that would have to be considered on a case-by-case basis.

Political Systems for Dealing With Moderate Polarization

That a more diffuse distribution of IPPs and the greater political disagreement they represent create problems for democratic polities is well understood by political theorists, even if not in these terms. It is in response to them that democratic polities usually have multi-tiered political systems, systems that can allow these problems to be ameliorated to some extent. Let us consider this important point here by considering a hypothetical two-tier system.

In this system, there are two levels at which democratic politics operates: a national level and a regional level. At the national level, the system works the same way as the systems we have already described. However, at the regional level, the system is split up into two parts. Each part corresponds to a different region of the polity, and each has its own PP and jurisdiction (represented by the straight lines). In these regions, each of which contains only part of the population of the polity as a whole, people are exposed to a regional set of policies too.

Diagram 11 shows this polity at the national level. Here, IPPs are spread out in a band concentrated around the horizontal axis. The DZF is 25%, and we will take the MDI as being 1.8.




Diagram 11

However, we have stipulated that this is a two-tier system, with a regional level of government with its own policies applicable only to people in the region. We represent this regional level in Diagram 12. Here, the blue circular area on the left represents Region A, the green circular area on the right Region B. We see that all IPPs in the regional system diagram are within the regional CZs of their respective regional PPs, set by regional governments. We see that DZFs are now zero for both regions, and we will say that both MDIs have a value of 0.8.




Diagram 12

What is the significance of this? We simply assign a weighting to each level, which represents its political authority as a fraction of all political authority in the system. Using percentages, we will stipulate that in this initial hypothetical example, the weighting is 50:50, meaning that political authority is equally distributed between the two levels. The MDI is therefore 50% of the national MDI plus 50% of the population-weighted average regional MDIs, or 1.3 for the system as a whole, less than the 1.8 it would have been in a single-tier system. The DZF is the average of the national DZF and the regional DZF, and represents a composite picture taking both levels into account. In this case, it is 12.5%, which is $(25\% + 0)/2$.

Thus, by introducing regional autonomy, the system has created greater political stability, with the MDI falling from the original 1.8 to 1.3, and the DZF falling from 25% to 12.5%. If the split were 60:40 national to regional, these figures would be 1.4 and 15% respectively, as the more polarized national politics took on more precedence. If it were 40:60, the figures would be 1.2 and 10% respectively.

Another way of seeing this is to draw the two regional system diagrams independently of each other. Region A looks like this:




Diagram 13

Region B looks like this:




Diagram 14

This makes it clear that, at the regional level for both regions, the systems are fairly politically homogenous, with low MDIs and DZFs equal to zero. Hence their contribution to the political stability of the system as a whole.

The obvious problem with this model as stated is that we have assumed that the distribution of political diversity in the polity is such that political beliefs correlate very strongly with geographical location. What reason is there to expect the people in Region A, for example, to have such similar opinions?

In reality, there is no reason to assume that political beliefs and geographical location correlate so strongly, if at all. Let us make this point clear by re-drawing the two diagrams above in one diagram. Now, the positions of the IPPs have the same significance as always, but instead of fairly arbitrarily drawing a line on the system diagram to create two separate areas, one green, one blue, let us use green and red IPPs to represent which of the two component regions of the country the people represented by the PP live in: Greens live in Region 1, Reds live in Region 2. We stress again that the colours do NOT correspond to political affiliation. Political positions are represented by the positions of the IPPs, as always; it is geographical location that is represented by colour.

In our first version, which is simply Diagram 11 redrawn with colour, the political heterogeneity is matched very well by geographical distribution; people of like political beliefs live in the same regions. The regional diagrams will be the same as Diagrams 13 and 14. MDIs and DZFs for this system will be as they were in the above calculations, as, we say again, this is simply the same system presented differently.




Diagram 15

In our second version, in Diagrams 16, 17, and 18, political beliefs correlate reasonably well with geographical distribution, but not as well as before. Region 1, which contains the green population, can no longer keep everyone in the CZ, with the DZF having risen from 0 to 5%, and the MDI from 0.8 to 1.5. Region 2, which contains the red population, can perhaps keep everyone in the CZ with a non-equilibrium PP, but not with an equilibrium PP. In Diagrams 17 and 18, we have drawn both regional system diagrams with what we take to be equilibrium PPs. Region 2, the red region, now has a regional MDI of 1.5 and a regional DZF of 5%. Calculating composite figures for the system as a whole with a 50:50 weighting now gives a composite MDI of 1.65 (as opposed to 1.3 before) and a composite DZF of 15% (as opposed to 12.5% before). The national contributions to these figures have not changed, as individual IPPs are not moving. However, the regional contributions have gone up. This is why the composite MDI must rise as regional political homogeneity breaks down, with a commensurate fall in political stability.

However, the weighted MDI will still be lower than it was in the single-tier system, so there is still some utility to this system.




Diagram 16




Diagram 17




Diagram 18

In our third and final version, we have a situation in which there is no obvious relationship between geographic location and political at all. The equilibrium regional PPs are now all to be found in the centre of the system diagram, as the distribution of the greens, reds is essentially symmetrical around that centre. But this is where the national PP is! The regional MDIs are now as high as the national MDIs, and everyone in the DZ on the national diagram must be in the DZ on their respective regional diagram. Irrespective of the weightings of the two tiers, therefore, MDIs and DZFs will not change. In these cases, multi-tier political systems have no utility in increasing political stability.




Diagram 19




Diagram 20




Diagram 21

What this analysis shows is that political diversity that clusters geographically is much easier to accommodate than political diversity that is smeared relatively evenly throughout the polity in question. Countries such as Belgium, Spain, and Switzerland give insights into this truth, with political stability being maintained through the granting of substantial political autonomy to regions inhabited largely by ethnic groups who have ambivalent relationships with the 'nation' states that they are part of.

If we look at a country like the US and treat it purely as a two-tier national (or federal) and regional (state) system, we see a similar dynamic at work. Of course, the state structure of the US was not created in an attempt to ameliorate the problems posed by political polarization. It grew organically as new territories became settled enough and populated enough to be incorporated

into the growing United States. Nonetheless, it seems intuitively obvious that a country as large and diverse as the US would have evolved some sort of regional structure anyway, and its current structure serves some similar function. Let us consider the US federal system in light of the model we have developed here.

We are all familiar with the stereotypes of the pickup-driving, Stetson-wearing, gunslinging Texan conservative and the environmentally-conscious, latte-drinking, Californian liberal. These stereotypes encapsulate certain truths about the distribution of political beliefs and attitudes in the US, however rough and ready they may be.

Considering gun control will help us understand the point. We have then, our Texan conservative who sleeps with his rifle by his side and his .357 Magnum under his pillow. We also have our Californian liberal who believes that all private gun ownership should be banned. If these people coexist in a single-tier political system, then we can imagine three basic scenarios: a) Private gun ownership is banned, our Californian liberal celebrates, our Texan conservative flies into a rage and starts talking about secession, b) private gun ownership up to and including belt-fed 20mm cannon is made legal, our Texan conservative celebrates and maxes out his credit card, our Californian liberal flies into a rage and starts talking about secession, and c) our Texan conservative gets to keep his rifle but loses his .357 Magnum, resulting in serious disgruntlement on his part over the loss of his beloved revolver, and serious disgruntlement on the part of our Californian liberal over the continued availability of rifles, but no talk of secession. This would be a textbook example of our linear, fixed-MDI system where the authorities' best option is to try and keep people out of the DZF through compromise.

Might it not be better then, if Texas and California were allowed to have different gun laws? In a hugely mobile society such as the US, where picking up and heading for new climes is a large part of the national character, such a system is unusually well-suited to the people and would result in the benefits we have seen already in our hypothetical examples of two-tier systems. Of course Texans and Californians will still grumble about each other, but they will probably be better off on the whole.

We reiterate that all of this is predicated on a high level of political-geographic correlation between states and/or a pronounced willingness on the part of Americans to move around the country to increase such clumping. If this clumping were to be radically reduced, then the extra political stability the US and its component parts obtain by virtue of their federal system would be radically reduced, as we saw in our examples above.

It is worth noting here that a different development could have similar effects. We stipulated above that, in our hypothetical example, the weightings of the national and regional levels were 50:50. If this were to alter, and the national/regional weighting were to become 60:40, then we would have to take 60% of the national MDI and only 40% of the regional MDI in calculating our composite MDI. The whole point of this type of two-tier system is that regional MDIs are lower than national MDIs due to their reduced political diversity, so any increase in the weighting of the national MDI would necessarily increase the composite MDI and reduce the political stability of the system. In the US, this would have to be expected if the authority of the federal government were to increase at the expense of the authority of state governments.

In closing this discussion of multi-tiered systems, we should ask: if multi-tiered systems decrease composite MDIs across the whole system, why not take the weighting of the regional level to 100%, a state which would represent complete political independence and the complete replacement of higher composite MDIs with lower regional MDIs. The answer lies in the fact that there are often advantages to being part of larger political units that outweigh the disadvantages of having to make political concessions to the other population groups in those larger polities. If this were not so, there would be no aggregation of people into larger political units at all, and the split of one polity into two would then have to be followed by the break-up of those two into four, the four into eight, and those into yet more, *ad infinitum*. The advantages of belonging to a larger unit are not easily represented on our two-dimensional system diagrams (they would belong somewhere in the 98 unnamed axes of political variation we discarded earlier on), but it is important to mention them here to convey the principle and forestall the criticism that they have been ignored.

From Homogeneous to Polarized Systems

We have argued that the benefits that can be expected to result from the application of democratic politics are functions of the political diversity of the underlying human substrates of the polities in question. We have further argued that, when political diversity is significant, the introduction of multi-tiered democratic systems may become a necessity, and that such multi-tiered systems are most viable when politically disparate groups are geographically clustered.

It stands to reason that, when extreme political polarization exists in a society, it may well be the case that there exists no system diagram, with any conceivable number of tiers, or any conceivable set of PPs, consistent with the relatively low MDIs and low DZFs that characterize peaceful and harmonious democratic polities. In these cases, the exercise of democratic politics simply ends up becoming part of a battle between different factions in the society in question, part of a war conducted by other means.

So far, we have discussed system diagrams and the polities they represent as if all the IPPs were fixed in place. But it is clear upon a moment's reflection that this cannot be true if we introduce the dimension of time into our model. It is simply not the case that the political positions of individuals or the political characters of societies are unchanging over time. Accordingly, we must recognize that there will always be a chance that homogenous societies are becoming more polarized or polarized societies more homogeneous.

Polarized societies becoming more homogeneous are undoubtedly a worthy topic for consideration but they will have to be considered by some other author in some other document. Here, we concern ourselves with the way in which relatively homogeneous societies can drift towards polarization.

Generally speaking, there are three obvious ways in which a reasonably homogeneous system could start to become more polarized. In the first, disparate political groups already in the society grow ever further apart due, initially, to events over which they have little control, and then due to both external events and internal polarization. An example of this would be the polarizations

observed in so many European countries during the 1920s and 1930s between communists and fascists, prompted by the aftermath of World War I and the Great Depression.

The second way in which this drift can occur would be the sudden disappearance of a stabilizing factor in a system in which political polarization is latent, on ethnic or religious grounds. This factor, possibly external to the polity itself, would have exerted a pressure on the various ethnic groups that strongly discouraged expressions of ethno-religious tribalism, effectively forcing the actors on our system diagrams to be more moderate in this regard. Taking Yugoslavia as an example, we can see two shocks, one internal and one external, that could be considered to have contributed to its eventual collapse: the death of Tito in 1980, which brought to an end to his crucial moderating influence, and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, which suggested that Communism was not long for this world, in Yugoslavia or anywhere else.

The third, final, and for our purposes most relevant form of drift away from homogeneity is that in which entirely new groups spring into being within a polity as a consequence of immigration. The existence of these peoples on the same system diagram as the host people will have two destabilizing effects on the country in question. Firstly, it will introduce both essential and non-essential diversity into the system for the reasons we have already outlined. Secondly, and crucially, their presence will also create a very strong tendency towards polarization in that system.

Polarization is a vital part of our analysis, and, in terms of our system diagrams, is simply the tendency of certain clusters of people and the IPPs that represent them, to repel each other. Readers will understand that, in the real world, this will correspond to the political positions of these groups becoming ever more distant, ever more opposed, in direct response to the behavior and attitudes of the other. Let us view this phenomenon, a sort of reverse gravity, through some system diagrams.

First, we will see two diagrams, one representing a standard homogeneous population, and one representing that population with a small immigrant population. Here, immigrants are shown as red IPPs, and the native population as green IPPs. This is in contrast with our multi-tiered polity discussion, where colours were used to represent regions. Here, no regional information is conveyed in the system diagram.




Diagram 22




Diagram 23

This new immigrant population will shift the equilibrium PP in its own direction by a small amount. In so doing, it will have a minor effect on the MDI. However, the immigrant population is so close to the equilibrium PP, so close to what is effectively the political consensus in the society, that the effect would be very small. The effect on the DZF in this case is zero, though this need not be the case. If we were to ask what sort of immigrants might be represented by this change, we can think of the Taiwanese-American immigrants we discussed earlier, who added very little non-essential diversity and some small but non-trivial essential diversity to the system diagram of the US.

In contrast with this, let us imagine making a change of equivalent relative size to the British system diagram by introducing the same amount of Somalis, as per our other earlier comparison:




Diagram 24

Here, an immigrant influx of the same relative size as before results in a larger shift, and a definite increase, in the MDI, along with a larger movement in the equilibrium PP. This may not be obvious visually from the diagram, but we can see intuitively that any increase in the concentration of IPPs towards the outer fringes of the IPP distribution represents a stretching outwards of the distribution. We will define increases in the MDI and DZF brought about in this way as first-order polarizations of the system diagram.

As there are no good reasons for Western peoples to welcome Somalis to their countries and many good reasons to want them kept out, it stands to reason that many in the host population will be unhappy with this Somali immigration. These people are likely to become ever more insistent that no more of this sort of immigration should be allowed, that those Somalis in the country should be repatriated as and when possible, that they should be awarded fewer benefits, and that their criminality should be clamped down on in ever-more-draconian fashion. Some smaller number may respond by attacking Somalis on the streets or attacking buildings and facilities associated with them. This change in their positions caused by the first-order polarization will be defined as second-order polarization.

Going back to our system diagram, let us assume that the Somali population has increased by a factor of five. We will show two diagrams, the first only showing the first-order effects, the second the first and second-order effects combined.




Diagram 25: First-order only




Diagram 26: First- and second-order

To clarify, Diagram 25 shows the first-order polarization caused by the diverging political beliefs of the Somalis, and Diagram 26 shows both that and the second-order polarization that is the rest of the population reacting to the presence of the Somalis.

To summarize the developments, we have a pre-immigrant population with an MDI of 1.4 and a DZF of 12.5%. A single Somali IPP is added through immigration, which takes the MDI to 1.45 and leaves the DZF at 12.5%. Then the Somali population grows, through immigration or natural growth, to constitute 5 IPPs. First-order polarization, as the Somalis use their power at the ballot box to influence policy, results in an MDI of 1.7 and a DZF of 22%. Second-order polarization, as the native population reacts to this development, takes the MDI to 1.9 and the DZF to 29%. Notice that, as the polarization heightens, the stretching of the IPP distribution along the

horizontal axis is accompanied by a flattening along the vertical axis, which is indicative of how the tribal issues underlying the polarization are starting to push other political issues to the sidelines.

All subsequent polarization effects are second-order, including those of the immigrants themselves, in that they are reactive in nature. Interactions between immigrant peoples and the host society can, and probably will, result in further polarization over time, with everything that implies for the political stability of the society as a whole. To what extent this political diversity can be peacefully accommodated within the same society is then an open question.

When growing immigrant communities are granted political influence commensurate with their numbers, then the equilibrium PP in the system in question will, all other things being equal, drift towards them. This is the nature of first-order polarization, which must draw the equilibrium PP towards new immigrant groups. However, whether or not it will drift towards them *in practice*, is another matter entirely, due to the existence of second-order effects. As there is no way of predicting how large these effects become, how quickly, or in which part of the population, there is no way of predicting how the equilibrium PP will move in response to immigration.

In the next diagram, Diagram 27, we see further second-order polarization, and a PP shifting away from the immigrants to the left. Here, the growing immigrant community creates such a large backlash that the political consensus is actually moving away from it as it grows, as the PP moves left. Even with the PP in its equilibrium position, our MDI has now risen appreciably in contrast with, say Diagram 23, our DZF is soaring, and we have moved from being a homogenous system, to ever greater degrees of polarization.




Diagram 27

This helps us address a naïve analysis of democratic politics in Western countries, and the way it is influenced by Muslim immigration in particular. The analysis is roughly as follows. Immigrant

group X has higher fertility rates than the native population, and continues to immigrate. This creates an ever-denser population cluster consisting of those immigrants, a cluster that must pull the equilibrium PP ever closer towards it through democratic mechanisms. There is nothing anybody can do about this, it is now written in the stars. Indeed, the trend most be expected to accelerate, as the growing influence of the immigrant group will allow it to bend immigration policy itself ever further to its will.

Here, the analysis tends to bifurcate, with those broadly on the political left cheering it on, and those on the right weeping and tearing their hair out, or mouthing desperate inanities about how these immigrants are 'natural conservatives' who just happen to vote overwhelmingly for parties of the left. Fortunately, we can now see that both parties are mistaken in seeing these changes as only working in one direction, at least as a matter of general principle, as the exact contours of second-order polarization are radically unknowable. There is no way of knowing where the equilibrium PP will move to, even assuming the system ends up in equilibrium at all.

Moreover, there is a more important sense in which the naïve analysis is incorrect. As we have already made clear, any given system diagram will have an equilibrium PP, at which the MDI is minimized for the system, and the DZF close to a minimum in symmetrical systems. But this tells us nothing about what the MDI and DZF will actually be when the PP is in this equilibrium position. Both values could be very high, and the first- and second-order polarizations caused by immigration will, over time, cause our distribution of IPPs to spread out. If this process goes far enough, the MDI and the DZF will both end up taking on such high values as to cause a disintegration of civil order, a breakdown of democratic politics, and even outright civil war. When this happens, ruminations on who will win the next election become meaningless, as meaningless as saying, in early 2015, that Bashar Assad and the Alawite community he is a part of cannot continue to govern Syria as they are only a small minority of the population and could therefore not win an election by themselves.

Here, we reiterate what we consider to be the crucial advantage of our model with respect to the implicit assumptions of the overwhelming majority of analysis of this matter in the mainstream media. Too often, discussions of these matters are purely partisan in nature, in that they focus only on the likelihood of particular political parties or coalitions of parties gaining power given the demographic and political trends in the polity in question. But this focus on trying to determine who can gain a majority of the vote, or the seats in an assembly, tends to obscure the brute underlying reality of immigration-induced political polarization and its implications, a reality that a structural analysis would expose. Consider France. Does the presence of ever-larger minority groups of Third World origin guarantee that a nativist, nationalist party like the National Front cannot gain power? Or does it actually make it more likely that the National Front will eventually take power, as the native French, seeing their country swallowed up by the peoples of their former colonies, are driven to support it? To rephrase, could the National Front ever have hoped to gain power in the absence of mass immigration?

There is no way of reliably answering questions like this before the fact, especially given the complexities of electoral systems and voter behavior. As such, they could be batted back and forth endlessly until events preempted them, this way or that, with one side being proved wrong and the other right, and very little enlightenment would be enjoyed by any participant prior to the

fact. By ignoring these matters and focusing instead on the raw political diversity in the polities in question, we gain crucial insights that cut across the problem in a different way. The admission of large numbers of inassimilable Muslim peoples into France seeded a dynamic of polarization that will play out as follows:

- a) There exists a divergence of views between French and Muslim populations in France, consisting of both essential and non-essential political diversity.
- b) The population cluster representing the immigrants becomes ever larger, pulling the PP further towards itself. This is first-order polarization.
- c) Those French whose IPPs are furthest from the immigrants' IPPs become ever more distressed and concerned by this development, and support ever more restrictive policies with respect to immigrants and would-be immigrants. This is second-order polarization.
- d) The IPPs of the immigrants and at least some of their political supporters become more polarized in the opposite direction, for opposing reasons. More moderate, right-leaning French also start to become polarized as well.
- e) As the contested issues come to dominate the political sphere, political difference comes to consist primarily of these differences, which we have said is represented by a flattening of the IPP distribution towards a single axis, or political issue. This is a characteristic of tribalized societies.
- f) As the MDI and DZF soar, as they must under these circumstances, some event will eventually act as a trigger for a descent into outright civil conflict, revolution, civil war, or a military coup.

This is the course that any Western society will tread if it allows its towns and cities to be swamped by inassimilable, hostile Third World immigrants, which means most obviously Muslim immigrants. Given the obvious truth that that which we want to be true of our societies cannot be true if they are wracked by these phenomena, it follows that ensuring that this type of polarization does not take place must be the first priority for any Western government.

Part Two: Using Our Model to Think About Western Democracies

Thus far, our discussion has referred largely to hypothetical societies that exist only on our system diagrams. However, readers will already understand that this essay has not been written purely as a dispassionate investigation of the effects of ethno-religious political diversity. The rate at which this diversity is increasing in Western countries must, if the reasoning herein is sound, give rise to serious political conflicts, conflicts which are by no means certain to be resolved peaceably.

This remaining parts of the essay will strive to move away from the hypothetical and towards the concrete. It has the following objectives:

- a) to explain the difference between structural and partisan analyses of the political diversity brought about by growing ethnic diversity,
- b) to show that most mainstream analysis and even most ostensibly rarified, academic analysis of this political diversity is partisan in nature, and
- c) to demonstrate the pointlessness of these partisan analyses by performing what we hope will constitute a reasonable first attempt at the structural analysis that seems so elusive.

We will work towards these objectives via reference to Britain, as, being British, Britain is the country we know most about and whose media and political discourse we have most convenient access to. Readers from other countries will undoubtedly be able to construct similar analyses of the political situations in their own countries.

Alert readers will recall that the distinction between structural and partisan analyses is one we first introduced when first introducing our system diagrams, and touched on later when talking about the prospects of a party like the National Front in France winning a presidential election. This preemptive introduction of the concept was hard to avoid given its importance in our analysis. Let us now water the seed we planted earlier.

The Difference between Structural Analysis and Partisan Analysis

Why exactly analysis of the subject matter of this document tends overwhelmingly to be partisan rather than structural is a mystery to us. Time after time, one reads articles and supposed analyses of these matters that give no hint whatsoever of appreciating the deeper issues involved.

A partisan analysis of ethnically and religiously induced political diversity is characterized in the following manner:

- a) it concerns itself purely with the relative electoral prospects of competing political parties (hence its name),
- b) it assumes that the game of electoral politics will continue to play out as it has in recent decades for the rest of time,
- c) it asks no questions about the underlying political stability of the polities it is concerned with,
- d) it asks no questions about whether the demographic changes it studies might not entirely delegitimize the electoral process and motivate politically concerned parties to act apolitically in pursuit of their political goals, and
- e) it is peculiarly bloodless and removed, in that it demonstrates no understanding of the importance human beings attach to political power and the anguish they must be expected to evince if such power is taken away from them in their own countries, especially by groups with which they have antagonistic relationships

A structural analysis of this same sort of political diversity is characterized as follows:

- a) it concerns itself primarily with whether or not the political diversity in a polity is of a type consistent with the maintenance of democratic government, and only secondarily with how party politics affects that,
- b) it assumes that electoral politics is a very fragile thing, and that a sufficient degree of estrangement from democratic outcomes will lead people to ignore those outcomes,
- c) it focuses on the probability of political stability being destroyed through inter-group hostility and violence,
- d) it understands that radical demographic change will tend to result in attempts to radically redistribute political power, and
- e) in keeping with the previous four points, it is psychologically engaged in that it sees the potential for political upheaval to result when political power threatens to shift from one part of society to another.

In March 1992, a referendum was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia), one of the original six republics of Yugoslavia, to determine whether or not the territory should declare independence from that rapidly crumbling state. The referendum delivered a resounding 'Yes' to independence, as a consequence of which Bosnia seceded from Yugoslavia and established a thriving, multiethnic, multifaith country in which disparate groups of people lived, worked, and

socialized alongside each other in peace, and on the basis of a civic national identity that was open to all who subscribed to Bosnian values.

Anyone with the slightest understanding of the breakup of Yugoslavia will realize that the above account of the Bosnian path to independence is pure fantasy. As Slovenia and Croatia had already declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and been embroiled in war as a consequence, it was clear to Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, who made up a small majority of the Bosnian population, that remaining in the Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia was not a viable option. Unfortunately for them, Bosnia had and has a large Serb minority, which was adamant that it would remain in some sort of political union with Serbia itself. It was not prepared to be dragged into an independent Bosnia in which it would exist as a minority, confronted with a majority Muslim and Croat population that it was in conflict with, for reasons both historical and current.

The referendum was essentially a farcical exercise. Bosnian Serbs, not wishing to legitimize it, overwhelmingly refrained from voting. Serb paramilitaries intimidated those few Serbs who might otherwise have been interested in casting a vote. Amongst Bosnian Muslims and Croats, on the other hand, turnout was extremely high. These factors resulted in a turnout of 63.4%, with 99.7% of voters casting their ballots in favour of independence.

War broke out immediately upon the Bosnian government's recognition of the referendum result and independence being declared. The JNA (Jugoslav National Army) and Bosnian Serb paramilitaries joined forces and commenced a brutal war that took as its objective the driving of non-Serb populations out of what they considered Serb territory in Bosnia. At their high-water mark, they were to control about 70% of the entire country. From 1993 until 1994, Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces would fight a vicious war of mutual ethnic cleansing between themselves, making for a complex three-way conflict. The conflict only came to an end in 1995, when Muslim and Croat forces, rearmed, reequipped, and putting their own mutual hostility aside, would be joined by NATO airpower to push back against Serb forces and retake large parts of the country. Formal peace, and the power-sharing agreement we briefly alluded to in the first part of this document, would only be established in December 1995.

If we now imagine two political analysts, one partisan, one structural, sitting together on the eve of the referendum, and discussing its likely result and consequences together, what do we imagine they would say to each other? The partisan analyst would surely say that Bosnia would soon be a new, independent country, as all the population figures and opinion polls pointed in that direction. He would then have stopped speaking, as a partisan analyst has no other analytical tools to bring to bear.

The structural analyst, on the other hand, would point out that war was almost certainly unavoidable, and that the referendum was a tribal head-count rather than a meaningful democratic exercise. He might also point out that, if the situation were different, and the Bosnian Muslims and Croats were a minority of the population, it would be the Serbs clamouring for a referendum, and the Muslims and Croats preparing to unilaterally secede from Bosnia in areas they dominated. Lastly, he would point out that war was in the cards either way, as the interests and objectives of the various sides were mutually contradictory and not amenable to negotiation.

It is immensely unlikely that any real-world analyst of any sort would actually have been as woolly-headed as our hypothetical partisan analyst in the preceding paragraph. But then, war had already broken out in Yugoslavia. The war with Slovenia was short and sharp, a mere ten days, and had ended in the rump Yugoslavia's agreeing to Slovenian independence. The war with Croatia, however, though deadlocked, was ongoing, with large parts of Croatian territory under the control of the JNA and ethnic Serb paramilitaries, who were intent on incorporating it into a Greater Serbia. Against this backdrop, even the most utopian partisan analyst would undoubtedly already have been shaken out of any partisan reverie they might have been enjoying.

Insofar as one can tell from reading analysis of ethno-religious political diversity in Britain, however, virtually everyone in any mainstream publication who says anything at all on this matter is indeed still in a dreamlike state. We will establish this more definitively in the next section.

Mainstream Analysis of Ethno-Religious Political Diversity in Britain

In the last couple of years, a tipping point seems to have been reached in British political discourse in terms of an awareness of the growing electoral heft of the ethnically non-white part of the electorate. That the numbers of these people in Britain have reached such levels is, of course, a consequence of decades of mass Third World immigration, higher immigrant fertility, and a willingness on the part of British governments to enfranchise immigrants and their descendants. There is much uncertainty as to exactly what effects this new electorate will have on forthcoming general elections, but its growing significance is apparently not contested.

Viewed from one perspective, the observation that a part of the electorate that grows in size becomes more significant is trivially true. If it were to be discovered that left-handed people were becoming an ever-larger part of the electorate, then it would obviously be the case that, all other things being equal, politicians would have to pay more attention to the political positions of those left-handed people. The same would be true of people whose names began with the letter P, or people who played the banjo. The reason there is never any discussion of the size of the left-handed electorate, the electoral significance of those whose names begin with the letter P, or the number of banjo-players in crucial, contested constituencies, is that these characteristics are not of any political significance, and do not inform people's political views. Whoever heard of a civil war between the left-handed and the right-handed, or a grenade attack on a political rally of the Banjo Party?

If the electoral heft of non-white voters is discussed at all, it must be because this non-whiteness and its attendant cultural and religious differences *do* inform their electoral choices and political identities. And indeed, this seems to be a characteristic of democratic societies in general: different ethnic groups do, statistically speaking, tend to vote for different parties. What this observation does to the notion of a post-ethnic, post-racial national identity based on a shared culture is something to be debated.

We have suggested that mainstream analysis of ethno-religious political diversity is overwhelmingly partisan in nature, as we have defined partisan analysis above. Here, we would like to demonstrate the truth of this claim. First, we will briefly quote from mainly partisan analyses of ethno-religious political diversity taken from the mainstream British media, which for our purposes will mean the broadsheet newspapers. This will give a flavor of the type of analysis provided by regular journalists. That this analysis is, with a single exception, mindless even by the standards of partisan analysts will become quickly apparent. Nonetheless, it is important to set the scene and show what we later present our structural analysis as being in contrast with.

Second, we will look at a more weighty analysis of ethno-religious political diversity co-authored by an academic. We will observe that even a work of this nature, produced by people who should, we feel, be capable of more penetrating insights, is partisan in approach. This is a general truth of mainstream analysts of ethno-religious political diversity. Even when they show a hint of an awareness that there is a more insightful structural analysis to be performed, they show few signs of being willing to develop it.

* * * * *

We commence our study of partisan analysis of ethno-religious political diversity with a piece in the *Guardian* by Ian Birrell¹, published on October 2, 2013. Birrell writes of the suburban constituency of Mole Valley in Surrey, which he describes as being ‘*solidly Conservative.*’ However, he also tells us that it is changing at ‘*breathhtaking speed*’ due to immigration, and in a manner that ‘*contains a message the [Conservative] party ignores at its peril.*’ Indeed, these developments are ‘*dynamite that threatens the Conservative Party. For these migrant voters may share suburban values, but they do not share their politics.*’

According to Birrell, the ‘*Conservatives face a fundamental choice: do they want to chase the votes of the pessimists who preferred Britain as it was in the past, or those people living in the real world as it is today?*’. He concludes by telling us that ‘*if the Tories do not come to terms with the shifting shape of the suburbs, it could threaten their very existence.*’

Birrell is a former speechwriter for David Cameron, and therefore presumably considers himself to be some sort of conservative. What sort of conservative exactly, we cannot imagine, as his primary concern is to give the huge flood of immigrants swamping his country whatever they want, if it allows the Conservatives to cling to power. More importantly, there is no indication in his piece that he has any sense of any greater significance of what is occurring. There is a political party called the Conservative Party. How can this party win elections? Birrell evinces no interest in any other aspect of this matter.

Next, we have Tim Wigmore writing a blog entry for the *Daily Telegraph*² on January 24th, 2014 . His piece is entitled ‘*Unless the Tories engage with issues black voters care about, they face electoral oblivion*’, this title being an entire universe of intellectually sub-par partisan analysis distilled down to a single drop. Wigmore tells us that ‘*the Conservative Party’s hopes of winning elections rests [sic] on getting an increasing share of a declining part of the electorate. In 2010, they won only 16 per cent of the BME [Black and Minority Ethnic] vote. Unless that changes, defeat by democratic change awaits.*’

Wigmore spends a substantial part of his piece talking about how stop-and-search is a key area where the Conservatives could improve their appeal to, and soften their image with, black voters in particular. Apparently, black people are aggravated by the vigorous efforts of police forces to stop young black men carrying weapons with which to maim and kill other young black men. Be this as it may, the entire piece is again couched entirely in terms of what the Conservative Party must do to win elections. This is the only issue floating around inside this incurious young man’s skull.

¹ <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/02/tories-wither-away-migrant-vote>

² <http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/timwigmore/100256394/unless-the-tories-engage-with-issues-black-voters-cre-about-they-face-oblivion/>

Do those elements of British society who support the Conservatives want their future governments to be determined by the feelings black people have towards those tasked with restraining their overwhelming criminality? Does any other part of the white British electorate? These questions are not raised. We were foolish enough to allow large-scale black immigration. Now we must start to do what these civilizationally hopeless peoples want. This is democracy, Wigmore implicitly tells us. Indeed, he tells us the same thing again in a blog post dated February 26th, 2014, imaginatively titled '*Without more ethnic minority votes, can the Conservatives ever win again?*', which recycles all the same points in similarly clueless fashion.

Our travails not yet over, we stumble away from the egregious Wigmore straight into the path of Hugh Muir, a black man who writes for *The Guardian*. He can be distinguished from Gary Young of the same publication by the occasional touch of humour in his writing, though he possesses the same predictably singleminded focus on race and ethnicity. On September 4th, 2013, *The Guardian* published a long article by Muir on the possible influence of ethnic minority voters on the 2015 general election in Britain.

The focus of Muir's article was some recent research conducted by Operation Black Vote (OBV), that most post-racial of organizations. The research examined the distribution of ethnic minority voters throughout constituencies across the country, and compared the predicted ethnic minority vote counts in each to the margin of victory in each at the last general election, in 2010. It revealed '*that 168 marginal seats are susceptible to the voting whims of a minority electorate*', a development that Muir describes as '*a depth charge into the waters of contemporary politics*.' Whether or not the indigenous British people actually want black and brown people detonating depth charges in contemporary politics, or anything else, is not discussed.

Muir continues, telling us that it is '*High time, says Woolley [OBV's director], for each [of the three major political parties] to explain what they would do about pressing subjects such as equalities legislation, immigration and stop and search*.' His article is less tightly focused on Conservative prospects than others we have looked at, but the gist is clear from his mention of Conservative Party strategists '*who observe the wreckage of a US Republican party that is estranged from the growing Hispanic population of 53 million in the US and thus condemned to bit-part status*.' The once-proud party of Abraham Lincoln, now a rusty derelict long-since abandoned by the side of the road because Mexicans will not vote for it. Such are the fruits of diversity.

Muir's article considers in reasonable detail the possible implications of growing ethnic diversity for the three major parties, which makes it a more interesting piece than the pathetic efforts penned by Birrell and Wigmore. Nonetheless, it is purely partisan. There is simply not a glimmer of awareness in it that a deeper, structural awareness is waiting to be unearthed.

Our next, and last, piece drawn from the mainstream media is more interesting in that it is one of the vanishingly small number of such pieces that show some awareness of the underlying structural issues, whilst also demonstrating a more nuanced take on the partisan issues themselves. It is an editorial published in *The Guardian*³ on June 20th, 2014. Responding to a

³ <http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/20/guardian-view-minority-voting>

recently published analysis we will be looking at in more detail later on, the editorial first makes some generic comments about how ethnic minority groups tend to vote Labour rather than Conservative. However, in a departure from type, it then informs us that *'the most urgent message is for Labour, which may come to rely on minority support, a phenomenon the authors call the "browning of Labour". Therein lies the most troubling indication of how politics may fracture; party endorsement predicated on ethnicity.'* Here we have the first hint of an awareness that the developments we have looked at thus far may actually be more significant than what the weather forecast is for Wimbledon this year, or what England's prospects are for retaining the Ashes. Like some primeval fish laboriously pulling itself onto a muddy shore to discover to its astonishment that the ocean *is not all there is*, the editorial writers at the Guardian have made their way into an entirely new intellectual world.

Sucking away at the thin atmospheric oxygen via mechanisms we can only wonder at, our fish's primitive brain notes that *'Two out of three minority voters backed Labour in London [at the last elections to the European Parliament], according to researchers. Exactly the same proportion of white voters backed the Tories [Conservatives] or UKIP. Not so much a multicultural rejection of UKIP, rather that Nigel Farage [UKIP's leader] was overwhelmed by the hard realities of London's demography.'*

In other words, politics in London is becoming ever less political, and ever more tribal. Political diversity is becoming ever more essential, ever less non-essential. Political parties are becoming ever more the vehicles for different ethnic groups or coalitions thereof to protect their interests as they perceive them. We would suggest that the first- and second-order polarization we outlined earlier in this document both lie submerged within this development, along with many other antagonisms and resentments.

Our fish does not make this observation. It has not yet learnt these difficult terms, or learnt to perform a structural analysis of ethno-religious political diversity; it is merely groping in the right direction. We hope to make more progress in this direction ourselves later on. For the moment, we will leave broadsheet media analysis of our subject matter to one side and look briefly at two recent in-depth pieces of analysis to show that partisan naivety is not limited to journalists, but is also found amongst the heavy hitters of the academy.

Our first 'serious' piece of analysis is an article entitled *The Tories' Missing Half Million Voters*⁴, published in Demos Quarterly on April 24th, 2014. It was authored by one Richard Webber, a Visiting Professor at the Department of Geography, Kings College London, and Trevor Phillips, a professional black man and apparatchik of the multicultural state. What exactly Phillips could have contributed to such a dense piece of number-crunching besides his boyish charm and winning smile remains a mystery. Either way, the piece has the strengths of partisan analysis at its best, and the weaknesses common to all partisan analysis, good, bad, or indifferent.

Webber and Phillips offer up some interesting suggestions and insights. They consider, for example, the possibility that visible minorities (their term) who would once have voted for the

⁴ <http://quarterly.demos.co.uk/article/issue-2/the-tories-missing-half-million/>

Labour Party tend to drop their support for it as they diffuse out of their original areas of settlement. They note that there are large differences in the tendency of visible minorities to vote Labour as a function of the ethnic minority they belong to (Black African, Indian, Bangladeshi, etc.). There is also a discussion of what motivates ethnic minorities to vote the way they do: is it class, race, or both? This said, the article as a whole is a purely partisan exercise, concerned only with the relative electoral prospects of the main British political parties.

Our second piece of academic analysis, written by the same authors, is entitled *Labour's New Majority*⁵, and is found again in *Demos Quarterly*, published on July 18th, 2014. It was in response to this research, but prior to its publication, that the Guardian editorial we quoted above was published. There is no reason for us to consider this article at length; it suffices here to note that it demonstrates that the partisan nature of the previous work by this pair of authors was not an anomaly. Scholarly, learned, thorough, and largely worthless to those with a desire to understand the likely long-term consequences of Third World immigration into Britain, this, our last piece of partisan analysis, is of a piece with other work in this genre.

We close here by pointing out that both of these two final pieces have titles that make their partisan nature clear at a glance: the Tories this, Labour that. In the intellectual world of the partisan analysts, there are only political parties and their relative fortunes. Asking them about the structural implications of the demographic shifts they study would be akin to asking a particle physicist how bats can sleep upside-down, or how chameleons change colour. These questions simply do not have meaning in the analytical worlds they inhabit.

⁵ <http://quarterly.demos.co.uk/article/issue-3/537/>

A Structural Analysis of Ethno-Religious Political Diversity in Britain

Having considered now the mainstream, partisan analyses of ethno-religious political diversity, let us attempt to show how restricted and misguided they are by conducting our own structural analysis. Consider the following two system diagrams. In the first, we have a fairly symmetrical, roughly circular, distribution of IPPs. Instead of a single cross representing the PP, we have two crosses, each representing the proposed PP of one political party in what we will say is a two-party system. Each IPP votes for the political party closest to itself, so the IPPs vote as shown in the diagram. Strictly speaking, this election will result in a draw, as the IPPs are evenly split.




Diagram 28




Diagram 29

In the second diagram, we have created a radically polarized system, which still retains the vertical axis of symmetry that the first diagram had. As such, the two political parties can keep their proposed IPPs in the same places, keep the same vote shares, and the election will still result in a draw. From the point of view of a partisan analysis, there is little more to say here. Both systems, due to their symmetry, yield essentially the same result. Once the votes have been counted up and the nature of the next government predicted, what else is there to do?

We, however, have an entirely separate set of conceptual tools with which to analyze these matters. Applying these tools, we can see immediately that there is a world of difference between these two system diagrams, the first with its low MDI and zero DZF, and the second with its much higher MDI and substantial DZF. We understand that the second system diagram must be characterized by a high level of political discontent and fractiousness, not to mention strikes, political violence, riots, and the like. If we were to increase this degree of political polarization further, eventually its democratic politics would collapse into civil disorder, a military coup, or worse.

The central and disabling weakness of partisan analysis is that it is blind to this underlying reality of political polarization. Just as the vision of human beings does not extend into the infrared spectrum, the vision of partisan analyses does not extend into the vertical or horizontal dimensions of our system diagrams. Rather, it can only aggregate IPPs into groups as a function of which proposed PPs they are closest to, then print those results out, all information about the nature of the distribution discarded on the way. When we peer into our political infrared spectrum with our system diagrams and our understanding of first- and second-order polarization, we see much more. Indeed, we see so much as to render the partisan analyses almost meaningless in comparison.

* * * * *

Since the start of mass Third-World immigration into Britain in 1948, the country has been altered beyond recognition. Interested parties can conduct their own research into the demographic transformation that has resulted from the insanity of the last few decades. We do not propose to describe it in exhaustive detail here, especially given that readers of this document are likely to be broadly familiar with it. What is most important for our purposes is to give a brief outline of the salient characteristics of the most problematic peoples that have come to reside in the UK as a consequence of mass immigration.

Firstly, we have the black population of Britain. Complex though it is in terms of its countries of origin and cultural breakdown, it evinces the characteristics any thinking person will already have come to expect from black people: disproportionately high crime rates, disproportionately high social dysfunction, miserable economic and professional achievements, and a pronounced hostility towards those organs of the state that must keep a lid on this great swell of primitive, atavistic behaviour, the police in particular. Admittedly, this picture is complicated by the fact that large-scale, unrestricted immigration from British Commonwealth territories such as Jamaica has long since been brought to a halt, and that much black immigration today is from the African middle class, which comes seeking tertiary education and professional advancement. Nonetheless, a glance at the relevant statistics on prison populations, young offender

populations, conviction rates, school expulsion rates, employment rates, and educational achievements at whatever level will make the general picture clear, and this against a background of impressive achievements in these regards by other non-white immigrant groups with no obvious economic advantages, such as certain Indian and Chinese populations.

Secondly, we have the South Asian Muslim population, which consists mainly of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis. The politest verdict we can pass on these two peoples is that they are a blight on the face of Britain, and between them constitute an existential threat to the country as it currently exists. The reasons for this are twofold, the first being the sheer degeneracy and destructiveness of their behavior, the second being the acute political polarization their presence in Britain necessarily gives rise to. High fertility rates and an insistence on bringing as many family members as possible into Britain to procreate with result in very high rates of growth for both groups, with the predictable effect that they are coming to demographically dominate their areas of original settlement. Those who wish to know more about the despicable behaviours of these peoples are free to start by investigating the mass, systematic rape, torture and enslavement of white British girls by Pakistanis, and the deliberate subverting of British democracy in the London Borough of Tower Hamlets by Bangladeshis keen to recreate their own less than salubrious country in microcosm in our green and pleasant land. After that, they can take their research in whichever direction most interests or appalls them. They will find no shortage of material making clear just how disastrous it is that either of these peoples should inhabit Britain at all.

It should hardly be necessary to point out that these two populations, black people and South Asian Muslims, create very substantial essential and non-essential diversity in the system diagram of Britain. This first-order polarization, we suggest, must be causing severe second-order polarization, the reverse gravity of which must be forcing, and must continue to force, the MDI and DZF for Britain's system diagram ever higher. The implications of this development will be clear to readers from our earlier discussions, but let us make them real here.

If one puts oneself in the shoes of a white British person aghast at the changes brought about in their country by the Third-World diasporas described here, a person who wishes to ameliorate as much as possible the damage being done to that country, what course of action would we suggest that person take? In a democratic society, it is held that discussion in the public square and decisions made via the ballot box are the only legitimate ways of attempting to influence policy. Slitting throats and detonating bombs in public places have fallen rather out of fashion. But what will it avail our white British person to engage in politics in this manner when tribally-motivated peoples that will fight tooth and claw to maintain, indeed to extend, their current privileges constitute an ever larger part of the electorate?

If our white Briton is anguished by the depredations inflicted on urban dwellers, most obviously in parts of London, by feral black people, how can he address it democratically as their population continues to climb, increasing their political clout in both national elections and local elections in London? If he is anguished by the mass child rape perpetrated by Pakistanis, how can he hope to address it, as politicians become ever more dependent on Pakistani support in more and more constituencies?

No great foresight is required to predict that the potential for extreme second-order polarization here is very great. Whether it will take the form of ever-growing white support for nationalist parties, the formation of paramilitary self-defence organizations, or a complete disintegration of civil order in certain urban areas is impossible to say. But there can be no reasonable doubt that such polarization must occur, and no reasonable belief that democratic-politics-as-usual could restrain it.

More or less quickly, our political cart is heading over the cliff of democratic implosion, as a direct consequence of mass immigration of racially and culturally alien peoples. It is against this backdrop that the partisan analyses we considered above must be viewed. Given that all political power in a polity must sum to 100%, it is clear that, as one group comes to possess more and more of that power, other groups must come to possess less and less. To the extent that different groups in a society are conscious of themselves as being groups, and groups with mutually incompatible objectives at that, it stands to reason that shifts in the distribution of power between them will be bitterly resented by those parties that stand to suffer as a consequence. We should consider how much truer this must be when those groups share no overarching identity, and feel no historical sense of shared peoplehood whatsoever.

We earlier used the word bloodless in an attempt to describe one of the key characteristics of standard partisan analyses. It simply does not seem to occur to most partisan analysts that a situation in which UK-resident diasporas of miserable, dysfunctional, Third-World countries inflict terrible damage on Britain and its people whilst also obtaining ever-more political influence is not politically sustainable. One need only look at the Pakistanis again to understand the point. On what basis do these people wield ever-greater political authority in Britain? Their moral excellence? Their proven ability to create decent, ordered societies? Or the institutionalized mass rape of their forced marriages, coupled with Third-World fertility rates and the stupidity the white man has demonstrated in allowing them to infiltrate his country to such an extent?

Democracy is not a system for producing the gold of political order and social harmony from the lead of mutually hostile peoples. Rather, it is a system for reconciling the political differences that exist within and across relatively homogenous groups of people, who already broadly share sets of ideas about how their societies should be. The Greek post-and-lintel system that still just about succeeds in keeping the roof of our political structures up is gradually being called upon to span distances that it was never designed to span. Collapse is inevitable.

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Now that the fundamentals of our structural analysis are in place, let us see how we can build on them by taking what would usually be the components of a partisan analysis and breathing some life into them. The general diagnosis we have made here of our structural problems in Britain could be applied with only a few variations for local colour in just about any other Western country. Let us now make the analysis more specifically British.

As some readers will be aware, the British political system is not based on proportional representation. In the House of Commons, the lower, and only elected, house of parliament, there

are 650 distinct territorial subdivisions called constituencies, each of which elects one Member of Parliament (MP) to government each general election. To win a constituency election, a candidate need only obtain more votes than any other candidate in that constituency. If a single party has a majority in the 650-strong House of Commons, it forms a government and its leader becomes Prime Minister. If not, the party with the largest number of MPs will receive the opportunity to try to form a coalition government with other parties, a coalition which will have a majority of MPs. Failing this, the options are a minority government, or another election. Coalition governments are the exception rather than the norm in Britain, though this may not hold true for much longer.

It should be understood that the British electoral and political systems have evolved over a very, very long time, and, to be polite, do not necessarily correspond very closely to what a rational individual might choose to implement if they were designing a system from scratch. The most frequent criticism of the current system is that it allows governments to win majorities in the House of Commons with mere pluralities of the popular vote. We can consider this to be a type of splitting effect, in which the popular vote decides the rank order of the parties and the constituency system then splits their relative successes further apart, benefiting the winner to the detriment of the other parties.

The merits of this splitting effect are much debated. Some argue that it tends to result in strong governments, in contrast with proportional representation (PR) systems, which tend to result in a proliferation of parties and multi-party coalition governments that can easily collapse if parties withdraw from the coalition. Others make the point that it seems, in the most fundamental sense, to be unfair, in that political power in the House of Commons is simply not proportional to vote count for the party as a whole. We would argue that the tendency of this system to herd voters away from smaller parties and towards larger parties stifles political innovation, effectively awarding the leaders of the two or three largest parties a veto with respect to the basic contours of political discussion. The recent successes of UKIP in attacking and undermining the stultifying consensus amongst the cardboard cutout figures in the political elite are, therefore, as remarkable as they are gratifying.

Whatever one thinks of this splitting effect, there is another, arguably more disturbing effect of the British system, which we will call a scattering effect. The scattering effect weakens the relationship not just between popular vote count and seats in the House of Commons, but the rank order of the parties in terms of the popular vote and the number of seats. It is said that, in general, the Conservative Party must win four percentage points more in the popular vote to win the same number of seats as the Labour Party, largely as a consequence of voter turnout being lower in Labour-dominated constituencies and these constituencies therefore being won with fewer votes on average than Conservative-dominated constituencies. In principle Labour could win an election with fewer votes than the Conservatives. More disturbingly, as of March 2015, UKIP had for months been polling at around 15% for the 2015 general election, but was still expected to win only a handful of seats. We will have more to say about this when we look at effective gerrymandering later on.

These splitting and scattering effects combine with other effects to create an electoral system which, in all its subtleties and implications for voter behaviour, is terribly complicated,

unintuitive, and unfair. Arguably, it is a disgrace to a supposedly democratic country. Trying to see how it is likely to function under geographically shifting patterns of ethno-religious political diversity is undoubtedly a horrendous task, and one that we do not envy those political and social scientists who seriously engage with this task. Nevertheless, we stand by our earlier criticism that these analyses are overwhelmingly partisan in nature, and therefore suffer from all the weaknesses of such analyses.

Let us then consider how the particular nature of our electoral system might interact with the elements of the structural analysis we have been conducting. We will limit our attention here to two areas: perverse PP movement and effective gerrymandering.

Perverse PP Movement

Perverse PP movement refers simply to a situation in which, in a system undergoing political polarization, a shift in one direction of the equilibrium PP causes the actual PP to move in the opposite direction. To make this clearer, let us imagine a right-leaning constituency with 80,000 voters. Under normal circumstances, the Conservative Party wins 45,000 votes, the Labour Party 25,000, the Liberal Democrats 5,000, and other smaller parties 5,000 between them. The Conservatives therefore win the constituency.

Now along comes another party of the right, UKIP, and, in response to growing alarm over rising levels of immigration under a Conservative government, takes half the previously Conservative vote. Now both Conservatives and UKIP have 22,500 votes, which results in a Labour victory. Now the pro-immigration Labour Party has gained one previously Conservative seat in the House of Commons, despite the fact that the actual shift in political opinion in the constituency was against it, which is to say, away from the policies it advocated.

Here, a rightwards drift in political opinion has resulted in a leftwards drift in political power and, therefore, the PP in the relevant system diagram. The basic point is hopefully clear enough that we do not need to demonstrate it visually. We will simply remind our readers that the utility of democratic mechanisms of government lie in their ability to keep the PP close to equilibrium PP, which is to say, close to the centre of mass of political opinion in the system. The British political system makes it entirely possible, and, in the long term, probable, that, at least some of the time, the exact opposite is happening. American readers will recognize some of this in their presidential elections, where Ralph Nader and Ross Perot have split left and right respectively to arguably push the election the 'wrong' way.

In contrast, if we consider this hypothetical constituency to be a country in its own right, and one that operates on the basis of a proportional representation system, we see that the perverse PP movement will not occur. Labour could not form a government with its 25,000 votes, even in unwieldy coalition with the parties whose vote tallies sum to 5,000, as this coalition would have no majority. Instead, we would have to imagine that the Conservatives and UKIP would form a coalition whose policies would be an averaging out of their respective policies, reflecting the rightward drift that caused the Conservative vote to split in the first place.

Imagine for a moment a car whose steering system is so perversely designed that, attempting to turn left, one *might* end up turning right instead, and *vice versa*. The idiocy of such a system would be clear. Equally clear now, we hope, is the idiocy of its political analogue. If the British electoral system had been designed by a baboon, we would nonetheless furrow our brows in consternation at its efforts, and tell it we had had higher expectations of it. Unfortunately, it is instead the product of centuries of tradition and gradual evolution, which leads many otherwise intelligent people to nod in quiet satisfaction when confronted with its manifest deficiencies.

There is nothing particularly original in the observation that the British electoral system demonstrates this particular insanity. Our point here is that if this perverse PP movement is seen to operate along a dimension of political variation that represents a matter of existential importance to the people in the system, its ability to discredit the system and delegitimize its modes of function will be far more acute. The ethno-religious conflicts we are primarily concerned with in this document represent just such a dimension.

Effective Gerrymandering

Gerrymandering is that process whereby constituency boundaries (or their equivalents) are positioned in such a manner as to result in the number of constituencies controlled by a given party bearing little relationship to the fraction of ballots cast for it. This will become clear with an example. We have a UK-style polity, with a first-past-the-post electoral system and a parliamentary style of government. It has five hundred thousand voters, who are split into five different constituencies of one hundred thousand voters each. There are two parties in this polity, the Red Party and the Blue Party. Polls indicate that the Red Party can expect to receive 240,000 votes in the next election, the Blue Party 260,000. Naively, one might expect the Blue Party to win this election, but this depends entirely on the distribution of voters in the five constituencies.

If Red voters and Blue voters are spread out randomly amongst the five constituencies, then there will be 52,000 Blue voters and 48,000 Red voters in each constituency. The Blue Party will therefore win all five constituency elections, all five MPs in the equivalent of the House of Commons, and its leader becomes the Prime Minister. This result makes sense in that we would expect the Blue Party to win, though we must feel rather uneasy over the complete lack of representation of the Red Party in parliament, given that it won 48% of the vote.

What happens if we redraw the constituency boundaries so that four constituencies contain 52,000 Red voters and 48,000 Blue voters, with the fifth constituency containing 32,000 Red voters and 68,000 Blue voters? Now the Red Party wins four out of five seats in the House of Commons, and the Blue Party only one, with the position of Prime Minister and, therefore, control of the executive branch of government, going to the Red Party as a consequence. Mathematically, the Blue Party cannot be completely gerrymandered out of parliament if it has a majority of the popular vote. Nonetheless, in terms of actual political power, this is almost precisely the reverse of the first result.

Both of these results are equally valid given the nature of the electoral and political systems in our hypothetical polity. What we would tend to intuitively consider the fairest possible result, in which the Blue Party gains three seats and the position of Prime Minister, and the Red Party

gains two seats and ends up as the parliamentary opposition, is by no means guaranteed to come about. Indeed, the results can vary freely between the two extremes we outlined above, from 5-0 to the Blue Party to 4-1 to the Red Party, despite the popular vote count remaining 260,000 for the Blues and 240,000 for the Reds.

We take gerrymandering as being simply the deliberate interference with constituency boundaries in pursuit of election results which do not map proportionately onto the popular vote tallies for the polity as a whole. Extreme gerrymandering can produce results that are essentially unconnected to popular vote tallies, as in our 4-1 Red Party victory above. It requires no particular imagination to see that if the Red Party somehow managed to bring about this result through gerrymandering, the political stability of the polity would be jeopardized by it, as the Blue Party and its supporters would surely never be reconciled to losing the election in this fashion.

We make the observation now that situations must sometimes arise in democratic societies in which gerrymandering has *effectively* taken place, which is to say in which election results do not map proportionately onto popular vote tallies, as a consequence of patterns in immigration and internal migration. This *effective gerrymandering* surely has just as much potential to cause a crisis in the political system as the actual gerrymandering that we performed above when we gifted our hypothetical election to the Red Party and gave it its 4-1 result. If Blue supporters start concentrating themselves in certain constituencies while Red supporters fan out to other constituencies to just the right extent, this effective gerrymandering could easily come about over a period of time without there being any underhand intent on the part of those Red supporters.

Note that once the constituency boundaries are in place, there is nothing undemocratic about such an outcome, if by democratic we mean simply that a superficially reasonable electoral system is implemented free from electoral fraud. As such, it must be predicted that those parties that benefit from effective gerrymandering will fight tooth and claw to preserve it, just as those that suffer as a consequence will fight desperately against it. More importantly for us (as our analysis, we state not for the first time, is not a partisan one), those parts of the population that feel themselves to be unfairly robbed of power by this system must be expected to react very badly.

In terms of our system diagrams, we see here a phenomenon similar to the perverse PP movement we discussed previously. Perverse PP movement occurs when a change in the equilibrium PP causes the actual PP to move in the opposite direction. Here, we have a movement that is a function of our constituency-based system and the specifics of the geographical distribution of peoples, neither of which is captured in our standard system diagrams. Hence, from the perspective of our diagrams, it is a random motion in that it does not pertain to, and cannot be explained by, anything in them. This unmooring of the equilibrium PP and the actual PP will have effects that are hard to predict in the general case, but obviously bode ill for the political stability of the system as a whole.

Gerrymandering in modern Britain is not, as far as we are concerned, a major problem. In Northern Ireland prior to the outbreak of the Troubles there in the late 1960s, there was a degree of pro-Unionist/Protestant gerrymandering at the local council level, which contributed greatly to

the frustration of the Nationalist/Catholic community with the status quo. British general elections are not plagued by gerrymandering. However, there already exists within our system a great deal of effective gerrymandering. If we add to this the additional effective gerrymandering that may well result from immigration and the subsequent diffusion of immigrant populations around the country, we have the potential for severe political tension.

First, let us consider the effective gerrymandering that already exists in the system. Remembering that gerrymandering consists of contriving constituency boundaries so that election results are not proportionate to popular vote tallies across the system as a whole, and that effective gerrymandering has taken place when this state of affairs has come into place of its own accord, we see that effective gerrymandering is a key characteristic of the British electoral system. Indeed, the ostensible merits of the system rely on it. The splitting effect we referred to earlier is a direct result of effective gerrymandering. Labour's landslide election victory in 1997 was achieved with only 43% of the vote, though it resulted in them winning 418 out of the 650 in the House of Commons. This resulted, as we have explained, from the geographical distribution of Labour voters throughout the country. When the Conservatives last won a general election outright, in 1992, they won 336 of the 650 seats in the House of Commons with only 41.9% of the vote.

The second part of the effective gerrymandering problem lies in the spread of immigrant-origin populations. Arguably, given that the entire British system is based on effective gerrymandering, this new issue is only a minor variation on a long-existing theme. A defender of the first-past-the-post system we currently have would, perhaps, not be entitled to complain about this newest instance of the problem. But those who do take issue with the current system do not suffer from this restriction.

In a nutshell, there appears to be a possibility that, as well-established immigrants move out of their areas of original settlement and into more rural, Conservative-voting areas, they could end up swinging the electoral balance in Labour's favour in these constituencies. It is possible, some suggest, that fairly small shifts in the distribution of the immigrant population throughout the country could sufficiently reduce the ability of the Conservative party to win in marginal seats as to make it difficult for them to win future elections at all.

We stress that this is an exceedingly complex matter, upon which light could only be shed by a dense, data-heavy analysis of the type that one would find in higher-level, academic partisan analysis. Indeed, it is something considered by Richard Webber and Trevor Phillips in one of the articles of theirs we looked at earlier. Readers will have noted that we give partisan analysis fairly short shrift in general. Nonetheless, we stand by our earlier claim that partisan analysis that rests upon a foundation provided by structural analysis is not worthless.

The significance of this development, if it did in fact transpire, would be as follows. The effective gerrymandering of our system results in those most concerned about immigration, UKIP voters, being almost entirely shut out of power. We mentioned earlier that UKIP has been polling at roughly 15% in the run-up to the 2015 general election, but is still expected to win only a handful of seats. Additionally, it must be borne in mind that this fact presumably leads many who would otherwise vote for UKIP to vote Conservative instead, to keep Labour out. So

we have would-be UKIP supporters reluctantly voting for their second-choice party due to effective gerrymandering, and those who do vote UKIP finding that the party simply does not win seats at all proportional to its vote totals throughout the country.

Now contrast this with what might happen, or might already be happening, with respect to the immigrant-origin population and its diffusion out of the cities into hitherto Conservative-dominated areas. Relatively small numbers of, to put it crudely, black and brown Labour voters tipping the balance in marginal constituencies and colouring the electoral map red (i.e. Labour) where it used to be blue (i.e. Conservative) would represent a reassigning of disproportionate political power towards those black and brown voters.

If these two phenomena were to occur together, they would constitute an instance of effective gerrymandering on a large enough scale to bring about a significant shift in political power away from those white British voters most concerned about immigration to those immigrant-origin populations that those white British voters were, if they were honest, most resentful of and least identified with. It is difficult to imagine a development more likely to delegitimize the electoral process in the eyes of a large fraction of the white British population.

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The preceding thoughts should not be taken as an exhaustive analysis of the electoral prospects of the various main parties in British politics. On the contrary, such an analysis would be a) a partisan analysis, which is not our objective, and b) something we could not conduct in any case. Some readers will be aware of the current surge of support for the Scottish Nationalist Party, which threatens to destroy Labour's electoral hopes in Scotland. Others will wonder, quite legitimately, whether UKIP might not be capable of eating into Labour support in its traditional heartlands, as the Labour base of working-class white people on the one hand, and black and brown people on the other, fragments with the release of pent-up nationalistic feeling. There are few certainties in British electoral politics at present.

Furthermore, readers should bear in mind that both of the phenomena we have discussed here, perverse PP movement and effective gerrymandering, are direct consequences of the constituency-based, first-past-the-post system of British electoral politics. They are contingent phenomena and, in a proportional representation system, they would not arise, though it is entirely possible that other sets of problems we have not considered here would arise instead.

We will point out in closing that one of the advantages of structural analysis over partisan analysis is that it is not invalidated by changes in electoral systems. A purely partisan analysis such as that offered up by Webber and Phillips in their pieces for *Demos Quarterly* would become completely redundant overnight if significant electoral reform were introduced in Britain. Neither our system diagrams, which are not fundamentally concerned with party politics at all, nor the structural insights we claim to glean from them, would be even slightly affected by any electoral reform that stopped short of stripping the right to vote away from large numbers of people. For this reason, they constitute a far more fundamental mode of analysis than any partisan analysis ever could.

In Conclusion

Thus far our discussion has tried to avoid making any moral judgements about the phenomena under discussion or those responsible for them. This has been a deliberate stance, adopted to stress our belief that it is both possible and necessary to consider these matters in a detached, analytical fashion, free of any kneejerk tendency to take sides or assign blame. Readers should in no way interpret this as an indication that we actually take no sides and assign no blame. We do both. But it is not appropriate, when introducing a model for thinking about complex phenomena as we have done in this document, to muddy the waters of discussion with any expression of personal feelings about blame and responsibility. Now that we have delivered our analysis as dispassionately as possible, we feel free to sidestep this restriction and make several observations along these lines.

The first observation to make is that the wielders of political power, in any country, are required to deal with any number of complex problems, in real time, and that it would be unreasonable to expect them to attach categorical importance to the maintenance of the ethno-religious homogeneity discussed herein at all times. As such, we cannot simply point a finger at all politicians allowing or favouring at least some immigration of ethnically distinct peoples and mark those leaders as villains. No country that wishes to be a part of the modern world can completely shut itself to outsiders in the name of maintaining homogeneity.

Secondly, we must observe that what we consider to be the validity of our arguments notwithstanding, some ethnically foreign immigrants will demonstrate such high levels of compatibility with their new countries that even fairly substantial immigration on their part would not result in particularly troublesome polarization on our system diagrams. The admission of large numbers of Armenians to the United States following the Armenian Genocide, in what was then the Ottoman Empire, would undoubtedly have increased political tensions in the US for the reasons we have outlined in such depth in this essay. Similarly, the immigration of large numbers of South Koreans in the last few decades has resulted in various tensions in the areas in which they settle. But it is far from obvious that either of these waves of immigrants constituted or constitutes some terrible threat to the political stability of the US.

The point here is not that this Armenian and Korean immigration were good for the United States or its people, and have created no problems. Korean immigration has resulted in bitter hostilities between those Koreans and the black Americans that often inhabit areas of Korean settlement in large numbers, hostilities that burst to the surface in spectacular fashion during the LA Riots of 1992. Other difficulties may well have been created by the immigration of Armenians a century ago. These are complex and profoundly subjective matters that we can make no pronouncements upon. Our point here is merely that we see no grounds to conclude that either of these immigrant communities is exerting a badly disruptive polarizing effect on American politics as a whole.

If, on the other hand, we were to consider Mexican immigration into the United States since the Immigration Reform Act, both legal and illegal, then for the reasons we have considered in detail in this document, we would be talking about something quite different. The problems and political tensions caused by the presence in the US of so many people of Mexican origin are not trivial. Neither are they subjective and simply a function of one's point of view. They are as real

and undeniable, though not as bitter or damaging, as the tensions between Tamils and Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. One may believe that Mexican immigration into the US is the best or the worst thing that has ever happened to that country. But one cannot deny that it has polarizing effects on the US system diagram, effects which exist objectively despite the difficulties involved in quantifying them.

Our own position is that large-scale immigration of ethnically and religiously alien peoples into the United Kingdom is having and will continue to have profoundly negative consequences for our ability to enjoy the benefits we have come to expect from our democratic form of politics. This should not be taken as an endorsement of unlimited immigration of European peoples from, for example, Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria. Rather, it is simply a statement of our belief that the kaleidoscopic ethnic mix we are creating in, most obviously, our major cities, is not and cannot be compatible with the maintenance of a healthy democratic politics, whether on a local or national basis. Coupled with the attitudes and behavior of Muslim diasporas in particular, its consequences are likely to be extremely destructive.

We must make the observation that, once the necessary conditions for healthy democratic politics have been destroyed, there is no way to recreate them in the now-ethnically diverse societies we inhabit without a level of coercion and disenfranchisement that would have to be described as revolutionary, both in type and scope. Given that there was no reason for these terrible developments to take place at all, we are surely entitled to suggest that those responsible for them would deserve harsh judgement even if they had been guilty of no more than foolish blundering. How much more harshly then, must we judge them if their actions were not the result of a series of blunders, but instead of a desire to derive partisan political advantage from the rapidly growing immigrant communities their policies were creating?

It would strain credulity to suggest that a serious political party, which by its nature can only implement its political platform if it can win elections, does not attach an overwhelming importance to its ability to do so. Staying with our British political context, if we then observe that an immigrant community votes overwhelmingly for the Labour Party, and that the Labour Party introduces or has introduced policies that must result in the rapid growth of that community, there are only two ways we can interpret this. Either the Labour Party considers the policies intrinsically meritorious and discovers, almost to its own surprise, that they also lead to electoral advantage, *or* it introduced them, at least in part, because of the electoral advantage they would offer. The first possibility here is so absurd that we must disregard it entirely. This leaves only the second possibility, that of a political party quite happily undermining the very foundations of democratic politics, and rendering large swathes of our towns and cities alien, for selfish, short-term gain.

Returning one final time to the Greek post-and-lintel we commenced this document with, we state in closing that the political analogue of this simple structure is being asked to span distances that it cannot span. When it finally collapses, we must hope that amongst the people crushed by the wood and masonry that crash down with it are those who, through their disregard for their own peoples and their desire for political gain, caused the collapse in the first place. Anything else would be unjust.