Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy, Part 2

“Allah has purposely created the infidels and their science in such a way that they are low-hanging fruit for his followers.”

Below is the second part of a three-part essay by Hans-Peter Raddatz about the EU, the Mediterranean Union, the Islamization of the West, and the deliberate engineering of the “Arab Spring” by the global elites to serve their own long-term goals (previously: Part 1, background by Rembrandt Clancy). It was originally published at Die Neue Ordnung in pdf form, and has been kindly translated from the German by JLH:

Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy

by Hans-Peter Raddatz

3. Allah’s Order and Democracy

The integral identity of Islam, which has been retained through all historical vacillations from the time of Mohammed until the present day, is central. While we are dealing here with a kind of eschatological totalitarianism which puts Allah in the center of the worldview as the only point of reference that is yet to discuss, the dialogue propaganda appears like a friendly addition, which continues the tradition of the Enlightenment by destroying the ancient Judaeo-Christian culture and its tradition of scientific thought, and gradually filling the resultant vacuum with pro-Islamic reflexes, i.e., with the integral identity of Islam. The historical healing power of Islam above and beyond the characteristic perpetual Christian use of force and the Islamic state of peace was presented to the public with few, but effective — because endlessly repeated — verbal shibboleths, as a phenomenon as diffuse as it is suggestive; “not a monolith” but disintegrating into “many colorful facets” which had for centuries been enriching and fructifying the West politically, psychologically, religiously, economically, esoterically, ideologically, socially (John Esposito, Who Speaks For Islam? – 2008) and freeing it from the errors and faulty connections of the ancient Judaeo-Christian culture. While this multiple signpost curiously yields the German acronym PREIS (PRICE/PRIZE), which will occupy us later in several ways, the propaganda machine of the “dialogue” creates a further central aspect — jihad, which is not to be seen simply as war, but as an “effort of faith” in which Muslims struggle for inner purity, so that they may more righteously encounter non-believers. Since there is “no compulsion in faith,” this can only be assured if Muslims expand not only unhindered and “authentically,” i.e., isolated, but are also supported by local governments and authorities in the expansion of their mosques and political, social and educational network.

Representative of this and other practice-oriented models of the cultural dialogue is the American Jesuit theologian, John Esposito, who directed the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy (1999-2004) and later founded the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University. He is also a member of the High Level Group of the UN Alliance of Civilizations, which has its counterpart in the OIC Alliance of Civilizations, and — with important persons — he plays a central role in the global Islamic strategy for Islamization of the West (Bat Ye’or, loc. cit.) This intercultural multi-tasker belongs, not least, to the forum of the World Economic Council of 100 Leaders, which directs the worldwide streaming of information, productivity and finance and sets the course for ever more subtle and anonymous control mechanisms and techniques in mass influence through the media. With the interpretive power of the money standard, this elite council is an informal but deciding factor in the collaboration of global organizations with national leaderships and their influence on central institutions and functions — media, army, finance, infrastructure, accounting. It is pure coincidence that this list yields the acronym MAFIA. It has no connection to polemics, but may serve as a mnemonic device, if you consider its potential combination as a medium of integration, without whose “PREIS principle” such a comprehensive dynamic as the present elite usurpation of the global economic, financial, social and cultural potential would hardly be possible.

Against this global political background we can discern the three cited “movements” which (systemically and therefore involuntarily), are reproducing the strategic model at the network level with Wahhabism, Salafism and the Muslim Brotherhood. The last of these has already existed for 100 years. It is about furthering the collective behavior integral to Islam, the intrinsic missionary and expansionist pressure in the encounter with Western culture, and sending out tendrils in the form of bogus open “dialogue” and clandestine infiltration. This is in line with the Koranic technique of deception and the Western right-left cultural interchangeability, whose “class-racism,” measured on the scale of the PREIS principle, privileges Islamic immigration, deceives the institutions of the hated civil state by wearing the mask of tolerance and — unnoticed by the entertainment-oriented population — is approaching the ideal of the radical (people’s) democracy.[1]

Wahhabism arose in the middle of the 18th century from the sermons of Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (died 1792) in the central Arabian Nadid province, and today — after a stormy history which divides into three historical phases of expansion and suppression — is the established religion of the Saudi state. Building on the orthodox, Hanbalite school of law, but by no means uncontested in terms of purism in Islam, it is based on the absolute unity of Allah (tawhid), and must be just as absolutely closed off from any deviation or innovation, from unbelief and idol worship (shirk). It is the most important alignment outside of Mohammed, whose companions and disciples are the righteous forebears of Islam (Arabic: salaf), who later also became the basis of the reform movement of Egyptian Muhammad Abdou (died 1905) and — as Salafists — are gaining increasing significance in the present time. At the beginning if the 20th century, mindful of the problems experienced by Mohammed with the less than controllable Bedouin lifestyle, the Wahhabis founded the Ikhwan — a Bedouin brotherhood working gradually toward a settled life. It is represented by the patriarchs of the still-migrant tribes and is a part of the highest advisory body (majlis ash-shura), which the Western cultural dialogue markets as the “nucleus of democracy.” It was possible to neutralize initial resistance by placing Bedouins in control authorities, especially the religious police (al-mutatawwi’a). The centerpiece of Wahhabism is control of the sacred places in Mecca and Medina (al-haramayn) as well as carrying out the annual pilgrimage. When it was taken over in 1925, intra-Islamic conflicts arose, especially with Egypt, because the Wahhabi purists, in rejecting the sacred cult, vandalized many graves and mausoleums and even undertook alterations in Medina to the grave of the enunciator of Islam.

Nevertheless, over the course of the century, Wahhabism proved to be a variant of Islam which, with all its orthodoxy, also displayed pragmatic flexibility and gradually — through its growing financial power — became compatible with the Sunnis of the Islamic community (umma). There was an important — if not decisive — ideological impetus after WWII, when many Muslim Brothers were imprisoned by the Nasser regime, or fled and found sanctuary, especially in Saudi Arabia. Although the USA first made it possible for the Saudis to reap growing profits from oil, this was primarily out of self-interest and changed little in its status as an alien element which identified with Britain’s hostile image of the Muslim Brotherhood, and thus reactivated the common identification with Islam (see above). This policy had as its target the “near enemy” — all Islamic governments which collaborated with the Western “distant enemy” — and essentially offered all like-minded groups a compatible platform.

Whether it is Salafism as an offshoot of Wahhabism, the Islamic Community (diama’a islamiyya) of Pakistan, the adherents of the Indian tradition (ahl al-hadith), the Taliban of Afghanistan, Hamas of Palestine, Milli Görüsh of Turkey, the cells of Al Qaida — they all can be more or less explicitly traced to the intrinsic Islamic principle of expansion by demands, threats and violence. The formula for success of the Wahhabis, who style themselves “uniters of Islam” (al-muwahhidun) consists for one thing of the ideologically and financially pervasive platform which effects a unity attributable to the success of the OIC. And for another thing, it has a moderating effect on the Islamic zealots — including their Western “dialogue” colleagues — and has made possible, despite all financial envy, the Saudi strategy of controlling their rage against the enemy and not showing their intentions too soon. Third, the concept is enhanced by the concentrated MAFIA impulses of Western de-democratization accompanied by the opportunism of the PREIS elite and radicalism of their avant-garde, while the Muslim leader classes are spared any genuine reforms, except perhaps, a minimal fig leaf. Playing perfectly into the hands of the Muslims, this development represents itself from a political-religious perspective as Allah’s creating of salvation. Allah also creates Evil, i.e., unbelief, in order to experience himself as the just law-giver — a circular self-relationship first remarked by the Jews, giving historical scholars of Islam endless material for discussion. In this context, anyone who offends against the shariatic order of salvation becomes Allah’s sacred instrument who can, nonetheless, not escape punishment, because everything allowed and everything forbidden is known. To escape the quandary between temptation (fitna) and devotion to the One, Ibn Taymiyya (died 1228), one of the highest authorities on the three concepts of Islam, recommends the Muslim avoid the risks of paganism and idol-worship (tagut) by staying away from infidels and re-orienting himself to the piety of the elders. They know the foundations of Islam: Allah, Mohammed and the world order. And this last, as tradition has developed, is concentrated on three points: the head of all things is Islam; the pillar of all things is prayer; the pinnacle of all things is jihad on the path of Allah. This comprehensive belief system (Arabic: din) is under the rubric of constant veneration of Allah, which is, after all, the sole purpose of the creation of the human being. “I created jinns and human beings so that they would worship me.” (51/56) Thus, it is a part of Western misunderstanding, which also afflicts many a Muslim, to think that this way of life could allow total devotion to the One to coexist with any other system of laws, for instance, allegiance to an infidel democracy. Any cooperation with infidels must be abjured — is only temporarily allowable if it is useful to Islam and the service of Allah, e.g., building of a mosque, Islamic education, covering of women.

Because, according to a central instruction of the Koran (33/37), “It does not befit believers to act other than as Allah and his messenger ordain.” When “dialoguing” says that Muslims are “on the path to democracy,” the similarity of phrasing points to their being rather “on the path of Allah,” ergo jihad. Because the modern age — in the style of the Habermas communication theory and/or Luhmann’s social cybernetics[2] — is deconstructing tolerance from a conscious ethical act to an unconscious function, the cultures can come together in a similarity of procedure, which is taking on radical characteristics. For it also does not befit human beings to decide differently than the doctrine of tolerance ordains. Even Luhmann had to concede that. He identified “effects of increasing severity and prioritization of the discrepancy between inclusion and exclusion” (Sociological Enlightenment, 6, 260 — Opladen, 1995). Gradually, under “elite” guidance, a general level of dehumanizing mechanization is arising, against which René Descartes warned, and later, as qualified connoisseur and critic of Kant and Hegel — also Franz von Baader (died 1841). The latter, as an avowed and uncomfortably logical Christian is doubly out of place and is not one of those quoted in support of the established, power-connected philosophy.

The timelessness of the trend, coupled with the money-fueled retro-development to neo-feudal, mafia-like, oligarchic power structures seems more sustainable. There is a strengthening anti-Christian change in the long-range world view since the Enlightenment, — seen today as an intercultural way out of democracy, in which Allah is not merely a coincidental motivating factor, or as Einstein would say, is throwing the dice. Allah has purposely created the infidels and their science in such a way that they are low-hanging fruit for his followers. The “struggle in the faith” can become an elite walk in the park, which unfortunately, in accordance with a rigid power routine, will not be accomplished without large-scale collateral damage. That is assured by the prayer mills of the culture dialogue and the daily multi-prayer giving pungent and unmistakable expression in the network of mosques all across Europe, preparing for jihad, as well as in the manifestos of Islamic organizations, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood.

Next: The Religious Technique of Islamic Terror


1.   Raddatz no doubt has in mind the many “people’s republics” of the post-WWII era.
2.   “Luhmann is probably best known to North Americans for his debate with the critical theorist Jürgen Habermas over the potential of social systems theory.” — Wikipedia.

Previous posts by or about Hans-Peter Raddatz:

2011   Mar   6   Is Secularization Possible in Islamic Countries?
2012   Dec   30   Europe and the Coming Caliphate: The Political-Cultural Scenario
        31   Europe and the Coming Caliphate: European Mufti-ism
2013   Jan   1   Europe and the Coming Caliphate: Dhimmitude versus Islamophobia
        2   The Profit for Islam from the Reduction of Thought
    Aug   6   The Visible, Gradual Surrender of Sovereignty
    Nov   7   Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy, Part 1
        9   The Slavery of “Radical Democracy”

6 thoughts on “Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy, Part 2

  1. This analysis backs up the idea that Islam cannibalized a flowering classical world and took credit for “things already in place”. It’s as much a parasitic ruling caste gone mad as anything else.

  2. Pingback: Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy: The Main Themes | Gates of Vienna

  3. Pingback: Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy: Part II, Section 2 | Gates of Vienna

  4. Pingback: Islamic Seasons and “Democratic” Global Policy: Part II, Section 3 | Gates of Vienna

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