The Council on Foreign Relations is an American-based think tank. It was founded in 1921 in order to help leaders and policymakers “better understand the world and the foreign policy choices facing the United States and other countries”. Its website says it has “no affiliation with the U.S. government”, and that is quite true: the CFR is primarily affiliated with the trans-national elites who consolidate and manage the emerging regime of global governance.
The list of officers, directors, emeriti, and members of the CFR reads like a who’s-who of the Washington/New York power elite. Among the names I recognize are John Abizaid, Fouad Ajami, Madeleine Albright, Tom Brokaw, Martin Feldstein, Maurice Greenberg, Carla Hills, Richard Holbrooke, Colin Powell, Penny Pritzker, David Rockefeller, Robert Rubin, Laura D’Andrea Tyson, Vin Weber, Christine Todd Whitman, and Fareed Zakaria. These are the people who circle the centers of power in Washington D.C., playing musical chairs in lobbying firms, think tanks, charitable organizations, and the Cabinet. Not coincidentally, many of them are also frequent attendees at the World Economic Forum in Davos, annual Bilderberg Group meetings, and other popular venues where the movers and shakers of the New World Order meet to chart our global future.
A recent CFR article takes a look at the migration crisis in Europe from the perspective of the NWO. Those who would “harmonize” the borderless global society have every reason to be concerned about the situation in Europe. Yet what they find alarming is not the mass influx of illiterate third-world refugees itself, but the possibility that the crisis might enhance the popular appeal (and thus the political clout) of “nationalist” and “xenophobic” parties in Europe.
The article is full of useful facts and statistics on the current refugee crisis in Europe. If you want to know how many migrants there are, where they originate, and where they are landing, the CFR has all the data. Its editorial opinions, however, are a different issue.
To give you an idea of the slant imposed on the raw data, consider this 2011 photo of Tunisian refugees at Lampedusa, which was used as the header for the CFR article:
This particular photo was taken in Lampedusa during the “Camp of the Saints” crisis of 2011, when the rate of migration into the EU generated by the “Arab Spring” was even greater than it is today. Of all the photos that could have been used for the piece, the editors at CFR chose one of the most innocuous. These young Tunisian men are poignant and affecting in their dejection. And they appear — dare we say it? — almost white, and therefore less subliminally threatening to the gutmenschen of Europe and North America.
Needless to say, this photo is not representative of the thousands that were taken during the crisis of 2011. More typical examples may be found among these shots of the arrivals in Lampedusa:
Lampedusa: boatload of refugees #1
Lampedusa: boatload of refugees #4
Lampedusa: boatload of refugees #7
Malta: boatload of refugees #2
Sicily: boatload of refugees #1
There were hundreds — perhaps thousands — more boats just like these, packed to the gunwales with desperate, illiterate, and mostly Muslim refugees from all parts of Africa and the Middle East. The crisis triggered by their arrival in Italy, Malta, Greece, and Spain cannot be solved by disbursing a few hundred million more euros from the coffers in Brussels, or expanding the refugee reception camps in Sicily and Calabria, or establishing new job training centers in Rome and Athens.
This is a deep, intractable, systemic crisis engendered by the very same immigration policies that the CFR is doing its utmost to protect.
Below is the complete article from the CFR website. I’ve marked certain sentences and phrases in red for later discussion.
Europe’s Migration Crisis
by Jeanne Park, Deputy Director
April 30, 2014
The rising tide of migrants and asylum seekers fleeing turmoil in Africa and the Middle East poses complex challenges for European policymakers still reeling from the political fallout of recent economic upheaval. To date, Europe’s collective response to its growing migration crisis has been ad hoc and, critics charge, more focused on securing the bloc’s borders than on protecting the rights of migrants and refugees. Many European Union countries struggling with high levels of unemployment and reduced government services have also seen a rise in political extremism and xenophobia. These developments have raised concerns about an erosion of EU core values like human rights and travel freedoms opened up under the Schengen Agreement. With nationalist parties projected to make big gains in the May 2014 European elections, it remains unclear if political headwinds will facilitate a new climate of immigration reform.
Where do these migrants and refugees come from?
Political upheaval in the Middle East and North Africa is reshaping migration trends in Europe. In 2011, the number of illegal border-crossing detections in the EU jumped by nearly 35 percent from the previous two years to 141,000 as thousands of Tunisians started to arrive at the Italian island of Lampedusa, off the coast of Sicily, following the onset of the Arab Spring. Sub-Saharan Africans fleeing unrest in Libya followed in 2011-2012. In 2013, European border agency Frontex reported another spike of detections along the EU’s maritime borders, this time due to the growing numbers of Syrian refugees. The EU also received more than 350,000 applications for international protection in 2013, the highest number since data collection began in 2008.
Illegal border crossings most often fall along several major routes spanning the southern and eastern borders of Europe. In 2013, a surge in detections occurred along the central Mediterranean passage, with Lampedusa and Sicily serving as the main entry points for migrants and asylum seekers from Syria, Eritrea, Egypt, and Somalia. Deteriorating security situations in Libya, Central African Republic, and South Sudan are also seen as contributing factors to this growing migration crisis. Some experts believe that the withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force troops from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 will spur an exodus of Afghan asylum seekers to Europe.
Making a distinction between asylum seekers and economic migrants is not always clear cut, even though they are entitled to different levels of assistance and protection under international law. This gray area is frequently exacerbated by the inconsistent methods with which asylum applications are often processed across the EU’s twenty-eight member states.
Which EU member states have been hardest hit by the crisis?
The EU member states hardest hit by the economic crisis — Greece, Italy, Malta, Cyprus, and Spain — have also served as the main points of entry for migrants and refugees because of their proximity to the Mediterranean Basin.
The Eastern Mediterranean route has seen the highest level of irregular migration since 2008. In 2012, 51 percent of migrants (PDF) entering the EU illegally did so via Greece. That shifted in 2013 after Greek authorities enhanced border controls under Operation Aspida (or “Shield”), which included the construction of a barbed-wire fence at the Greek-Turkish border.
Increased Spanish patrols in the waters off western Africa have curbed migration along the Western Mediterranean passage in recent years. However, 2013 saw an uptick in activity along the Strait of Gibraltar, with new reports surfacing of migrants traveling in dinghies to elude detection.
With the resurgent popularity of the Central Mediterranean passage in 2013, Italy and Malta have borne the brunt of the most recent wave of irregular migration. According to Frontex, there were more than 31,000 illegal border crossings along this route during the first nine months of 2013, almost quadruple the number of detections there compared to the same period in 2012. Several major incidents of boats capsizing off the coast of Lampedusa last year, including one in October 2013 that claimed more than 360 lives, garnered global attention and elicited calls from human rights activists, Pope Francis, and policymakers for a united European response to the migration crisis.
Entry-point states bear unilateral responsibility for migrants under the Dublin Regulation (PDF). Revised in 2013, this EU law continues to stipulate that asylum seekers must remain in the first European country they enter, and that country is solely responsible for examining migrants’ asylum applications. Migrants who travel to other EU states face deportation back to the EU country they originally entered.
To facilitate burden sharing across the EU, entry-point states have called for the suspension of the Dublin Regulation. However, northern European countries like Germany, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and Belgium point out that they registered 70 percent of the 332,000 applications received by the EU in 2012.
“Both the burden and the sharing are in the eye of the beholder. I don’t know if any EU country will ever find the equity that is being sought,” says Center for Strategic and International Studies senior fellow Heather Conley.
What conditions do these migrants face?
Migrant detention centers along Europe’s southern periphery — in Greece, Italy, Spain, and Malta — have all invited charges of abuse and neglect over the years. Many rights groups contend that a number of these centers violate Article III of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment.
“We used to think of migration as a human security issue: protecting people and providing assistance,” says Geneva Center for Security Policy deputy director Khalid Koser. “Now we clearly perceive — or misperceive — migration as a national security issue. And the risk of securitizing migration is that you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses.”
In Italy, migrants face fines and deportation under the controversial Bossi-Fini immigration law, which stipulates that they must secure work contracts before entering the country. This 2002 law makes illegal migration (and aiding illicit migrants) a punishable offense. Despite its severity, some say it has done little to curb the flow of migrants in recent years.
The situation is especially acute in Greece, which hit hard by a four-year-old debt crisis and successive rounds of austerity measures. Overcrowded facilities lacking proper ventilation, clean water, and sanitation have been blamed for compromising migrants’ health, and police mistreatment and harassment continue to elicit censure from rights groups. Ascendant right-wing extremist groups like Golden Dawn that campaign on anti-immigrant platforms have also contributed to an uptick in xenophobic violence. The country’s soaring unemployment rates and drastic cuts in public spending mean there is scant economic opportunity and welfare support for migrants and refugees.
While these Mediterranean states received about half of the €1.82 billion the EU set aside for external border funds for 2007-2013, the budget for migration issues is limited because all EU states have curbed public spending in the wake of the economic crisis. Similarly, Frontex saw its annual budget cut from €118 million in 2011 to €85 million in 2013. In December 2013, the European Commission created an emergency fund of €50 million to help countries facing “high migratory pressure,” with €30 million set aside for Italy. However, many critics charge that these funds are insufficient to address the magnitude of the situation.
In contrast, migrants in the richer north find comparatively well-run asylum centers and generous resettlement policies. But these harder-to-reach countries often cater to migrants who have the wherewithal to navigate entry-point states or obtain expensive travel documents that ensure safe air passage with the assistance of traffickers. These countries remain inaccessible to most migrant groups looking for work or international protection.
How has the European Union responded?
As with the sovereign-debt crisis, national interests have consistently trumped European ones in the areas of migration and asylum. This was illustrated in 2011, when France briefly reintroduced border controls in the free-movement Schengen area, a cornerstone of the European project, in response to the influx of thousands of Tunisian and Libyan refugees in neighboring Italy.
The adoption of “fortress” policies by several EU member states has come at a high cost, some rights groups contend. In Greece, the implementation of stricter border-control operations, like its Aspida program, has taken precedence over reforming a dysfunctional asylum system. And while Aspida has successfully lowered the numbers of migrants entering the EU via the Greek-Turkish border, many rights activists believe that fortified land borders have simply pushed refugees and migrants to risk more dangerous sea passages.
The more economically stable countries of the north have continued to offer more inclusive migration and asylum policies. In September 2013, Sweden announced that it would offer permanent residency to all Syrian refugees. Germany also committed to offer ten thousand Syrian refugees temporary residency late last year. But some experts say these policies run counter to the trend of anti-immigrant sentiment that is gaining hold in both countries as well as across much of Europe.
“The backdrop to this [growing anti-immigrant sentiment] is the difficulty that many European countries have in integrating minorities into the social mainstream. Many of these immigrants are coming from Muslim countries, and the relationship between immigrant Muslim communities and the majority populations is not good,” says CFR’s Charles Kupchan. “Europe has historically embraced more ethnic than civic approaches to nationhood, unlike the United States, and that is part of the reason immigration is proving so difficult,” he says.
The recent economic crisis has also spurred a demographic shift across the continent, with citizens of crisis-hit states migrating to the north in record numbers in search of work. And while the issue of intra-EU migration has sparked anxiety over social welfare benefits in recent months, “those who are coming from the Middle East and North Africa tend to provoke more heated political debate because of this issue of communal cleavage and integration,” says Kupchan.
What are the main proposals for managing the crisis?
In June 2013, the European Parliament voted in favor of establishing a framework for a common European asylum system. However, implementation and enforcement across the twenty-eight-member bloc remains a challenge, and many critics charge that the legal framework lacks clarity and still gives too much discretion to member states. “Migration is an issue that strikes at the heart of sovereignty. It’s about national identity, economic competitiveness, security — so it’s not surprising that governments are not willing to cede much ground,” says CSIS’s Conley.
While most EU member states have generally been receptive to recommendations for expanded maritime patrols in the Mediterranean and the adoption of technology and information sharing tools, there has been less agreement about instituting policies that safeguard the rights of asylum seekers and migrants.
A 2013 Mediterranean Task Force report (PDF) stressed the needs for increased cooperation with countries of origin and transit to curb trafficking and more legal paths for migrants. The report proposed allowing migrants to apply for asylum from countries of origin or transit, thereby eliminating the need for risky and illegal crossings, as well as issuing humanitarian visas to refugees from recognized conflict zones like Syria.
These proposals have failed to gain much traction. Experts say that any movement on immigration reform is unlikely before the European Parliament elections in May 2014, in which nationalist parties across the continent are expected to make significant gains.
What are the potential consequences of an inadequate EU response?
The lack of a coordinated EU response to Middle Eastern and North African migration in the near-to-mid-term could exacerbate the ways in which individual countries see migration through the lens of national security rather than international protection.
“The political response of countries pushing migrants out or incarcerating them for long stretches runs counter to the very values that the EU promotes, like protecting human life and the right to asylum,” says Conley.
In addition to undermining core values of the EU, Conley fears that a sustained influx of migrants could spur more member states to suspend Schengen, as France did, for longer stretches of time. “I suspect if the politics surrounding migration really start getting messy, you’ll see countries reintroducing internal borders with greater frequency, which means they would have chiseled away at one of the main pillars of Europe, which is the free movement of people,” she says.
Policymakers also worry about the longer-term effects of rising xenophobia and nationalism. Many cite Switzerland’s recent vote to impose quotas on immigration from EU countries as an example of how mobilized anti-immigration parties can fundamentally change a country’s politics.
“The longer these nationalist parties have the upper hand and become more mobilized and professionalized, then it be may be that they can continue the spirit of anti-immigration even once Europe begins to recover economically. That is my concern,” says the Geneva Center’s Koser.
Now let’s take a look at the interpolated editorial opinions — implied or overt — of the Council on Foreign Relations:
…more focused on securing the bloc’s borders than on protecting the rights of migrants and refugees
Why shouldn’t Europe be more concerned with securing its borders than coddling people who illegally breach them? Isn’t one of the prime functions of a sovereign state to protect its borders against all encroachments?
Even devotees of the European Union — as distinct from those who wish to re-establish the sovereignty of individual European nation-states — should support border controls at the frontiers of Europe. The refugees who wash up on European shores deserve charitable consideration, but the rights of the natives come first.
[I]t remains unclear if political headwinds will facilitate a new climate of immigration reform.
One may assume that the CFR understands “immigration reform” to mean the same thing in Europe that it does in the United States — i.e., opening the borders to all and sundry in the name of “social justice”.
The EU also received more than 350,000 applications for international protection in 2013, the highest number since data collection began in 2008.
How could any political entity, even one the size of the EU, sustain such an annual rate of influx without destroying itself?
The unemployment rate for young people in much of Europe is already near 50%, and even higher in Greece and Spain. The boat people are mostly young, and those who are willing to work will underbid local wage rates, driving even more twenty-somethings onto the dole. Those who are unwilling to work — a large proportion, based on previous experience — will draw welfare benefits for themselves, their wife or wives, and their 4.5 children per wife.
The political and economic systems of southern Europe cannot withstand such migration rates, no matter how much harder the Germans work to pay for further bailouts. If the current trend continues, it can only end in collapse.
“Now we clearly perceive — or misperceive — migration as a national security issue. And the risk of securitizing migration is that you risk legitimizing extraordinary responses.”
But aren’t extraordinary responses called for?
And if you don’t legitimize them, you can expect illegitimate ad-hoc responses that will be far more brutal and inhumane than anything the state could ever devise.
And while Aspida has successfully lowered the numbers of migrants entering the EU via the Greek-Turkish border, many rights activists believe that fortified land borders have simply pushed refugees and migrants to risk more dangerous sea passages.
What has pushed migrants to cram the rickety boats and make the crossing to Lampedusa is the fact that the vast majority of them succeed, and will never be sent back to Africa or the Middle East. They’ve all seen what happened to their predecessors, and they know the “Mare Nostrum” initiative will do its best to rescue them. They know that when they get to Europe, they will live far better than they did at home. They know that only a small percentage of illegal migrants will be sent back, and an even smaller proportion will die trying to make the crossing.
That’s why they risk the more dangerous sea passage.
…the difficulty that many European countries have in integrating minorities into the social mainstream.
There are two important points to be made here:
|1.||It is simply impossible for Europe to integrate immigrants in the numbers that have been arriving since 2011.|
|2.||It is impossible to integrate large numbers of Muslim immigrants under any circumstances. Muslims refuse to integrate. Their cultural, religious, and political ideology prohibits integration.
[T]here has been less agreement about instituting policies that safeguard the rights of asylum seekers and migrants.
Policies that safeguard the rights of asylum seekers must take a back seat to the safety, prosperity, and cultural integrity of European natives. All other priorities constitute a betrayal of native Europeans and a violation of the fundamental contract the state makes with its citizens.
“The political response of countries pushing migrants out or incarcerating them for long stretches runs counter to the very values that the EU promotes, like protecting human life and the right to asylum,” says Conley.
The very values promoted by Ms. Conley, if applied by the European Union over the interests of its citizens, would destroy both the Union itself and its component states. Why would any sane person promote such values?
…rising xenophobia and nationalism
Now we’re getting down to the nitty-gritty. Above all else, European nationalists must be squashed.
“The longer these nationalist parties have the upper hand and become more mobilized and professionalized, then it be may be that they can continue the spirit of anti-immigration even once Europe begins to recover economically…”
And we can’t have that, can we?
No matter what, immigration must not be opposed. Our global masters have made the decision, and there will be no choice: the immigrants must come.
Mass immigration is overwhelmingly opposed by Europeans, Australians, and North Americans, but political leaders have imposed it on their electorates anyway. When it comes to this issue, “democracy” is a complete sham. This failure is indicative of a concerted, deliberate plan by the elite leaders of Western governments who meet at international gatherings to decide the future of their peoples, regardless of those peoples’ wishes.
One may charitably assume that mass immigration was originally planned with the best of intentions. Demographic trends in the West were already apparent forty or fifty years ago. Anyone charged with looking ahead and planning for the future welfare of his people could see that the welfare system would become unsustainable in half a century without a drastic change of course. The obvious solution was to import foreigners who would replenish the supply of young tax-paying workers as the native population aged and retired.
I don’t think those early planners realized that it couldn’t possibly work. I doubt they examined Islamic culture in any depth. And why should they? Muslim countries were so obviously inferior. The wretched refuse of their teeming shores would be surely be delighted to migrate to the West and enjoy all the benefits of civilization whilst working hard to take care of aging white people.
It was such a great idea. What could possibly go wrong?
It’s too late now; the clock can’t be turned back. The system doesn’t work, but there is no longer any alternative. The immigrants must come, millions upon millions of them. Any opposition to the process must be ruthlessly squashed, by any means necessary.
Hat tip: LS.