Many thanks to Hellequin GB for translating this article from Tichys Einblick:
EU Migration Pact: The next conflict on immigration
The EU Commission has presented a “Pact for Migration and Asylum”.
Critics fear that this will accelerate the UN migration pact that promotes immigration, and that the pact is intended to be the lever to break the resistance of the Eastern European states to migration.
The question that arises is whether the planned migration and asylum pact is more of a defense against “too many” immigrants, especially illegal immigrants and those who are actually not supposed to be in the country — or means a further opening towards more regular, steady and numerically expanded migration, as many critics fear in the commentary section on the “Roadmap”.
This cannot be answered with certainty at the moment — since there is still no concrete (published) pact text that could be evaluated, and presumably the authors of the pact are also torn between humane intentions and the recognition of all kinds of practical problems.
In addition, the commission shies away from open conflict with Eastern European states, which, unlike Germany, are fighting for a limitation and see the German situation as a deterrent.
There is simply no one ideal solution for major global migrations from densely populated, rather poorer regions; this was sufficiently shown by the dispute over the UN migration pact of 2018.
The European conflict remains and is intensifying.
The conflict between the self-proclaimed immigration countries such as Germany and the opponents of massive and unbridled immigration is coming to a head — and it is to be feared that Angela Merkel will try to break the resistance against immigration.
Extensive declarations of intent
The currently available statements on the EU pact contain declarations of intent that amount to a “defense”, control and reduction of the number of migrants. There should be a (security, health and identity) preliminary examination of asylum seekers at the EU’s external borders, the consistent return to their countries of origin of persons not entitled to protection, i.e. the prevention of long-term stays in Europe without authorization. The EU border authority Frontex is to be strengthened and a more intensive security-related exchange between the countries is to control migration. So far so good.
However, the drafts up to now also contain elements such as the principle of the routine EU-wide distribution of all persons considered eligible, as well as a yes to legal migration and resettlement programs for refugees. This increases the potential for immigration and is also intended to cover those regions in which the rights of the state population are taken into account even more, and which do not see themselves as immigration countries, as is the case in Germany. One may understand this passage as an attack on Poland, Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary, which generally reject further migration and distribution mandates.
Signal for more migration to Europe
There is a risk that the new migration and asylum pact will dramatically increase in their countries of origin the number of people willing to migrate, and that it will be interpreted as a signal that Europe also accepts and wants to (and can) manage more extensive migration.
Asylum centers at the EU’s external borders may contribute to this, especially if they are coupled with intensive legal protection (the possibility of objecting to negative asylum notifications, etc.) in the interests of human rights organizations.
The EU is clearly endeavoring to use new, specific regulations and procedures to convert the current, sometimes chaotic, weaknesses of real immigration into a clear, controlled, regular system. Which should be easier in theory than in practice.
It remains to be seen — beyond the crucial question of how migration will develop in terms of magnitude in the coming years — to what extent many possibly meaningful theoretical building blocks can be implemented in real life and with which goal.
This concerns, for example, the successful securing of the external borders — whereupon the role of private and church “sea rescue”, which Germany promotes as a lever for more African immigration, would have to be clarified.
What needs to be clarified is the harmonious cooperation with numerous countries of origin and transit, the acceptance of the EU-wide distribution mechanisms by the affected immigrants, who in case of doubt would also have to accept Finland or Romania as their new home.
So far, immigrants have chosen the destination country with the highest level of benefit for them.
In general, the willingness of migrants to respect rejected asylum notices should be promoted — this is also a conflict: rejected asylum seekers can effectively remain in Germany; the restrictive effect of the asylum law is not applied.
This state of de facto open borders between states and their social systems is encountering resistance in more and more countries, not only in Eastern Europe, but also in Scandinavia.
Will the resistance of Eastern Europe be broken?
The biggest question mark remains, for example, how Eastern European countries can be integrated into a common European asylum system.
Should countries, possibly EU net recipients, “avoid” accepting immigrants through financial payments, these will accordingly cluster in willing states such as Germany, which has virtually ceased carrying out deportations and always accepts new waves of immigration.
Basically, the EU-wide distribution of migrants is lacking because the living conditions and socio-economic requirements / benefits for migrants are very different in individual countries — and migrants behave accordingly.
In the comments on the “Roadmap” website, which gathers numerous constructive contributions, the EU project is seldom welcomed unreservedly, but it is often emphasized that the current and future state of the host countries also plays a role in migration issues.
For example, in the shadow of the Corona crisis, commentators point to the dangers of overloading the social systems, excessive economic migration and the immigration of poverty.
Problems with the integration of the existing immigrants, population density and land consumption in the host country, too few vacancies, etc. are emphasized.
The issues of asylum and migration (in general) should be clearly separated. Many observers are concerned that continuous immigration will overwhelm European states.
Seen in this way, perhaps the core objective of the new migration and asylum pact, described on the website, is “to create a comprehensive, sustainable and crisis-proof framework for the management of asylum and migration in the EU and the entire migration route from the country of origin and transit to the host countries to be covered.”
It is about an integration pact that addresses the question of how the refugees and migrants received can be specifically integrated into the host countries.
Ultimately, ideally, the causes of migration should also be taken into account.
These are the real, difficult issues, not just the European standardization and redistribution of more and more so-called “refugees”.
Therefore, the fear remains that the pact will only serve to promote immigration and remove resistance to it.