Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Our Muslim Troubles

Part Four: The Military and the Paramilitaries

“A key difference between the Troubles and our Muslim Troubles is that there will be no hinterlands, no rural areas, in which Muslims can operate with a minimum of attention being paid to them… This will be quite a disadvantage for Muslim paramilitaries, to put it mildly.”

This is the fourth of a five-part series by El Inglés comparing and contrasting the Troubles in Northern Ireland with the coming Muslim Troubles in Britain. Previously: Part One, Part Two, and Part Three.

The entire series will be made published as a single document in pdf format after the final part is posted at Gates of Vienna.

As I have reminded readers before: El Inglés’ scenarios are descriptive, not normative. This is not advocacy, but an analysis of the likely future for Britain.

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

by El Inglés

VIII. Paramilitaries: Core Objectives

We have considered how the descent into violent conflict is likely to take place, and attained some familiarity with how Irish republicanism terrorism compares with loyalist terrorism on the one hand and Muslim terrorism on the other. Thus prepared, let us consider what we can expect of British and Muslim paramilitaries when our Muslim Troubles begin in earnest.

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In the early stages of the conflict, violence is likely to be spontaneous, disorganized, and relatively low in fatalities due to the lack of availability of weapons and the vigorous riot control efforts of the authorities. However, once the Rubicon has been crossed and it has become clear to both sides that any sort of peaceful coexistence is impossible, cooler heads on both sides will start asking themselves what their long-term objectives should be and how they are most likely to be achieved.

We should first dispense with that which is relatively trivial and easy to predict and describe: the likely nature of Muslim violence towards the British. Muslim terrorist violence is so commonplace these days that its basic nature is perfectly clear. It is not complacent to suppose that Muslims will direct a type of violence at the British very similar to that that they already direct at people who provoke their ire. Muslims will be looking mainly to consolidate geographically, establishing zones within which they have control, within which the police cannot operate, and through which people considered to be outsiders cannot pass. They will accomplish this by rioting and attacking the police as and when they try to enter ‘their’ areas. Meanwhile, hard-line Muslims will undoubtedly work to enforce their own versions of sharia law within these enclaves. These efforts will be complemented by a heightened degree of terrorist activity of the type Muslims are already engaged in.

In short, Muslims will simply be doing more of what they are doing already, and trying to do it more consistently and with greater and more permanent effect. Far more worthy of detailed analysis is the likely nature of the violence of the British paramilitaries which have not yet emerged and whose activities are therefore, at present, the great unknowns ahead of us. The only obvious precedent we have in this regard is the loyalist terrorism we have already glanced at. During the Troubles, there were two paramilitary ‘teams’: republican paramilitaries (most obviously the PIRA, but also the OIRA, INLA, etc.), whose aims were to bring an end to British rule in NI and bring about a united Ireland of whatever sort, and loyalist paramilitaries (most obviously the UDA and UVF), whose aims were to keep NI in the United Kingdom and maintain Protestant political dominance there.

Core Objectives of British Paramilitaries

We point out here that we are focusing primarily on the early and middle stages of this conflict. The permanent departure of the bulk of the Muslim population of the UK may well be the ultimate strategic objective of many British paramilitaries, but it is not something that they can reasonably work towards in the short or, probably, even the medium term, so we will put it to one side here and ask what plausible short- and medium-term objectives British paramilitaries will likely establish for themselves. The only way to try and do this is to: a) assume that they will adopt sensible objectives, b) assume that we have the insight required to determine what would actually be sensible objectives, and c) to conclude that British paramilitaries will therefore adopt the strategies we consider to be sensible. Of course, this is a great arrogance on our part, but we cannot proceed without it.

What then, would constitute a viable, reasonable set of strategic objectives for a British paramilitary organization or organizations to formulate after a descent into the widespread ethno-sectarian violence we predict here? Most obviously, it would include the following:

  • Geographical consolidation
  • Establishment of the principle of retaliation
  • Assassination of key Muslims considered hostile
  • Assassination of key non-Muslims considered hostile
  • Establishment and display of technical expertise required to pull off ‘spectaculars’

We will take these five objectives as being core objectives, the absolute bare minimum that any self-respecting broad-reach paramilitary organization could settle for in the early stages of a conflict. We will explore each in turn.

1) Geographical Consolidation

At the outbreak of our Muslim Troubles, we will have an archipelago of Muslim-dominated areas of towns and cities loosely strung out across the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the North West of England. Some of these areas will be in a state of outright hostilities with the surrounding British populations, some relatively peaceful but in a state of high tension and on the verge of hostilities. There is a crucial point here that must be understood if one is to have any grasp of the basic strategic situation that will obtain between British and Muslims: if one cannot extend numerical control over the enemy population in a tribal conflict of the type we are headed for, then extending geographical control over that population becomes a matter of overriding importance. In other words, if one cannot wave a magic wand over the Muslim population of the UK and make it disappear, then one must confine it to certain areas of the country, outside of which the ability of its members to contaminate and degrade the lives of the British people is reduced virtually to zero. Growing Muslim numbers combined with a lack of geographical control will create such an intolerable situation that it must and will be violently rejected sooner or later.

Let us divide the whole of the UK up into three non-contiguous zones, Zones A, B, and C. Zone A refers to all those locations out of which, in a tribal conflict, Muslims could not be driven by force without driving them out of the UK, such as parts of London, parts of Birmingham, Bradford and so on. Muslims could not meaningfully flee these places for other destinations in the UK as all other destinations (Penzance, Canterbury, the Scottish Highlands, etc.) would only leave them even more exposed. Zone A is concentrated in the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the north-west of England.

Zone B refers to areas out of which Muslims could meaningfully be driven without being driven out of the UK, but within which they have sufficiently large numbers, geographically concentrated to a sufficient extent, that they are not an atomised presence whose people, homes and businesses can be attacked on an isolated basis. There will be countless towns and cities across the country whose Muslim populations are such that they meet this description, such as Cardiff, Bristol, and Nottingham. These places form Zone B, which exists in a scattered, pinprick fashion across virtually the whole of England, and parts of Scotland and Wales.

Zone C consists of every other part of the UK, where Muslims exist not at all or only in very small numbers, and are of necessity scattered throughout the surrounding population in terms of where they live and work. They do not exist in large enough numbers to dominate neighbourhoods, and cannot seal themselves off from the outside world to any significant extent at all. Zone C, by definition, includes everywhere in the UK outside of Zones A and B, and accounts for the overwhelming majority of the land mass of the country.

Geographical consolidation, in a nutshell, consists of forcing Muslims in Zone C to Zones A and B, and, eventually, Muslims in Zone B to Zone A. We note that Muslims in Zone C are, by definition, few and scattered. Furthermore, they will often be running catering businesses that serve the public in the area they live in, and that are open to being disrupted by anything from a brick through the plate glass front window to an arson attack staged in earnest. Restaurants tend to take a disproportionate fraction of their revenue on just a couple of days of the week, so disruption on these days would be the most obvious way of driving them out of the area in question. This could probably be done without actually having to hurt or kill anyone, which would be useful from a propaganda point of view.

If Muslims in Zone C prove resistant to this sort of coercion, then attacks on their homes or persons will likely be resorted to in order to up the stakes. Again, readers should bear in mind that we are talking here about rural areas, with low concentrations of CCTV cameras and other elements of the surveillance state. A small group of dedicated and disciplined people, familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of the Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR) system and similar law enforcement tools, and with the discipline to maintain a degree of discretion about their activities, could probably exert considerable relocation pressure on Muslims across hundreds of square miles of Zone C. If they were prepared to use violence up to and including the lethal as and when they deemed it necessary, then it is hard to see how isolated Muslims could continue to function at all in that part of Zone C to which the paramilitaries had turned their attentions. Would one really fancy the chances of a hypothetical Pakistani trying to run a curry house in Swaffham, Norfolk (population 6,935 according to the 2001 census) when the hard men of that good county had committed themselves to burning said curry house to the ground by hook or by crook, with its proprietor inside if necessary?

We say again that it is hard to see how the police could respond to a team of the type we have already described. We are not talking here about a bunch of drunken yobs putting the odd brick through a window after a hard night’s drinking. We are talking about ruthless and organized people who are part of larger organizations with specific, even nationwide, strategic objectives, one of which is the complete expulsion of Muslims from Zone C. Short of having a permanent police presence outside every Muslim home and establishment, which is obviously impossible, it is difficult to see how the police could take any effective action at all.

As we will discuss in more detail later, a descent into tribal violence between British and Muslims will so overwhelm the apparatus of state that trying to protect isolated Muslims in Zone C is likely to prove a project that the state will abandon quickly. This will render these operations relatively cost-free for the British paramilitaries engaged in them. Given that they will require little in the way of technical or operational expertise (contrast with, for example, the PIRA’s mortar attack on Downing Street in 1991), there will be no obvious operational barriers to engaging in them, and they will probably attract people we shall euphemistically refer to as freelancers as well.

As a consequence of the foregoing considerations, the Muslim presence in Zone C must be expected to fall very quickly if British paramilitaries seriously apply themselves to bringing it down. What of Zone B? This is the hardest zone to define, but let us take Cardiff as being the most obvious Zone B location in Wales. Cardiff has a population of about 340,000 people, of whom 11,000—12,000 seem to be Muslims. The brick-through-your-window-and-then-a-petrol-bomb-if-you’re-stubborn modus operandi of those pushing Muslims out of Zone C will almost certainly be ineffective in the context of a Zone B city like Cardiff. When Muslims are concentrated in certain neighbourhoods, their ability to keep an eye on those coming and going will obviously increase, as will their ability to riot in response to violence or intimidation. In addition, the greater concentration of CCTV and similar technologies in larger towns and cities will make the process more operationally demanding and prone to result in the incarceration of would-be geographical consolidators. This makes pushing Muslims from Zone B to Zone A a qualitatively different process to pushing them from Zone C to Zones A and B, and one that probably cannot be achieved without the ability to inflict damage widely and indiscriminately in Muslim areas of Zone B. To be blunt, this means bombing them, a matter we will discuss later. Suffice it to say here that pushing Muslims from Zone B to Zone A would be a much more difficult and bloody process than pushing them from Zone C to Zone B.

The relative costs and benefits of forcing Muslims out of Zone C and into Zones A and B, and, gradually, out of Zone B into Zone A will be such that it is hard to imagine British paramilitaries not doing it. This form of broad geographical consolidation will have massive effects. It will make it clear to Muslims that Britain is not their country, and that that portion of it that they can freely access without fear of violence is actually very small. It will also have a huge morale-boosting effect for the British themselves, in that it will substantially bring to a halt the conversion of the urban UK into Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Somali enclaves, and restricting the growth of Islam to those areas it has already most contaminated. Readers can consider this a quarantine if they so desire. Either way, it is the conversion of a vast swathe of the UK into a fully-fledged no-go zone for Muslims, which will be a huge step forward in its own right. It will also be a huge challenge to the authority of state itself, and one which will demonstrate its impotence.

If all Muslims were to end up in Zone A, then geographical consolidation would be complete. Muslim population growth will presumably result in them putting demographic pressure on currently non-Muslim areas in Zone A, but that is another matter. Getting Muslims out of Zone A and back to their countries of origin would, in principle, require massive paramilitary violence and/or the intervention of the state itself and is therefore outside the scope of the essay.

2) Establishment of the Principle of Retaliation

This principle is largely self-explanatory, but is still one of the core objectives, and must therefore be discussed here. Most British paramilitaries would, given the opportunity, presumably focus their violent endeavours on those members of the Muslim community who were out to do the British people harm in some fashion. However, identifying and acting against these people is a task which taxes the resources of the security apparatus itself, and which is therefore certainly not going to be achievable by paramilitaries.[11] However, given that Muslims will certainly inflict violence upon the British, the matter of prevention arises, and it is virtually guaranteed that British paramilitaries will respond as loyalist paramilitaries did during the Troubles: by killing random Muslims.

Acknowledging the strategic sense in killing random civilians during tribal conflict is not the done thing during these times of relative peace and civility, but the underlying logic is as unassailable as it is brutal. If Muslims detonate a car bomb in the centre of London and kill 100 people, and if the perpetrators of such attacks cannot be identified in advance, then the only obvious way of trying to deter them from conducting similar attacks in future will be to have them understand that every time they kill one British person, they are also killing one or more Muslims. This is no different to what the loyalist paramilitaries were doing during the Troubles when they would kill randomly-selected Catholics.

How effective such a strategy would prove in deterring further killings is impossible to determine in advance. But the possibility that this strategy might not succeed does not render it ill-advised or foolish. Given that wars tend to have losers, there is always some group of people whose strategies are being proved inadequate in some sense. During the Pacific War, the Japanese strategy was to launch lightning attacks throughout south-east Asia, secure a huge resource base, and build up a strong enough naval deterrent to inflict such casualties on an American counter-attack across the Pacific as to force America to seek terms rather than fight the war to a conclusion. The fact that this strategy failed does not mean that it did not make any sense. It simply means that it did not work, which is not necessarily the same thing.

Exactly how far retaliatory killings go will be dependent on how many British people Muslim paramilitaries can kill, and therefore, substantially, on the efficiency of the security service and the vigilance of the British public. It is clear that, in principle, there is no limit to the amount of violence that could be perpetrated to obtain this strategic objective.

3) Assassination of Key Muslims

Britain already contains all sorts of Muslim organizations and individuals who are, to a greater or lesser extent, outspoken in service of their religious tribalism and at the expense of Britain and the British people. From Anjem Choudary (whose probable violent demise no great foresight is required to predict) to the Muslim talking heads who tell us that drawing cartoons of Mohammed should be banned on grounds of community cohesion, Britain during our Muslim Troubles will be a breathtakingly target-rich environment even for those British paramilitaries who have a hands-off policy with respect to ‘normal’ Muslims. Like a child in a sweet factory, the main difficulty will be in deciding where to start.

Ruthlessly cutting down those Muslims who are seen as being hostile, subversive, or seditious will serve to impress upon Muslims that the days of multicultural genuflection to their sensitivities are over. Though the numbers of people assassinated in this manner would probably be relatively low compared to the numbers who could be killed in spectaculars (discussed below) aimed at mass civilian targets, the psychological and morale effects would be huge. Note also that should it be the case that the British government responds to the violence we predict by looking for a ‘partner for peace’ in the Muslim community to make concessions to, the assassination of the key Muslim players will have a salutary effect in persuading said government of the obstacles such a road is likely to present them with. Partners for peace are of little use if they are dead, and their deaths will likely serve to impress upon both government and Muslims the foolishness of attempting to further undermine the British people and their way of life.

4) Assassination of Key Britons

Following on closely from the previous objective, the assassination of key British traitors and collaborators will be an obvious goal for British paramilitaries. Such ruthless folk as the paramilitary types we envisage here will have little compunction about killing people perceived to be on the other side, most obviously politicians, public intellectuals, far left activists, and journalists. Activities of this sort will help impress upon the British public as a whole that British paramilitaries believe themselves to be in a war, and that war requires that traitors and enablers of the enemy be acted against ruthlessly.

5) Spectaculars — Technical Expertise and Display

Though the core objectives do not include attempts to persuade government to act in any particular manner, they do include the demonstration, to government and other interested parties, of the capacity to act in such a manner as to utterly disrupt the normal function of society in Muslim areas, and the inability of the government to do anything to prevent this from happening. This will in turn allow the paramilitaries in question to put a great deal of pressure on government to act in the required fashion later on, when specific actions are required of it.

When we talk of spectaculars, we are, of course, making reference to the spectaculars pulled off by the PIRA in the 1990s in London and Manchester. These huge bombings, at the Baltic Exchange in 1992, Bishopsgate in 1993, and Canary Wharf and Manchester in 1996, caused devastation in the areas where they took place, some causing damage to the tune of hundreds of millions of pounds. In keeping with our earlier observations about IRA strategy, these bombings did not kill many people, especially when one takes into account their huge size: three people were killed at the Baltic Exchange, one at Bishopsgate, none in Manchester, and two at Canary Wharf. Their main objective was to cause financial damage and disrupt the everyday function of the areas they targeted.

We have already mentioned geographical consolidation, which is, of course, essentially a euphemism for ethno-religious cleansing. In this context, we discussed the relative ease of pushing Muslims from Zone C to Zone B, and the relative difficulty of pushing them from Zone B to Zone A. This objective would probably have to be achieved, at least in some cases, by car bombings, as Zone B Muslim areas are, by definition, too large and robust for isolated attacks on single targets to be able to uproot them with consistency. Of course, these attacks would have the potential to kill large numbers of Muslim passers-by if conducted without warnings. This large-scale killing is not one of the core objectives (except in the hypothetical case in which it takes place as a retaliatory attack), so we assume that British paramilitaries will try and avoid it at the stages of the conflict we are describing here. Nonetheless, this objective and the geographical consolidation objective may end up dovetailing with the use of car bombs against Muslim residential or commercial areas either at night or with warnings to limit casualties.

IX. Paramilitaries: State Response

An Outline of the Problem

If the collapse of civil order accompanying the onset of our Muslim Troubles is on the scale that we predict, deploying the British Army will be the only way the government can try to restore a semblance of order in the worst-afflicted areas. Though the police will of course be playing a supplementary role, by themselves they will be utterly overwhelmed by the scale of what confronts them, just as the RUC was overwhelmed by the rioting in Belfast and Derry in the summer of 1969.

According to standard counter-insurgency doctrine (which seems to derive substantially from British military experience around the world), there should be one soldier or policeman on the ground for every fifty people in the population throughout which the insurgency is taking place. The population of Northern Ireland during the Troubles was about 1.5 million, a number which necessitated 30,000 troops and/or police. At the height of the violence in the early 1970s, 21,000 soldiers of the regular army were deployed in Northern Ireland. They were supplemented by the RUC, which had 8,500 members at its peak and a reserve of 4,500, and the UDR, whose strength grew from about 1,600 in 1970 to 6,000 (3,000 part-time and 3,000 full-time) in 1990. Taken together, these three forces satisfied the 1-to-50 troop-to-population ratio that counter-insurgency doctrine apparently calls for in pacifying an area, during the height of the violence in the early 1970s.

However, the situation is more complex than this summary makes it appear. A tour of duty in NI for a regular army regiment was six months, after which it would be rotated out and to other duties in other parts of the world. This means that each regiment would spend only one fifth of its time in NI. More sustained exposure to counter-insurgency or other high-intensity duties would have placed unsustainable burdens, in terms of morale and psychological strain, on soldiers. What this means is that sustaining 21,000 soldiers in counter-insurgency operations requires 105,000 soldiers in total to be rotated in and out of the insurgency zone as described. The regular army currently has about 106,000 soldiers, which means that a violent conflict across a population of 1.5 million (roughly equivalent to the populations of Birmingham, Bradford, Burnley, and Oldham today) would be the upper boundary to the type of counter-insurgency campaign the regular army could fight, if supplemented à la Troubles by equivalents to the RUC and UDR that allow the 30,000 troop-equivalent figure to be made up. In other words, the current regular army would be at full stretch dealing with the Troubles at their peak.

How do things stand at present? As we have stated, the regular army has 106,000 soldiers. It can, in principle, be supplemented by the 33,000 members of the Territorial Army, and the 134,000 soldiers of the reserve for a total of 273,000 troops. Under standard counter-insurgency calculations as described above, this would allow a counter-insurgency force of 54,600, capable of fighting a standard counter-insurgency in a population of 2.73 million people. Our key assumption in this document (erring on the pessimistic side though it probably is) has been that our government(s) will keep us on a steady course towards Islamization until a crisis occurs. We have argued that this crisis cannot be more than twenty years away, so let us assume that it is exactly twenty years away. The Muslim population of the UK has risen by about 60% in the last ten years, to 2.9 million people. If we extrapolate this growth trend for another twenty years, there will be approximately 7.4 million Muslims in the UK. If we assume that the core conflict zone contains this population and a British population twice as large, then the conflict zone will contain about 22 million people. A counter-insurgency operation fought in this zone would require 440,000 troop-equivalents, which would necessitate a 2.2 million-strong force. We have already shown that the entire British Army, including reservists and the Territorial Army, has only 273,000 troops, almost exactly one eighth of the required number. If we assume that the logistical and psychological advantages of fighting so close to home (i.e. in our home) would allow troops to spend one half of their time in theatre rather one fifth (six month tours of duty alternating with six months elsewhere), then we would still have only 136,500 troop-equivalents out of the desired total of 440,000, or about 31% of the whole.

This line of reasoning makes it clear that a violent conflict spread out through those areas of the UK populated by the 22 million people we mentioned above will massively overwhelm any conceivable efforts of the state to control it. This will not only facilitate the emergence of paramilitaries, it will make their emergence absolutely certain. Indeed, government may accept, legitimise, and cooperate with at least some of the more organized paramilitaries that do emerge in an attempt to retain some influence over them.

Deployment of the British Army

The horrendous difficulties the state will encounter in trying to restore and maintain order notwithstanding, the army is still the only tool it will have at its disposal when it attempts to do so. It therefore behoves us to discuss how it might go about doing so, at least to the extent that it can.

One of the peculiar truths of the Troubles was that the regular Army, certainly from about late 1974 and the start of the PIRA’s temporary ceasefire onwards, saw very little in the way of actual combat with republican paramilitaries. When this year-long ceasefire broke down in early 1976, the war moved quickly from its earlier insurgency phase (during which the PIRA sought to force British forces out of NI outright through relatively open warfare) into its ‘Long War’ phase (during which the PIRA adopted more ‘classic’ terrorist/guerrilla tactics to inflict attrition on British forces over the long term). Engaging in open gun battles with soldiers was no longer a PIRA objective. As a consequence, the duties of regular soldiers now consisted largely of patrolling, manning checkpoints, and standing guard. During the commission of these duties they would occasionally be attacked by bombers, snipers, and the like, but very rarely engage in shooting matches with them. Nearly all of the PIRA volunteers killed by British security forces after this transition were killed by the SAS, 14 Intelligence Company (of whom more later), or the RUC.

In essence, the main role of the regular army was to deny the PIRA the ability to move and operate with ease and impunity. Taking the fight back to them was something that required the unique abilities of special forces and proactive intelligence-gathering services: to carry out surveillance in republican areas (14 Intelligence Company’s speciality), to bug houses of known republicans, to stage ambushes when intelligence of forthcoming attacks was available (most notoriously at Loughgall in 1987, when the SAS shot dead eight PIRA men), to stake out weapons caches, and to capture or kill terrorists who went to retrieve weapons from them. Broadly speaking, we expect a similar pattern to emerge with respect to the deployment of army units during our Muslim Troubles, with the regular army used to patrol and man checkpoints, and with special forces used to conduct intelligence-led surveillance and armed operations.

Regular Army

Army patrols and checkpoints will be located and conducted, of necessity, in urban areas with large Muslim populations. Muslims being what they are, this will undoubtedly be seen as a war against all Muslims, the army laying siege to Muslims, an attempt to exterminate Muslims, or some combination thereof. In contrast, relations between the army and the British public must be expected to be largely peaceful. No conceivable British paramilitary would take the targeting of the army as an objective, not only, or even primarily, because it would be strategically idiotic, but because they will simply not countenance inflicting casualties on it. This does not mean that there will be no expressions of anger or frustration in the streets about actions the army might take, but that they are unlikely to turn to violence in either direction.

To the extent that the regular army comes into violent conflict with either side, it is overwhelmingly likely that it will be with the Muslims, who will probably take to the streets to confront the army quite quickly, rioting, burning, and, as the conflict progresses, shooting and bombing as well when they can. Given the opinions that those in the British Army are likely to have of Muslims in general, and given the violence and hostility they are certain to experience from Muslims, they are unlikely to interact smoothly with them even in the absence of violence. Irrespective of the multicultural guff that senior figures in the army will undoubtedly be spouting, the sympathies of the troops and junior officers will, of course, lie entirely with their own people, and their hatred of Muslims will grow by the day.

British soldiers on the ground in Northern Ireland, after the honeymoon period between them and the Catholic population ended in the spring and summer of 1970, developed a fierce hostility towards the nationalist population of NI that was returned in spades. If this was true during the Troubles, how much truer will it be during our Muslim Troubles? All of the hard fighting that the British Army has taken part in in the last twenty years has taken place against Muslims. There is an entire generation of young soldiers coming through who have never fought anyone else, and who will be painfully well aware of the fact that the Muslim ‘Britons’ they face on the streets would have been at best ambivalent about, and at worst psychologically on the other side during, those conflicts. The hostility shown returning British soldiers on the streets of the UK will not be quickly forgotten.

The likelihood of collusion between elements within the British Army and British paramilitaries is so high as to be a virtual certainty. Collusion can mean many things, and operate at many levels, but the illicit supply of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and intelligence to British paramilitaries by troops on the ground is a sure thing, and something that it will be impossible for more senior officers to clamp down on even if they want to, which is by no means a certainty itself.

More generally, the numerical inadequacy of the British Army relative to the size of the task confronting it (even in the most optimistic scenario) will force it to deploy at only a small fraction of the locations it would otherwise like to. Zone C will be written off by the army early on, if they pay any attention to it at all, and the army presence in much of Zone B will probably be marginal. Only Zone A, in the Greater London area, the West Midlands, and the north-west of England, is likely to see troop numbers even roughly proportional to the scale of the problem. This will have great significance for the British paramilitary core objective of geographical consolidation we discussed earlier. Whether or not British paramilitaries can push Muslims from Zone B to Zone A is one of the great unpredictables of the conflict. If the British Army is largely restricted to operating in Zone A, this objective is probably attainable, and the state may well be forced to facilitate the process to reduce the violence used to bring it about. If the army can maintain a presence in Zone B, then events will be much harder to predict.

Special Forces

There were two main units of special forces used in the Troubles, as we have already noted: the SAS, and 14 Intelligence Company. The SAS was used against republican paramilitaries on intelligence-led missions that required relatively small numbers of men to operate under difficult or unusually demanding circumstances. Reading about the Troubles leaves one with few illusions in this regard: when it comes to lying, soaking wet, in a field for days on end waiting to shoot an IRA man, the SAS have few equals. More interesting though, from our point of view is 14 Intelligence Company, which was just as crucial to the fight against the IRA, albeit in a very different way.

During the early years of the Troubles, army attempts to gather intelligence in republican areas were a fairly hit and miss affair. The need to put matters on a more rigorous footing led to the creation of an undercover army company trained specifically for the task of putting under surveillance republican paramilitary members in nationalist areas of NI where uniformed soldiers and policemen could not operate. This company, 14 Intelligence Company (also known, and subsequently referred to here, as the Det) was to prove its effectiveness time and time again. However, there will be no equivalent in our Muslim Troubles, a point the explication of which will shed some light on the nature of the conflict that awaits us.

One of the most intriguing details regarding the training regime of the Det is that which pertains to their training in the Ulster Irish accent. Though the Det recruited widely across the whole of the armed services, its recruits were mainly from outside of Northern Ireland, and this of course was clear from their accents. As such, they had attain at least some ability to pass themselves off as being men (or women) of Ulster, but it is hard to believe that many of them were particularly accomplished in this regard. Insofar as one can discern from reading about their exploits, most appear to have limited themselves to a few grunts when some sort of response was absolutely called for, as being identified as an Englishman with a gun in a republican area was a good way to end up in a ditch in South Armagh a day later, bound, gagged and shot through the head.

This was a surmountable operational difficulty presented by the linguistic differences between people who were visually indistinguishable. But when we consider the nature of our Muslim Troubles, we see immediately that operating undercover in this fashion is not going to be possible to any significant extent. Nearly all of the Muslims in the UK are something other than white, and nearly everyone in the British army is white. This means that putting together a Det-style army unit to go and prowl around in Muslim areas will be impossible, as there will be no significant pool of suitable people in the army to recruit from for the purpose. It will surely not be beyond the ken of Muslims to see that mysterious white converts to Islam who start coming into their areas may not be exactly what they seem. This is what we will call the mutual impermeability problem, a problem which will bedevil the efforts of all parties to the conflict one way or another. It will be one of the biggest and most significant differences between the Troubles and our forthcoming Muslim Troubles.

Let us explore this point a little further. During the Troubles, it was impossible to tell who was on which side simply by looking at them, which is to say that the parties to the conflict suffered from the mutual permeability problem. This problem, the mirror image of the mutual impermeability problem, sometimes had remarkable consequences. Loyalist hit squads targeting republican paramilitaries would take over houses in nationalist areas and tell the occupants that they were the IRA to gain their cooperation. Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair of the UDA would go jogging in nationalist areas to gather intelligence until his personal notoriety reached such levels as to make this impossible. IRA members would take workmen off a bus and have to ask who the Catholics were and who the Protestants were before opening fire. INLA members could walk into a Protestant pub, plant a bomb, and walk out again. The Shankill Butchers would pick up victims in Catholic areas of Belfast only, as they had no other way of identifying them. A great deal of the violence during the Troubles, and the way it was carried out, only makes sense if one bears in mind the mutual permeability problem.

In contrast, the protagonists to our Muslim Troubles will suffer, as we have said, from the mutual impermeability problem. As such, we can be sure that one of the most effective weapons against the PIRA will not be available in the army’s attempts to reconnoitre Muslim areas and put Muslim paramilitaries under surveillance. This will increase the dependence of the army and security services on informers within those communities and the use of technical and electronic surveillance, all of which have their own drawbacks.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

After the descent into violent conflict, there will be vast swathes of the country that have no unusual military presence at all, and that will be free zones for British paramilitaries to move, train, and organize as they deem appropriate. Only ‘normal’ police attention will be brought to bear on them. This will allow these areas to play a role similar to the one which the Republic of Ireland played for the PIRA during the Troubles, allowing them to operate with a minimum of scrutiny. Of course, the RUC could not operate at all in the Republic, and it was difficult if not impossible for the British government to have terrorist suspects extradited to the UK, two advantages that British paramilitaries will not have during the conflict in their own hinterlands. Nonetheless, they will still enjoy huge freedom of movement and action in this area, and the police will find it very difficult indeed to disrupt it. The more vicious the conflict becomes, the less willingness there will be a) on the part of local people to report suspicious events, and b) on the part of the British police to act against British paramilitaries anyway.

A key difference between the Troubles and our Muslim Troubles is that there will be no hinterlands, no rural areas, in which Muslims can operate with a minimum of attention being paid to them. There will certainly be no equivalent of the Bandit Country of South Armagh, which the South Armagh PIRA turned into a virtual no-go zone for the British Army for most of the Troubles, through the attentions of the South Armagh sniper and others. It will be as if every single rural area in NI had been utterly dominated by loyalist populations and paramilitaries, republicans had been entirely boxed into ghettoes, there had been no Republic of Ireland to act as training ground or sanctuary, and republicans would have been immediately identifiable as such if they were so foolish as to venture out into the countryside to try and test a bomb. This will be quite a disadvantage for Muslim paramilitaries, to put it mildly.

Coming up:

Part V: A Discredited State


11. We ignore here the possibility of collusion between security services and British paramilitaries, which could, in principle, result in those paramilitaries being able to target specific Muslims to a much greater extent.

Previous posts by El Inglés:

2007   Nov   28   The Danish Civil War
2008   Apr   24   Surrender, Genocide… or What?
    May   17   Sliding Into Irrelevance
    Jul   5   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 1
        6   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 2
        8   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 3
    Aug   25   Identity, Immigration, and Islam
    Oct   4   The Blackhoods of Antifa
        26   Racists ’R’ Us
    Nov   25   Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
2009   Feb   16   Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe
    Apr   11   Pick A Tribe, Any Tribe — Part II
    May   18   To Push or to Squeeze?
    Nov   2   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 1
    Dec   5   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 2
        7   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
2010   Mar   25   The Death of Democracy
        25   Some Fallacies On the Subject of Crime — Part 1
        28   Reflections on the Civil War in Britain
    Apr   1   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part One
        2   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part Two
        5   On Vigilantism — Part One
    Oct   29   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 1
    Nov   1   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 2
        4   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 3
        2   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 4
2011   Mar   10   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part One
        11   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Two
        12   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Three
        13   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Four
    May   25   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part One: The Idiot Paradigm
        26   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part Two: The Chocolate Cake Diet
        27   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part Three: An Explosive Situation

The Facts of Islam

The Tennessee Freedom Coalition

On May 12, 2011, Bill Warner spoke at the Cornerstone Church in Nashville, TN. His speech was part of Geert Wilders’ event, “A Warning to America”, sponsored by the Tennessee Freedom Coalition.

This is one of the best presentations on Islam I’ve ever seen, especially considering that it was delivered in just under thirteen minutes.

Many thanks to Andy Miller, Lou Ann Zelenik, and the other members of the Tennessee Freedom Coalition who made this video possible, and to Vlad Tepes for editing and YouTubing it:

Since we’re in the middle of Memorial Day weekend, I’ll post this video again on Tuesday, to make sure that plenty of people get a chance to watch it.

To reserve a copy of a DVD of the entire event, including speeches by Steve Gill, Bill Warner, Sam Solomon, and Geert Wilders, email the Tennessee Freedom Coalition: info@tnfreedomcoalition.org

Previous posts about the Tennessee Freedom Coalition:

2011   May   14   A Warning to America: “It’s Islam, Stupid!”
        14   The Tennessean Weighs In
        16   Tennessee the Model
        17   Losing Our Community
        18   Being Effective in Tennessee

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/28/2011

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/28/2011Egypt opened its border crossing at Rafah today, allowing Palestinians to enter Egypt at will after four years of blockade. Residents of Gaza immediately took advantage of the new situation by crossing into Egypt for medical treatment, to do business, or to visit relatives.

In other news, during a Gay Pride parade near the Kremlin in Moscow, religious protesters attacked the marchers. Several people were arrested.

To see the headlines and the articles, open the full news post.

Thanks to AC, C. Cantoni, Insubria, JD, Lexington, Mary Abdelmassih, Nick, Steen, and all the other tipsters who sent these in.

Commenters are advised to leave their comments at this post (rather than with the news articles) so that they are more easily accessible.

Caveat: Articles in the news feed are posted “as is”. Gates of Vienna cannot vouch for the authenticity or accuracy of the contents of any individual item posted here. We check each entry to make sure it is relatively interesting, not patently offensive, and at least superficially plausible. The link to the original is included with each item’s title. Further research and verification are left to the reader.

Camp of the Saints: The Temperature Rises

Camp of the Saints Chart

Since my last “Camp of the Saints” post four or five days ago, more than 1,600 North African refugees have landed in Italy, most of them on the island of Lampedusa. My previous estimate of the total flow since January was 36,000 to 38,000, based on collected data from news stories, with official Italian reports supplying a fair amount of corroboration.

The latest additions would place the new total at 37,600 to 39,600. To make tallying easier, I’ll estimate the current total at 38,000, and use that as my baseline for future revisions. That’s the total represented on the Cultural Enrichment Thermometer in the above graphic, which will be updated periodically as the temperature continues to rise in Southern Europe.

We’ll begin tonight’s report with some of the immigration-related antics of the European Commission. It’s the usual dithering and dancing, full of sound and fury but signifying nothing.

First, a brief summary from AGI:

European Commission Issues N. Africa Migration Package

(AGI) Brussels — The European Commission has approved a new set of measures addressing migratory flows from North Africa. The package looks to establish greater solidarity and cooperation in respect of Members most affected by migrant inflow.

So the member states of the European Union will cope with the greatest refugee crisis in Europe since World War Two by… establishing greater solidarity and cooperation.

Yup, that’ll take care of it, all right. I love these nice, concrete, detailed plans of action.

ANSAmed has more. Notice the breathtaking scope of the EU’s ambitions: it will “prevent emergencies”. They like to think big, don’t they?

Pay close attention to the proposed preventive methods:

EU Launches Proposals to Prevent Emergencies

(ANSAmed) — Brussels, May 25 — The EU Commissioner for Internal Affairs, Cecilia Malmstrom, has laid down proposals aimed at “leaving the immigration emergency behind us”, by launching dialogue with North African countries, beginning with Tunisia and Egypt, designed to bring about “tailor made” agreements, facilitating entry into the EU for students, researchers and entrepreneurs. The proposals are geared towards tackling illegal immigration, by channeling migrants into regular flows that might allow Europe to continue supplying itself with the workforce that is fundamental for a continent suffering an inexorable ageing process.

So they’re going to prevent immigration emergencies by “launching dialogue with North African countries”.

You’ll also notice that Ms. Malmström is straightforward about the fact that Europe will urgently need these migrants to take care of aged Europeans, who have neglected to produce enough children to do the job.

Preventive measures will include adjustments to the issuing of visas:

Included in the package is the adoption of a protective clause to reintroduce rapidly the use of visas in Europe “in case of unexpected increases in the influx” of migrants from countries where visas have been liberalised, such as the Western Balkans. Common policy regarding asylum is also up for review.

Brussels believes that the package, which follows an announcement made on May 4, is aimed at “best managing the flow of migrants from the southern shores of the Mediterranean” and “ensuring that the current visa regulations do not allow irregularities”. The Commission says that “solidarity among the member states most exposed “to migratory pressure remains “absolutely crucial”.

So dialogue, visas, “solidarity”, and “not allowing irregularities” are the chosen instruments of coping with the migration crisis. Furthermore, there will even be “structured cooperation”. Ha! That’ll show those illegals!

“What I am proposing today goes beyond urgency,” Malmstrom said. “Our plan is to develop a more structured cooperation with North African countries. It is in the interests of both the EU and of countries in North Africa to promote mobility and well managed migration”. “Europe will be increasingly dependent on migrant workers. North Africa’s potential should be used to the benefit of both sides,” the Commissioner continued.

There’s even a “protective clause”, though it’s not clear who is being protected from what:

Malmstrom’s package includes the launch of a “protective clause” as part of the current European visa policy. The change will very quickly open to review the list of countries whose citizens need visas to enter the European Union.

And the following paragraph is absolutely incoherent, at least to anyone outside the labyrinthine recesses of the Brussels bureaucracy:

With the process of inclusion and exclusion from the list currently lasting years, the clause aims to cut review times in order to “prevent irregularities” and tackle “all potential negative consequences of the liberalisation of visas”. The hope is that external borders can be rapidly strengthened “in exceptional and well determined cases”, in the light of “unpredictable and unexpected” migratory flows.

While the Nabobs of Neighborliness were nattering in Brussels, the culture-enrichers were arriving on Europe’s southern shores. This group landed at an unusual location, Sardinia:

Ten Immigrants Aboard Fishing Boat Land in South Sardinia

(AGI) Cagliari — Ten immigrants from the Maghreb landed this morning on the south-west coast of Sardinia. They were aboard a 15 meter fishing boat which ran ashore near Cape Teulada. The immigrants, who claim to come from Libya, reached the shore near the mouth of the “Zafferaneddu” and were blocked and detained by the Carabinieri. In the meantime, the Sant’Antioco Port Authority is attempting to recover the fishing boat.

Another anomaly: a small group from Morocco tried to sneak into Spain:

Boatload of African Migrants Caught Off Almería Coast

A MOTORBOAT heading from Morocco carrying 40 would-be migrants attempting to enter Spain via the ‘back door’ has been intercepted near Punta Sabinar (Almería). The coastguard service detected the boat at around 22 miles south of the shore. They say there were seven women and two children amongst the passengers, but that all appeared to be in a good state of health. All passengers have been taken to Motril (Granada) where they are receiving first aid, food, water and clean, dry clothes from rescuers. Coastguard officials set out to the scene by air and sea after being alerted of a boat leaving a northern port in Morocco. It is not known what nationality the passengers are, since they may have travelled to Morocco from countries further south.

A third unusual arrival involved a group of Egyptians landing at Ugento, at the southern end of the heel of the Italian boot:

36 Egyptians Land in Salento

(AGI) Ugento — Thirty six Egyptian immigrants, 29 of whom underage, landed in Ugento, southern Italy, on Friday night.

The illegal immigrants, the youngest being only 11 years old, were found overnight and taken to the ‘Don Tonino Bello’ reception centre in Otranto, where they were given assistance.

No trace of the smugglers.

This group is part of the 1,600 that landed on Lampedusa in less than two days:

341 Rescued Migrants Land at Lampedusa

(AGI) Lampedusa — A new maxi landing at Lampedusa. According to the Coast Guard, 341 migrants landed at 5:30 today. Last afternoon, they were located some 60 miles offshore the Sicilian coast, on a boat in serious distress. Coast Guard and Guardia di Finanza vessels went to the rescue, saving the latest contingent of sub-Saharan migrants crossing from Libya.

After a 10-day truce, in a few hours, yesterday, over 850 migrants have reached the Italian soil. A few hundreds were crossing on two old wrecks ready to sink. 55 landed on their own at Pantelleria.

Then came 400 more:

Another 400 Migrants Land at Lampedusa

(AGI) Lampedusa — A boat with 400 migrants on board was rescued around four miles from Lampedusa. The coast guard and finance police conducted the transfer of passengers to their boats.

Some of the migrants have already landed at Favaloro harbour, while others are still on their way. The passengers of the unseaworthy vessel had to be rescued because its rudder was jammed. Three hundred and forty one had already landed by dawn.

The final report on the latest arrivals in Lampedusa:

Lampedusa Party 1600 New Arrivals in Just 36 Hours

(AGI) Lampedusa — Another landing took place just prior to 1700 hours in Lampedusa, with the arrival of 138 migrants. The latter add to the day’s total of 950. During the last 36 hours a total of 1,600 North African migrants have landed on the southern Italian island. The fresh arrivals have boarded ferry boat “Flaminia” towards mainland destinations.

All this cultural enrichment filled the temporary facilities in Lampedusa beyond their carrying capacity:

1,800 Packed Onto Lampedusa

(AGI) Lampedusa – After the landing of the latest 609 refugees today in Lampedusa, there are 1,800 immigrants on the island.

Among these are 41 women and 9 children. 1,450 of the immigrants have arrived between yesterday and today. The ferryboat “Flaminia” is on the site, equipped for the transfers. The Prefecture has already made arrangements for the embarcation of the majority of the refugees, in order to reduce the numbers in the refugee center, which is already over its maximum capacity. The immigrants will be separated for those requesting asylum in the country.

A reminder of the dangers of the crossing: 1,400 migrants — or about 3.5% of the those who have left North Africa since January — have died attempting to get to Italy. It tells you how badly they want to get out of the hellholes they came from:

More Than 1:400 Perish Trying to Reach Italian Shores

Lampedusa, 25 May (AKI) – More than 1,400 migrants have died this year while trying to reach Italian shores from North Africa, according Fortress Europe, an Italian blog that tracks the deaths through media reports. The figures were widely reported by the Italian press.

Through 23 May 1,403 people reportedly perished in the Strait of Sicily aboard boats sailing toward the island of Lampedusa – which is closer to Africa than the Italian mainland – while 1,510 have lost their lives in transit to Europe in the entire Mediterranean, the site said.

Over 30,000 people have come ashore aboard ships that had set sail mostly from Tunisia and Libya, where patrols were interrupted amid popular uprisings and civil war in the Middle East.

The trip can turn fatal when rickety vessels break up or drift for days upon weeks while transporting hundreds of would-be illegal immigrants.

Italian police last week rescued about 500 migrants from Libya after a small fire broke out on their boat close to the Italian coast.

More migrant lives have been lost during the first five months of this year than in all of 2008, the year before Italian law permitted forced repatriation, according to Fortress Europe.

Finally, a look at a slightly different aspect of the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. The current crisis is centered on the passage from Tunisia and Libya to Malta and Italy, but that is only a part of the larger picture. The migrant crisis at the Greek-Turkish border long predated the Arab Spring, and has been steadily worsening while the enrichers have been flooding into Italy.

This report looks at the enrichment crisis from both sides of the border between Greece and Turkey:

Trouble Never Ends at Greek-Turkish Border

26 May 2011 Le Monde Paris

Illegal migration into Greece has slowed at the crossing near the Turkish city of Edirne since the Frontex mission, charged by the European Union to monitor its borders, deployed there for four months. But while this gap in the Schengen Zone may be partially plugged, the problem has simply been displaced. A report.

Guillaume Perrier

Each night, vans coming from Istanbul discreetly release dozens of migrants at the border between Turkey and Greece. The region, which spreads out along the banks of the Meriç River [or Evros River in Greek], remains one of the main illegal access points into Europe. Using small boats, buoys or simple ropes drawn between the two river banks, men, women and children cross through the powerful current of this body of water that serves as a demarcation line.

On Tuesday, May 24, the European Commission presented a proposal for restrictive measures to stem growing criticism from those States most exposed to illegal migration. In 2010, the flow of illegals to the border already caused “an unprecedented humanitarian crisis,” according to Apostolos Veizis head of Greece’s Doctors without Borders team.

The migrants poured through a well-known gap to the south of the Turkish city of Edirne. Here, exists a patch of land border 12 kilometres long, easy to cross, through the fields, at night. Nearly 50,000 people were arrested in Greece in 2010 after having illegally used this access into the Schengen Free Circulation Zone, today decried throughout Europe. Thousands of others got through without getting caught.

62 people died trying to cross the river

“It’s a boulevard, that access must be closed down,” argues Georgios Salamagas, head of the police force at Orestiada, a small Greek border town. The Greek government has asserted its determination to build an anti-immigrant wall to plug those 12 km. The agency charged by the European Union to manage its border, Frontex, reacted in November by deploying 175 police officers from the 27 EU countries to the Edirne/Orestiada region.

The mission, which ended in March, had an immediate dissuasive effect. Arrests along this sensitive portion of border fell by 44%, Frontex reported. But the Orestiada police still intercepts a thousand migrants each month. More importantly, this highly-targeted operation displaced the problem further to the south. “Of course, the networks for human trafficking adapt quickly,” confirms Grigorios Apostolou, head of the Frontex team, which has opened a permanent office in Athens.

The border stretches along the Meriç River and the coast of the Aegean Sea. In 2010, at least 62 people died trying to cross the river. The bodies are rarely claimed and are buried in the village of Sidero, a Greek hamlet near the border, in a lot surrounded by wire mesh which serves as a cemetery for migrants.

“They beat us, we are treated like animals”

On the Turkish side, there is no indication of either a fall in attempts to cross the border illegally or of an improvement in the treatment of migrants. In the south, the army, which controls the border, reinforced its patrols. At the Pazarkule customs station, soldiers search the surrounding area using heat-sensitive cameras. “We caught 25 Algerians tonight,” says the garrison commander.

Once arrested, the migrants are sent to one of the region’s retention centres. The Edirne camp agreed to open its doors to a group led by MEP Hélène Flautre, chair of the EU-Turkey committee. Before the visit, the retention centre was emptied of two-thirds of its occupants and cleaned from top to bottom.

In this decrepit building, the travellers who land here are crowded together without any respect for regulations. Fourteen year-old Afghanis are locked up with adults. Retention time is set arbitrarily. One Tunisian man who tried to reach France explains that he’s been locked up for four months. He’s in the company of Moroccans, Burmese and Nigerians. “They beat us, we are treated like animals,” complains Mohammed, an Algerian. The cell is suddenly filled with a man’s shouting, a deserter from the Russian army suffering from psychiatric problems. “Don’t worry, he’ll soon be sent home,” the centre’s director says.

Greek-Turkish border remains porous

At the Soufli camp, on the Greek side, the situation is even worse. Fifty people are crowded into a cell of 50 square metres. No outings are allowed. “Three weeks ago, there were 115 of us, it’s inhuman,” says Yusuf, a young Christian Iraqi. “Some people are sleeping in the toilet and this cupboard,” he says, pointing to the cupboard. A single shower is operational. Two Iranians, who fled during the 2009 protests, are on a hunger strike. A Nigerian suffers from diabetes.

Asylum seekers are held for at least six months before their case is eventually examined, and, in most cases rejected. Yusuf isn’t even thinking of asking for asylum in Greece. “I fled Iraq in 2004, crossed Europe and made a request for asylum in Sweden. But they sent me back to Baghdad in 2009 saying the war was over,” he says.

Frontex continues to operate in the area. But the Greek-Turkish border remains porous and hard to control with its dozens of islands easily accessible by boat and because the illegal migrants trying to exploit those gaps are always more numerous. The flow towards Greece, seen as highly sensitive since 2008 when a record 150,000 arrests were made, is explained by increased surveillance along the Italian and Spanish coasts, Euro MP Hélène Flautre notes. The Greek route is used by 90% of illegal migrants.

Translated from the French by Patricia Brett

That’s the latest temperature reading from the Mediterranean. It’s still fairly cool, but rising fast.

Hat tips: C. Cantoni, Fjordman, and Insubria.

Lean to the Left

Nicolai Sennels offers this brief observation on the culpability of the mass media in the destruction of traditional nations and cultures.

The media’s greatest crime against democracy
by Nicolai Sennels

NPR mike #2The media’s greatest crime against democracy and public debate is that over the past forty years — slowly but surely — it has shifted the political scale. What was Left is now Center, and what was Center before has become Right. What was once Right has now turned into the “radical Right”. What was overly egalitarian and in some areas close to Communism is today Left.

Some claim that the media’s shifting of the political scale is a result of Arab oil money invested in our big media companies. Namely, that supporting Western values and national culture is a hindrance for immigration and Islamization. Others claim that the change happened because most journalists are Leftists (in Denmark, nine out of ten students in the journalism schools vote for the Left). A third explanation is that a certain worldview — systems theory — has conquered the universities. Systems theory claims that to a high degree an individual’s actions are determined by outer factors — the system that the individual is an “indivisible part of”. The Rightist view that individuals are responsible for their own success, happiness, and actions, consequently suffers.

Whatever the reason: Moving the political scale has made it easier to convince voters that high taxes, a large and powerful state, multiculture, and extremely powerful and wealthy non-democratic multinational organizations such as EU and UN are good for us.

In the meantime, it has been left up to the “extreme Right” or “radical Right” — or even racists or Nazis — to insist that our Western culture’s values are superior to, for example, multiculture or Islamic culture. The same stamp is given to citizens and parties that oppose the dominance of supranational political organizations led by officials and lawyers whose directives and conventions overrule our democratic laws.

Cui bono? With more money and a bigger state, those in power become yet more powerful. With the disappearance of national identity and borders, those who want to spread a certain religion have an easier time.

This is wrong, and the ensuing lack of discernment and determination to protect our culture may lead to the West’s downfall. Shifting the political scale is the biggest crime committed by the media.

Nicolai Sennels is a psychologist and the author of “Among Criminal Muslims: A Psychologist’s experiences with the Copenhagen Municipality”.

Previous posts by or about Nicolai Sennels:

2010   Jan   6   The Eternal Victim
    Feb   19   Youths, Crime, and Islam
    Apr   11   The Stigmatization Fallacy
    May   8   Islam Means Never Having to Say You’re Sorry
    Jul   28   Nicolai Sennels: An Open Letter to David Cameron
    Aug   5   Rape by Proxy
        10   Islam and Inbreeding
    Dec   17   The Connection Between Muslim Inbreeding and Terrorism
2011   Jan   10   The Dhimmification of the Red Cross
        12   Was Muhammad a Gelotophobe?
        26   Food Crises are Caused by Overpopulation
    Feb   10   Send in the Midwives!
        23   Western Quran Schools Are “Terrorist Factories”
    Mar   22   Why Multiculture Will Always Fail
        26   What is Islamization?
    Apr   3   The Psychopath’s Argument: Free Speech Kills People
    May   3   Islam’s Nancy Boys: The Psychological Background
        25   Arab Drought: Oil for Water

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/27/2011

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/27/2011The equal opportunity and human rights commissioner in the Australian state of Victoria says that public discussion about the burqa may actually put Muslim women in danger. The constant controversy may make women who choose to wear the burqa reluctant to leave their homes, or subject them to attack when in public.

In other news, Pakistan’s intelligence service has shut down its cooperation with its American counterpart, and the Pakistani government has asked the United States to reduce the number of military personnel stationed in the country.

To see the headlines and the articles, open the full news post.

Thanks to AC, C. Cantoni, Caroline Glick, heroyalwhyness, Insubria, JD, Srdja Trifkovic, Steen, and all the other tipsters who sent these in.

Commenters are advised to leave their comments at this post (rather than with the news articles) so that they are more easily accessible.

Caveat: Articles in the news feed are posted “as is”. Gates of Vienna cannot vouch for the authenticity or accuracy of the contents of any individual item posted here. We check each entry to make sure it is relatively interesting, not patently offensive, and at least superficially plausible. The link to the original is included with each item’s title. Further research and verification are left to the reader.

Unrest in Syria: Impressions from Damascus

Protesters in Deraa, Syria

Since the “Arab Spring” began in Deraa back in March, news coming out of Syria has been scanty. Western journalists have been arrested and expelled, so reports about the situation in Syria has come mainly from NGOs on the scene and individuals, both local and foreign, who manage to send out their accounts.

The following report was sent to us yesterday by an employee of a foreign corporation who lives in Damascus. He included this brief explanation:

As you can probably imagine, I have been following recent events here rather closely, not least because I have my family here with me, and have to admit that I have been astonished by the rather biased and one-sided reporting in the wider media, which in turn prompted me to write my own little report in an effort to set the record straight.

You will see that our correspondent is acting as somewhat of an apologist for the Assad regime. However, he has some good points to make. It’s obvious that there is more to the uprising than meets the eye, and that the Muslim Brotherhood is certain to be involved.

Another good point is that the international media are taking the statements issued by the protesters at face value, painting a picture of the valiant freedom fighters of the Arab Spring, à la Libya and Egypt.

The complete report is below.

Unrest in Syria: Impressions from Damascus
Damascus, 26 May 2011

While the overall picture remains somewhat murky, it would appear that the unrest in Syria unfolded in a number of distinct stages, as follows:

  • Initial demonstrations in Deraa in mid-March, when a number of families in the area demanded the release of a group of teenagers, who had reportedly been detained by the local authorities for spraying graffiti, presumably inspired by the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings.
  • A rather heavy-handed crackdown by the local authorities, which also led to a number of casualties. This was probably at least partly due to the fact that the authorities were genuinely surprised by and thus not accustomed to this kind of public dissent, something that was also alluded to in the president’s two speeches (and more so in the second one), following the uprising.
  • Tough talk by the government, nevertheless followed by a partial withdrawal of security forces from the area immediately affected, and hints at possible reforms.
  • A series of Friday demonstrations (always following prayers — the only time Syrians could congregate in larger numbers under the then emergency regulations), spreading to neighboring villages, and at times leading to further confrontations with the security forces, including casualties, followed by funeral processions and more demonstrations, interspersed with reform promises from the government, more often than not conveniently announced on a Thursday.
  • Despite these promises, culminating in the abrogation of the ‘emergency law’ (a key demand of the initial protests), these ‘concessions’ were summarily dismissed by the ‘opposition’ as merely symbolic, and by end of March the demonstrations started to spread further, first to the coastal areas and specifically Latakia and Banyas, a number of Damascus suburbs, the Kurdish areas, Homs and the border areas to Lebanon. And while the initial call in Deraa was simply for the release of their relatives, for the (related) abrogation of the emergency law, against corruption and for reform in general, this slowly gave way to ‘calls to topple the regime’.
  • By mid-April it apparently became clear to the government that whatever they were doing until then was not going to contain the situation, and so the army was called in, first into Deraa (and surrounding areas), followed by Banyas, Homs, and finally again the border areas to Lebanon. There were also similar operations reported in the affected Damascus suburbs. It should however be noted here that the army had already deployed to Deraa and Banyas much earlier, but at that time they were mostly used to cordon off the affected areas (i.e. from the outside), and not to go in ‘in force’.
  • The beginning of the army’s crackdown saw a spike in reported casualties, followed by reports of house-to-house searches and mass arrests, and two weeks of relative calm. There were also reports that the army had again withdrawn from some of the areas, or at least partially. The lull was however short-lived and last weekend saw again reports of significant casualties across the country.

While the above sequence of events is probably not in contention, the government’s and the opposition’s narratives for what has been happening on the ground nevertheless differ widely, including the number of casualties caused, who the victims are, and who is doing the shooting, something that is not helped by the fact that independent media are not allowed into the affected areas.

While recognizing that there are legitimate grievances and admitting shortcomings in the security forces’ response, the government now mostly blames the violence on armed gangs and Islamic extremists, who, using the demonstrations as a cover and pretext, are allegedly supported and directed from abroad, essentially spinning it all into one big conspiracy theory with the aim of toppling the regime. The opposition on the other hand blames the government’s heavy-handed crackdown, claiming that the security forces (including informal militias allied with the regime) are routinely firing at unarmed and peaceful protesters, with tanks allegedly even shelling residential areas. There are also reports of soldiers themselves being shot by their superiors for not obeying orders, of mass arrests and collective punishment, all in all invoking images from (and a narrative reminiscent of) recent conflicts across the region.

What an ‘international’ (i.e. US/western-led) and concerted effort at regime change looks like is of course amply demonstrated by the recent war in Iraq; current events in Libya are probably best characterized as a ‘half-hearted’ attempt; frequent inaction in response to similar situations across Africa illustrates the international community’s indifference in such cases; while Bahrain exemplifies the situation where the international community does not want to change a regime.

Syria probably lies somewhere in between half-heartedness and indifference, but while this would not support the government’s notion of a full-blown conspiracy, there nevertheless appears to be ample anecdotal evidence of foreign meddling, including credible reports of weapons seizures at Syria’s borders and related communications equipment being found, implicating certain political quarters in Lebanon that resent Syria’s (past and current) involvement there, the regional Muslim Brotherhood, and high profile exiles, to name just a few, and that amid allegations of private financial backing from Saudi Arabia. The absence of a larger conspiracy does however not mean that other regional and global stakeholders are not seizing the opportunity as well, with the Syrian regime now visibly weakened (and preoccupied), to push their own demands and agendas, no matter how unrelated they may be.

There is no doubt that people have been and are (still) being killed (including by the security forces), and that others are being arrested. However, and similar to the government’s conspiracy theory, there also appear to be significant discrepancies between the opposition’s narrative and the purported facts. If the security forces were indeed firing randomly into hundreds or thousands of protesters for the last two months, across multiple locations, and that (now) on pretty much a daily basis, the number of casualties would surely have to be higher. Also, this would not explain the number of security force members being killed or injured (with related images presented daily on Syrian prime-time TV), unless of course one subscribes to the opposition’s story of these frequently being shot by their own superiors, something rather difficult to hide in a multi-ethnic conscript army, and on such a large scale.

Similarly, neither mobile phone footage nor reports from independent witnesses that visited the affected areas after the army’s assault would seem to support the notion of damage consistent with the shelling of residential areas, or even the claim that utilities had been disconnected across the board. In this context, recent statements by (certain) opposition activist (as reported in the international media), that there may indeed be extremist elements mingling within the protesters, or that some may now have resorted to armed resistance in the face of the army’s crackdown, are noteworthy. There have also been claims (from various quarters) that armed elements may be provoking the security forces on purpose, and of others simply taking revenge, presumably for earlier killings.

However, the interesting point here is not so much what the opposition, or the government for that matter, are reporting, since both are obviously going to employ propaganda in order to support their respective positions, but rather the fact that the international media and by extension also the larger international community seem to have bought almost exclusively into the opposition narrative. Granted, everybody expects the regime to lie, and probably rightly so, but whenever there’s a statement from the opposition, be it a self-proclaimed eyewitness or human rights activist, then it is almost always taken for granted, or at least so it would appear to the casual observer.

So when the regime claims that an armed mob attacked the security forces, killing two and setting a building on fire, it usually does not get reported, but when a single source witness claims that the security forces fired at unarmed and peaceful demonstrators, killing five, including a child, it invariably makes the headlines. Even if this is followed by the usual caution that “the information cannot be independently verified”, the end result is the same, i.e. the latter gets prominence while the former doesn’t. This is not to say that such a claim may not be true, however one should not forget that both sides are keenly aware that casualties, and in particular reports of peaceful demonstrators being killed by the security forces, are pretty much the only thing that will bring international pressure to bear.

Therefore both sides have an incentive to fiddle with the facts and figures and, judging from the language used, both sides are probably doing just that. And with the opposition’s narrative almost exclusively based on such ‘eyewitness’ accounts, anecdotal evidence of some of these ‘witnesses’ not being where they claim to be, at times reportedly even calling from a different country altogether, of doctored images, and of images and footage allegedly/at times having been obtained elsewhere, are all noteworthy.

Consequently, major international news outlets like Al Jazeera or even Reuters are now seemingly leading the call for regime change. An example of this rather biased reporting would be a recent online article by an Al Jazeera journalist who had been detained for several days in Damascus, in which she describes what allegedly happened to her. While this is in no way meant to belittle her experience, nor to underestimate the Syrian security service’s propensity for heavy-handedness, there is no record of violence against foreign journalists. It is therefore simply not credible that she really thought that she might be shot when she was allegedly being blindfolded, something that her article clearly implies.

Similarly, it is not credible that they would have taken her as a foreign journalist to a place where suspects were pleading for their lives while being beaten, and where others were chained to radiators in the corridor, for her to interview them, while marveling at the pools of blood that she was standing in. After all the Syrian security services may well be brutal but they are not that stupid. And in her account of having been found to be in possession of a “commercially available” satellite phone and internet hub (presumably the reason for her detention), she conveniently fails to mention that these items are (and always have been) prohibited in Syria, a fact that should be well known to a foreign journalist coming into the country, not least because it is exactly via these means that opposition activists currently send out their messages to the world. Whether these items should be banned or not is of course an entirely different matter, but similar to hashish being readily available and legal in certain places (and within limits), in other places possession of it will nevertheless lead to arrest or worse.

In this context it is equally irrelevant whether the author just wanted to embellish her story for the reader’s benefit, or whether it was indeed meant to distort the picture, as frequently alluded to by the Syrian regime; again, the end result is the same.

The exact numbers of demonstrators to date are impossible to verify, however they seldom appear to exceed a few thousand for a particular event, are more often than not in the hundreds, and thus probably represent less than a percent of the population. But whereas in most countries this would simply be taken as evidence that the vast majority does not sympathize or agree with the protesters’ demands, at least not to the extent that they would join them, in Syria’s case the ‘Western’ assumption, aptly supported by the opposition’s narrative, seems to be that nobody can be happy living under such a regime and that thus people that don’t protest, other than the ‘few’ linked directly to (and allegedly corruptly benefiting from) the regime, don’t do so only out of fear.

This is not to say that there may not be people too afraid to protest (although the vast majority of Syrians certainly don’t seem to go about their daily business constantly looking over the shoulder, worried that the security forces might be creeping up on them), but even if they were to come out, it is doubtful that they would raise the number of demonstrators to anywhere near a significant figure. And, in the meantime, the mere assumption that the silent majority would otherwise also protest is at best patronizing, if not outright undemocratic in itself.

Similarly, the fact that the few pro-regime demonstrations to date, which nevertheless drew vastly greater numbers, were (of course) encouraged and facilitated by the regime, does not mean that the people did not join them willingly, driving around and waiving flags, and that in support of the president, and equally important, against what they see as others meddling in and endangering their country. A similar argument, by the way, can also be made about the recent Palestinian protesters crossing into the Israeli occupied Golan, who although probably encouraged (or at the very least not hindered) by the Syrian regime, nevertheless did so willingly and out of their own conviction, motivated by their desire to exercise their (perceived) right to return.

Having a closer look at the areas that have seen the vast majority of the protests so far is also instructive. Deraa and surroundings in the South, the affected suburbs of Damascus and Homs, as well as the city of Hama are all predominately if not exclusively Sunni, (mostly) poor and very conservative, and thus also known to be opposed to a lot of the regime’s more secular policies, including the recently reversed headscarf ban in public schools.

It is probably worth mentioning here that while Syria is clearly a dictatorship and a police state, and in the international discourse usually (and rightly so) portrayed as such, it nevertheless is one of the religiously and culturally most liberal regimes in the region, and certainly much more so than Jordan and Egypt, for example, something that is more often than not conveniently forgotten. Both the Kurdish areas in the Northeast and the coastal areas on the other hand have a history of ethnic friction, in the latter case reportedly also including an alleged turf battle (between local Sunnis and Alawites) over who controls the local port facilities, and with Banyas itself being the birthplace and thus heartland of one of the most prominent exiles, Abdul Halim Khaddam, himself a former Syrian Vice President, a Sunni, and a would-(like to)-be contender for the top seat, should the current regime fall.

Finally, the border areas to Lebanon, again mostly Sunni, are known for their smuggling activities, which frequently lead to confrontations with the local authorities. Other, smaller protests also took place elsewhere, including at universities in Damascus and Aleppo, but these reportedly only numbered in the tens, mostly consisted of students from the afore mentioned areas, and they were usually dissolved quickly, more often than not by bystanders, and not the security forces or pro-regime thugs, as portrayed in the international media.

Of course this is not to say that people in these areas do not have legitimate grievances or demands, but these issues are invariably interspersed with religious and ethnic motives, contrary to what is being claimed on related social networking sites, and they are certainly not as simplistic as portrayed in the international media. Freedom and democracy in this context is mostly reduced to the question of which group has the power to impose it’s will and values over the others, and not as a universal right for all, always invoked by whoever is not in power, and conveniently forgotten again once power has been attained. Therefore, decisions are frequently made based on ethnic and religious affiliation, as proscribed by a group’s preeminent leader, and not by individuals making a choice for themselves, as also evidenced in recent electoral events in neighboring Iraq. And while this may not sit well with the West’s current and rather rosy-eyed preoccupation with democratic change in the Middle East, the question of how democracy is to work in a society (as opposed to the regime itself) that does not permit its members to choose which studies or occupation to pursue, where to live, or even who to marry, and that especially if it is to espouse similar values to ours, is nevertheless worth considering.

This is not to say that the regime in Syria is likely to introduce reforms that will invariably lead to its own downfall either, but then again, which Western politicians is knowingly going to introduce legislation that will surely see him/her voted out of office at the next poll? That being said, there’s of course ample room for reform short of the regime giving up the reigns of power, but that’s not exactly what the protesters are calling for, at least not anymore.

In this context it is also noteworthy that protests are almost exclusively organized around local mosques, with Friday prayers or funerals being the chief catalysts, and it is quite unlikely that social networking (via the internet) has anything to do with events on the ground, other than as a conduit to the outside world, i.e. for uploading mobile phone footage etc., with these sites presumably operated by others, and that mostly if not exclusively outside of Syria. Who or what these others are, and who they represent, is not entirely clear, but the way these protests have unfolded and transformed after the initial unrest in Deraa would seem to indicate that certain individuals and groups were well prepared for just such an eventuality, in the wake of the wider regional unrest, ready to use the occasion as a pretext to push their own agendas.

The recent proliferation of self-proclaimed and hitherto unheard of Syrian ‘human rights’ activists and organizations is in this context equally noteworthy, as is the fact that during the initial month of the unrest thousands of unlicensed buildings went up almost over night, across the country, or reports of significantly increased/increasing petty criminality, with the authorities preoccupied elsewhere. The latter two issues, while clearly unrelated to the protests themselves, nevertheless nicely illustrate that others are more than willing to take advantage of the situation.

It is therefore probably not surprising that the Syrian regime, apart from blaming outside forces for instigating the unrest, has also warned that this would invariably lead to chaos, sectarian strife, and ultimately civil war. But while it is clearly in the regime’s interest to paint the picture as stark as possible in order to scare both the protesters and everybody else off the streets, and to justify its own rather heavy-handed crackdown, this does not in itself mean that the prediction is incorrect, nor that the regime would not feel compelled to counter this perceived threat.

This is not to say that the opposition currently is widespread enough to endanger the regime — it clearly isn’t — but should the regime indeed fall, then it would certainly be everybody fending for him/herself, which in this region invariably means Sunnis pitted against Christians, Shias and Alawites, and Kurds against Arabs, similar to what we have recently seen in Iraq, albeit without the foreign occupation. But while some outside forces are probably willing to take this risk (with some like the Egyptian Islamic theologian Yusuf al-Qaradawi even accepting the possibility of civil war publicly as a necessary evil in order to topple what he presumably sees as a heretical regime), since it won’t be them paying the price while nevertheless reaping the gains, or at least so they hope, and while the international community at large and the local demonstrators themselves appear largely oblivious to the dangers, one cannot really fault the regime for taking a different view.

The international community’s response to the situation has at first been muted, but the rhetoric has since changed, with increasing condemnation of the regime, accompanied by widening sanctions, although what exactly this is meant to achieve remains far from clear. But whatever their intentions (be it out of conviction [or lack thereof], out of a desire to change Syria’s stance vis-à-vis Iran and/or Israel, out of ignorance or mere animosity towards the regime, or simply because they had previously painted themselves into a corner, from which they now can’t extricate themselves), given the increasing heat, combined with what appears to be a concerted media campaign, and that in the wake of Iraq and Libya, it is not surprising that the Syrian regime and the population at large believe that they are at the receiving end of one big conspiracy.

As outlined above this claim is probably widely exaggerated but this in and of itself does not mean that the regime does not believe it, with all the potential consequences that this may entail. What is more, and given the various constraints the regime currently finds itself in, the assumption here clearly seems to be that the aim of this conspiracy is to topple the regime itself, and not only to force it to change its stance. Against this background, current international action is unlikely to benefit either side. While certainly encouraging the opposition in their struggle it is not going to tilt the scales in their favor to the extent that they will be able to unseat the present regime, nor will it entice the regime to speed up reforms, which, pushed into a corner and under additional financial constrains, it will be even less inclined and able to do so, even if it wanted to. On the contrary, these measures will probably only serve to polarize the situation further, and the end result will in all likelihood be a hardening of fronts on all sides, which given the current state of affairs, can’t really be in international community’s interest.

In the meantime, the two-week lull in reported (and probably factual) violence following the army’s crackdown was taken by many here as a sign that the government’s tactic was working, however, this optimism was somewhat short-lived, shattered by the violence that reportedly marred last weekend. Nevertheless, the fact that casualty numbers had dropped significantly in the wake of the crackdown, that (with the exception of last weekend) these casualties were now mostly confined to areas where even opposition activists were claiming that the army was being confronted by armed resistance, that demonstrations nevertheless did continue, even in areas that had just seen the army’s crackdown, and that reportedly mostly incident free, could also be taken as a sign that the government’s crackdown was not targeting the demonstrators per se, and that they had thus learned from their earlier mistakes.

Recent reports of opposition activists being released, even if others continue to be rounded up, and that probably in much larger numbers, are in this context also noteworthy. However, and even if one were to follow this line of argument, it wouldn’t be inconceivable that such a development wouldn’t be in the interest of the opposition, and that they would therefore only be motivated to further raise the stakes.

The main question then would not seem to be whether people are (still) being killed (however sad or shocking this in itself may be), or whether the government’s crackdown is ruthless — they are and it probably is — but rather how representative these protests are, whether they are really as innocent and peaceful as portrayed in the international media, what short of stepping down the regime would (now) have to do in order to appease them, and how far the regime is willing to go in order to suppress what it clearly sees as an existential threat.

In the meantime, ordinary Syrians appear to be living from Friday to Friday, with reported weekend casualties (no matter whether one believes the actual numbers or not) taken as an indication of the overall trend, with lower numbers obviously seen as a success for the regime’s current tactics. Naturally, the regime has been claiming all along that it is gaining the upper hand, but while there were also recent comments from (certain) opposition activists (again as reported in the international media) that they may be failing to garner the critical mass required, the final outcome is nevertheless far from clear.

Probably the best indicator that the tide may indeed be turning is the mood in Damascus itself, where people and traffic have been back out in force for the last three weeks (and especially weekends), whereas previously, although largely unaffected by the protests themselves, the streets, restaurants and shopping malls were half-empty, with people visibly worried. The timing of the international community’s hardening stance against this background would therefore seem to be even more curious.

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Our Muslim Troubles

Part Three: An Explosive Situation

“One of the most important single things to understand in the context of the brewing conflict between Europeans and Muslims is that Islamic terrorists either do not operate under moral constraints, or operate under constraints so loose that we, from our cultural perspective, can scarcely recognize them as restraints at all. Those Muslims motivated to kill in service of their religion seem to have very little in the way of a reluctance to kill civilians.”

This is the third of a five-part series by El Inglés comparing and contrasting the Troubles in Northern Ireland with the coming Muslim Troubles in Britain. Previously: Part One and Part Two.

The entire series will be made published as a single document in pdf format after the final part is posted at Gates of Vienna.

For those who are new to this series: El Inglés’ analysis is descriptive, not normative. This is not advocacy for what is being described, but rather a hard look at the near future in Britain.

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

by El Inglés

VI. An Introduction to Amateur Bomb-Building

Rioting and mob violence are, as we have already argued, likely to trigger and be prevalent at the outset of the conflict, but will not be especially lethal and will probably subside as the two sides hunker down in their zones of dominance and do their best to keep each other out. It is surely not too bold a prediction to state that any serious, long-term violence directed by either of the two sides at the other will therefore consist substantially of either the use of explosives or the use of firearms. A consideration of the former allows us to make some intriguing predictions with respect to key strategic and tactical aspects of our Muslim Troubles.

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That explosives are likely to be used in a violent conflict in the 21st century is too obvious a point to be worthy of further elaboration in its own right. However, given that neither side in the conflict will have much access, if any at all, to regular supplies of military explosives or explosive devices, nearly all use of explosives will feature home-made explosives of some sort. The importance of this point cannot be overstated. In Iraq, for example, the improvised explosive devices used by insurgents seem to be constructed overwhelmingly out of the vast stores of standard munitions that either existed in Iraq at the time of the 2003 invasion or that have been smuggled in since. Artillery shells, tank shells, mortar shells, and anti-tank mines, which is to say, industrially produced explosive devices of great power and reliability, have been crucial to the lethality of the operations undertaken against U.S. and other forces.

In the absence of such explosive materials, Iraq insurgents would have been forced to produce home-made explosives to build such devices, which would have drastically reduced their ability to wage their irregular campaign. Those involved in our looming conflict will operate under precisely these sorts of restraints. Though military, industrial, or commercial connections may allow those on the British side to acquire a certain quantity of commercial or military explosives, steady supplies of such material can hardly be relied upon. Accordingly, the amount and type of explosives available to each side will be a function of the following: a) their degree of access to relevant chemical precursors, and b) their technical proficiency in producing the required explosive substances and detonating them. Let us consider each in turn.

Access to Chemical Precursors

Those with a grasp of the underlying chemistry (which we will not be discussing in detail in this document) and the barest familiarity with Google will quickly discover that all sorts of chemical precursors for home-made explosives are available online to whoever wishes to order them, certainly in retail quantities and sometimes in bulk. However, attempts on the part of parties not well-established in the chemical or agricultural industries to order large, or in extreme cases any, quantities of such chemicals will have a high probability of resulting in the suppliers contacting the authorities. This principle can be generally illustrated in the context of ammonium nitrate, which is by far and away the most important chemical substance in this context.

Ammonium nitrate, produced and sold in huge quantities as a general purpose fertilizer, can be converted into an explosive substance if it is mixed with certain other chemical substances.[7] Being available in huge quantities for a legitimate purpose, it has proven to be central to the bombing campaigns of various paramilitary groups, including the PIRA, as well as in one-off attacks such as the Oklahoma City bombing. Such bombings and bombing campaigns would be exceptionally difficult to carry out without it. A large car or truck bomb of the type that the IRA used to devastate parts of London and Manchester in the 1990s requires hundreds of pounds, if not tonnes, of explosive. If many such bombings are to be carried out as part of an ongoing bombing campaign, then clearly huge amounts of the relevant chemical precursors are required. Hence the key role of ammonium nitrate in this regard. There is simply nothing else that can be procured in sufficiently large amounts.

The importance of ammonium nitrate will likely prove a key operational difficulty for Muslims throughout our Muslim Troubles. Though access to it is not restricted per se, it is usually bought in bulk from agricultural suppliers who adhere voluntarily to a code of practice under which they report suspicious purchases or requests to the authorities. This code of practice did not prevent Bodle Brothers, an agricultural supplier in Burgess Hill, selling 600kg of it to an Algerian would-be terrorist in 2003, despite it being vastly too much for the allotment for which he claimed to need it. However, we assume that the powers-that-be have since applied a cattle prod to the nether regions of agricultural suppliers in general, and that said suppliers run a tighter ship now. Either way, a descent into violent conflict will necessarily result in far greater scrutiny of attempts to purchase such chemicals than exists at present, and being a Muslim will be the greatest red flag of all. The five men of Bangladeshi origin arrested taking photographs of Sellafield on the day Osama bin Laden was killed will no doubt attest to the way in which belonging to certain ethnic groups results in you being flagged for special attention fairly promptly. This suspicion will only heighten along with the violence we predict.

British paramilitaries are unlikely to suffer from such difficulties, at least to the same extent, for two reasons. Firstly, John Smith will not attract the same degree of attention as Mohammed bin Qassim when he phones up his local garden centre for a bag of ammonium nitrate. Secondly, British paramilitaries will doubtless already be recruiting farmers into their organizations (for a variety of reasons), and who in government will be able to keep track of the approximately one million tonnes of ammonium nitrate acquired for legitimate agricultural purposes every year? If 100kg of ammonium nitrate is passed from a farmer to a bomb-maker and ends up devastating a Muslim residential area in Birmingham, how will the security forces move to interdict such flows in future? This is, after all, only a tenth of a percent of a percent of a percent of all the ammonium nitrate used annually.

We must conclude that any British paramilitary organization worthy of the name will certainly be able to acquire substantial quantities of ammonium nitrate, through setting up some agricultural operation itself as a front if necessary. It will be completely impossible for even the most careful efforts of the security services to reliably derail attempts by these paramilitaries to obtain ammonium nitrate in significant quantities. Accordingly, as was true of the IRA, there will be no obvious limit to the number or size of the bombs they will be able to build assuming they have the required expertise in certain key regards.

In parallel with this conclusion is another, equally important one: Muslim paramilitaries will not, in any remotely plausible scenario, ever attain the capability to conduct comprehensive bombing campaigns of the sort that the PIRA conducted during the Troubles. Both the maximum size and the number of the explosive devices they will be able to produce will be drastically curtailed relative to those of their enemies, the British paramilitaries fighting them.

We note here in the interests of being thorough that some Muslims do seem to believe they can produce car-bomb-sized explosive devices through the use of gas canisters as main charges. Attempted attacks in New York in 2010, Stockholm in 2010, and the UK in 2007 (all of which failed) demonstrate that there does exist the occasional Muslim terrorist of the opinion that these devices can actually be viable. However, their record to date in inducing these devices to explode is fairly underwhelming. It is certainly the case that, if one has a conventional explosive device, having gas canisters in close proximity to it when it explodes should create a bigger blast as the containers rupture, the gas rushes out with the shock wave, mixes with atmospheric oxygen, and ignites. A similar principle has been utilized by weapons developers in creating what are called fuel-air explosives, or thermobaric bombs. However, if one can produce conventional explosives, there is no obvious need to use gas canisters, as indeed the PIRA, and for that matter the loyalist paramilitaries, did not. And if one can not produce them, then one is left in the position of trying to pull oneself up by one’s own bootstraps with the jerryrigged firework-and-gas-canister assemblies that have so far done little more than allow security services in the UK and other countries to cull the less technically adept parts of the Muslim terrorist community.

To summarize this section, British paramilitaries will certainly develop contacts that put them in possession of large quantities of virtually all the chemical precursors that bomb-makers could possibly hope for. This will allow them to conduct what we have called a PIRA-style comprehensive bombing campaign, in which all types and sizes of bombs are built and used. In contrast, Muslims will be restricted to building much smaller devices composed largely from retail quantities of more specific types of chemical precursors.

Production and Detonation of Explosive Devices

Those who conclude on the basis of the foregoing that anyone with access to ammonium nitrate can build a bomb, are, thankfully, correct only in the sense that such a mixture will, in principle, explode if one knows how to detonate it. Understanding this point requires a certain familiarity with how explosives work.

There are various taxonomies of explosives, but the one that concerns us here is as follows. Broadly speaking, explosive substances can be sub-divided into three different types: primary explosives, which are relatively easy to detonate with temperature, shock, or electric spark (e.g. nitroglycerine, lead azide, TATP), secondary explosives, which are less sensitive and safer to handle (e.g. PETN, RDX), and tertiary explosives, which are the least sensitive and hardest to detonate of all (e.g. ANFO, TNT). Primary explosives are far too easily detonated to be used safely in large amounts, but they have the explosive power necessary to detonate the more stable secondary explosives, which can in turn be used to detonate tertiary explosives. As such, the problem facing the would-be bomb-builder is how to produce or obtain a set of explosive substances that allows him to create a sequence of explosions, that, concatenated into the tiniest fraction of a second, result in an explosion that satisfies his criteria.

Most ammonium nitrate-based explosives, and certainly those that are most likely to be produced by those who lack access to large supplies of industrial chemicals, are tertiary explosives and therefore require the use of both primary and secondary explosives to detonate.[8] This presents would-be bomb-builders with a problem fundamental to the nature of explosives themselves.

At some point in the bomb-building process, one must handle sensitive primary explosives that can go off very easily if exposed to the wrong type of stimulus. Those who cannot procure or produce secondary explosives will have no option but to rely purely on large amounts of primary explosive for the entire device, an exceptionally dangerous course of action when a single spark or jolt can result in detonation. It is thought that the notoriously sensitive primary explosive TATP[9] was used as the explosive in the 7/7 bombings. If so, this would be an example of creating explosive devices with primary explosives only, an incredibly risky undertaking and one that would require a great deal of care and at least a little luck to pull off.

If one does not wish to use such large amounts of primary explosive, one must rely on a secondary explosive either as the main charge or to detonate the main charge, and use the primary to detonate the secondary. But this requires access to the chemical precursors for the secondaries, the technical skills to produce them in pure enough form (which is not necessarily a straightforward undertaking), and the bomb-building skills to incorporate them, with the primary, into a viable device. Neither the experimentation nor the subsequent bomb-building are trivial matters, nor matters to be attempted by the slapdash.

This point can be better understood by considering the explosive repertoire of the PIRA. Technically proficient though it was, the PIRA was greatly enabled by the commercially produced Semtex (and presumably detonators, or primaries, as well) that it was provided with over the years by Gaddafi’s Libyan regime. Used in medium-sized bombs (such as the one used to blow up the Grand Hotel in Brighton in 1984), as booster charges for large car bombs, and in home-made, anti-personnel coffee jar bombs designed to detonate on impact, Semtex made a great impact on the PIRA’s military capabilities. A plastic explosive designed to combine the characteristics of explosive power, insensitivity to shock, and malleability, and possessing uniform and entirely predictable characteristics, Semtex is an ideal secondary explosive, and one of the most versatile explosive compositions in existence. The PIRA doubtless had the ability to produce secondary explosives itself, and would have done so when necessary. But this did not reduce the utility of its Semtex supplies. How much greater would the utility of such high-quality explosives be to inexperienced bomb-builders trying to cobble devices together in their bath-tubs?

If one browses the various improvised munitions handbooks, anarchist manuals, and Al-Qaeda bomb-building manuals that the Internet so generously makes available to us, one could be forgiven for thinking that a few pints of urine, a couple of clothes pegs, and a bottle of sulphuric acid were all that were required to start one’s own bombing campaign. Fortunately, as we have explained, the real world erects barriers that make this Blue Peter approach to terrorism problematic. We must observe, without wishing to appear complacent, that the bomb-building skills of the Muslim population of the UK, or Europe more generally, do not as yet seem to be particularly advanced. Though the 7/7 bombers were obviously well-trained enough to conduct a successful attack, the 21/7 would-be bombers were less proficient in this regard, with the detonators (i.e. the primary explosives) detonating but the main charges (i.e. the secondary explosives) failing to do so. The repeated failure of gas-canister car bombings is further evidence of technical ineptitude and restricted access to chemical precursors on the part of Muslim would-be bombers at present.

There will be other difficulties involved in amateur bomb-making. In contrast with military or industrial explosive systems, in which explosive substances and components have properties and interactions which are known with precision, amateur bomb-builders will be dealing with self-devised systems in which a) the purity of chemical substances, b) the amounts and relative positions of explosive components, c) the interactions between primaries, secondaries, and tertiaries, and d) the reliability of detonation systems will have to be tested to ensure that one has produced a viable explosive system. Accordingly, experimentation will be required, and it will be obvious that this will have to take place in isolated areas if terrorist plotters are to avoid detection by the authorities. Muslims are not only overwhelmingly concentrated in urban areas, but, as we have noted, already stick out like a sore thumb in rural areas unless they happen to be white converts. This increases the importance of such locations as Pakistan and Somalia to Muslim terrorists. However, visiting such places to receive training presents its own problems, which range from being flagged by the Pakistani, British, or American security services to having one’s stay in the motherland cut short by a Hellfire missile. Moreover, the high failure rate of graduates of these camps in actually trying to build viable devices suggests that tuition therein is often not really up to scratch.

In closing, let us consider what light is shed on these matters by the attempted terrorist attacks in Stockholm in December 2010. There were two bombs in the attack. The first one was a car bomb consisting of a primitive explosive device (possibly containing fireworks) and a number of liquid petroleum gas canisters. The gas was ignited by the explosive device but did not itself detonate, and caused only minor injuries to a small number of passers-by. This must be considered a severe failure, and is indicative of the type of problem that will be faced by would-be terrorists who lack access to chemical precursors, the technical expertise to formulate them into a bomb, or, in all likelihood in this particular case, both.

The second bomb consisted of a set of six pipe bombs strung around the bomber’s torso. The bomber was killed when one of the pipe bombs exploded prematurely, blowing a hole in his abdomen. A pipe bomb is essentially a very large and powerful firecracker, containing a black powder-type substance that explodes only if confined. These powders are extremely sensitive to temperature, shock, and static electricity, and this sensitivity is presumably what accounted for the premature explosion of one of the devices and the ignominious death of the Muslim terrorist who bore it. Whether the bomber went to heaven for his martyrdom, or hell for his suicide, will have to remain a secret between him and Allah. We confine our own comments to suggesting that, from the perspective of those still on this mortal coil, this second part of the operation too must be considered a failure. Such are the difficulties of reliably producing and detonating explosive devices, difficulties which have confounded people far more capable than the recently-deceased Stockholm bomber, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly.

VII. Paramilitaries: General Considerations

Though the threat of Muslim terrorism is often compared to the one-time (and future?) threat of Irish republican terrorism, the notion that they are similar is an appalling conceptual error that needs to be eradicated here. It is imperative that readers understand the massive qualitative difference between these two types of terrorism. Despite a common perception that the PIRA were perfectly happy to blow up British civilians willy-nilly if, in their estimation, it served their needs to do so, the truth of the matter is that, overwhelmingly, they were exceptionally reluctant to inflict significant numbers of such casualties, and then only as collateral damage in operations aimed at police, military, political, or economic targets. This point may well prove to be difficult to accept for the British people most likely to be reading this document, but it is true nonetheless. Of course, communities on the receiving end of violence rapidly lose interest in the subtleties of what exactly those directing that violence at them do or not intend, or which bomb went off early and which on time. This is natural enough, but cannot be allowed to affect the analysis here.

Most of the most notorious PIRA bomb attacks of the Troubles, which is to say, those that killed the largest number of civilians, either did so due to poor planning and/or operational errors, or were not sanctioned by the PIRA command structure. By and large, they were PR disasters for the PIRA and damaged its ability to present itself as a non-sectarian organization with legitimate political goals that it pursued as a disciplined military force. Let us review some of the most notorious here to establish this key point.

  • The La Mon restaurant bombing in 1978 was one of the worst PIRA atrocities of the Troubles, involving as it did an incendiary bomb that immolated twelve Protestant civilians. In what appears to have been a pattern for the PIRA, the phoned-in warning was delayed by the inability of the PIRA operatives in question to find a functional public phone box in time to provide a reasonable period for the building to be evacuated.
  • The Omagh bombing of 1998 was not in fact perpetrated by the PIRA, which was now committed to peace by the Good Friday Agreement, but by the dissident group that came to be known as the Real IRA. Though the operational doctrine of the RIRA was essentially that of the ‘classical’ PIRA and would not have allowed the targeting of civilians in this fashion, the car bomb was left in a location different to that originally planned. This resulted in a confused warning, and civilians being herded into the actual blast by unsuspecting security forces. Hence the extremely high death toll of twenty-nine.
  • The 1987 Remembrance Day bombing in Enniskillen, in which eleven civilians, most of them elderly First World War veterans, was a PR disaster for the PIRA. Gerry Adams himself said ‘the Republican movement cannot survive another Enniskillen.’ It is not entirely clear what happened, but it is thought that an army band (i.e. a military target) was the actual target, and that a mistake of whatever sort with respect to the timing of the explosion resulted in the civilian deaths.
  • The two Birmingham pub bombings in 1974, which resulted in 21 deaths between them and would eventually result in one of the most notorious miscarriages of justice of recent British history, do not appear to have been sanctioned by the PIRA leadership of the time. An insufficiently early warning for the first blast due, it appears, to yet another vandalised public phone, and a complete lack of warning for the second, contributed to the high casualty figure. Whatever exactly one concludes with respect to the intentions of the bombers, the Birmingham bombings were anomalous when viewed within the context of the PIRA’s 30-year military campaign.
  • The Shankill Road bombing of 1993 was an attempt on the part of the PIRA to decapitate the UDA by killing Johnny Adair and other leaders in their headquarters, which was situated above a chip shop on the Shankill Road. The bomb, carried into the shop by two PIRA members dressed as delivery men, had an eleven-second fuse designed to allow those in the shop to get out before it detonated. However, the explosion occurred prematurely, killing eight civilians, one UDA member, and one of the bombers. The UDA leadership was elsewhere at the time.
  • The Bloody Friday bombings of July 1972 were a part of the commercial bombing campaign that the PIRA had been conducting since 1971. Twenty-two bombs went off in Belfast, killing nine people. Warnings were called in for the bombs, but the time given to evacuate the areas was utterly inadequate, with the PIRA vastly overestimating the ability of the security forces to coordinate an evacuation against twenty-two bombs in such a short space of time. It issued a belated apology in 2002.

The key point to be made here is that, however ruthless the PIRA might have been, it never took the killing of civilians as an operational goal in its own right. Civilian casualties were certainly accepted as collateral damage (and the PIRA’s definition of civilians could be rather broad, including, for example, workmen working at British Army bases), but this tends to be true of all violent actors, military or paramilitary, and is certainly true of the British Army. The unwillingness to target civilians per se was founded on the following factors: a) a genuine repugnance on the part of many PIRA Volunteers and the PIRA leadership with respect to such activities, b) a keen understanding of how such activities eroded support for the PIRA amongst the Catholic populations of both NI and the Republic of Ireland; c) a doctrinal commitment to a non-sectarian conflict in which British forces were to be forced out of NI, which would then be incorporated into a united Ireland.

This is not, of course, to deny the mutual sectarian hostility that existed between Catholics and Protestants in NI, but simply to point out that the exercising of this hostility was not the primary motivating factor for the PIRA. The PIRA set off thousands of bombs during the Troubles, but only the very smallest fraction of them have become notorious for having killed large numbers of civilians. This is not the behaviour one would expect of an organization which took the killing of civilians as a key objective. Truck bombs of the sort that devastated English cities in the 1990s could have killed hundreds of civilians if the PIRA had detonated them with such murderous intent.

Some may object to this characterisation of the PIRA’s violence on the grounds of the sectarian killings that it engaged in from the early 1970s onwards. However, this sectarian killing campaign was instigated largely by the loyalist paramilitaries, was viewed with repugnance by many PIRA members, and was the source of bitter divisions in the PIRA leadership over what was considered a distortion of the organization’s long-term goals. This tit-for-tat killing spree ran at its fiercest from 1972 to 1976, when, threatening to escalate to new heights, it was scaled back by mutual consent on both sides. In the late 80s, when the loyalist paramilitaries ratcheted their killings up again, the PIRA refrained from retaliating on the same scale. The reasons for this are complex, but included an awareness that sectarian killings would damage the electoral appeal of Sinn Fein, the political wing of the PIRA, and that it was politically useful to be seen as the victim of sectarian terrorist violence rather than the perpetrator.

Irrespective of exactly how one interprets IRA violence, the contrast with Muslim terrorism and violence could hardly be starker. Muslim terrorism essentially consists of killing as many civilians as possible, with infrastructural damage and consequent economic damage thrown in for good measure if possible. This is not to deny that Muslim terrorists also target political and military figures, but they do not seem to have any preference for these targets. Furthermore, these targets are often well-guarded and hard to strike, and this, combined with the Islamic willingness to strike the softest of soft targets, means that they usually do.

The point has been made before by others, but the only discernible limiting factor on the terrorist violence that Muslims are prepared to do is capability. If they can kill ten people, they will, but if they can kill a hundred, they will do that instead. If they can kill a thousand, that would be preferable again. The talking heads who reiterate endlessly that we have dealt with terrorism before in the form of Irish republican terrorism, and that Muslim terrorism is not the only type of terrorism we face, always seem to ignore the fact that Muslim terrorists will kill as many of us as they can, men, women, and children. No similar terrorist threat has ever been faced by this country.

One of the most important single things to understand in the context of the brewing conflict between Europeans and Muslims is that Islamic terrorists either do not operate under moral constraints, or operate under constraints so loose that we, from our cultural perspective, can scarcely recognize them as restraints at all. Those Muslims motivated to kill in service of their religion seem to have very little in the way of a reluctance to kill civilians. Whether this lack of restraint derives directly from their religious doctrines or not is a matter that others can concern themselves with. Here, it suffices for us to observe that the type of mass civilian death toll the PIRA tried to avoid during its own armed campaign is precisely what Muslim terrorists strive for. Accordingly, and unsurprisingly, their terrorist attacks regularly cause civilian death tolls orders of magnitude beyond anything the IRA was responsible for, intentionally or otherwise.

The most obvious example of this would be the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 2001, which killed approximately 3,000 people, but there are many others that serve to demonstrate that Muslim terrorism takes the mass infliction of such casualties as its core operating objective. The Bali nightclub bombing killed about 200 people, mainly tourists. The Madrid subway bombing had a similar death toll. Whether we look at the U.S. Embassy bombing in Kenya, the attacks on Bombay in 2008, the Beslan school attack in Russia in 2004, or the Baghdad church bombing in 2010, we see that the basic objective is always the same: kill as many civilians as possible, simultaneously damaging economically vital infrastructure if possible, in attempts to horrify the relevant governments into doing what one wants them to do.

This will have great significance for our violent conflict with Muslims, in that atrocities of this sort tend to be responded to in kind in a tit-for-tat fashion. Loyalist and republican paramilitaries were quite conscious and explicit about the retaliatory nature of their attacks, often killing similar numbers of people to the numbers of their own communities who had been killed in the attacks they were retaliating for. Where will this eventually lead if Muslim terrorists in the UK storm a school and try to recreate the Beslan massacre on British soil?

Let us condense the argument to a single point here. The long string of torture-murders carried out in the 1970s by the UVF unit that came to be known as the Shankill Butchers was arguably the single most appalling episode in the Troubles. The murders were particularly disturbing in that most of them were finished off with the application of a razor-sharp butcher’s knife to the throat of the victim, cutting through the neck all the way down to the spinal column. These murders were committed by what was, in effect, a UVF franchise led by a psychopath who had already demonstrated that the UVF leadership could not control him, and who was content to act without regard for UVF policy and without the knowledge of the UVF leadership.

These frightful murders, the low point of the Troubles in terms of their sheer bestial brutality, were not only well within the boundaries of what Islamic terrorists seem to allow themselves, but very similar to what appears to constitute a key operational option for these people. The beheading, on camera, of those unfortunate enough to fall into their hands, is something we have come to expect from Muslim terrorists, and that this material should be used in recruitment attempts tells us something about Muslim psychology and the opinions of Muslim terrorists as to what will excite and motivate their fellow Muslims.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

This mention of the Shankill Butchers takes us conveniently back to the differences between Irish republican terrorism and loyalist terrorism. British readers are far more likely to know of the existence of the PIRA than they are of the existence of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or the Ulster Defence Association (UDA), the two main loyalist paramilitaries, but these latter are no less relevant to the likely course of events in our Muslim Troubles. We can start to see why this should be so by considering what was arguably the single most effective terrorist attack of the Troubles: the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of May 1974.

We will be discussing these bombings in more detail later on, but mention them here as well as evidence of the sheer ruthlessness of the UVF. Three car bombs in Dublin and one in Monaghan went off within a short period of time, killing a total of 33 people. Taken as a single attack, this death toll made them the single most lethal outrage of the Troubles, and one which deliberately targeted civilians without any warning at all. There is no bombing conducted by the PIRA that was directly comparable to them. Indeed, the contrast with the PIRA’s approach to bombings, especially in later years (prioritising economic damage, and delivering very careful warnings) is striking, and extremely instructive. We take them as strong supporting evidence for the following claim: that the loyalist paramilitaries were more ruthless than the republican paramilitaries.

Why should this have been the case? Three obvious reasons present themselves, and all are potentially instructive with respect to the conflict we are likely to end up in with Muslims in the UK. Of course, it is possible that there are deep cultural reasons that loyalists were more ruthless than republicans during the conflict, but we are unaware of them, and feel that much can be explained without recourse to such explanations.

The first reason for the greater ruthlessness of loyalists is that the UVF and the UDA[10] were not able to identify the republican paramilitaries they would most like to have struck at. Thus, when NI seemed to be disintegrating in 1972, and when the possibility of being dragged into a united Ireland seemed very real, they were left with a choice between leaving matters to the security forces (who, to put it mildly, were not exactly on top of the situation in the early 70s), or to strike at Catholic civilians in an attempt to pressurise the PIRA into bringing a halt to its own campaign. Of course, it would have been far more effective to kill PIRA members themselves, but how were paramilitaries without effective intelligence-gathering arms to accomplish what was often a very difficult task for the British state itself? The PIRA could target the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR), and the British Army and maintain a stance to the effect that it was waging a war against the British state. But there was no equivalent option for loyalist paramilitaries, hence their attacks on civilians.

The second reason, which would have been especially pertinent from the late 70s onwards, is that the PIRA understood by then, at least at leadership level, that its early 1970s objective of forcing British forces out of NI through physical force alone was untenable. What this meant was that any conceivable withdrawal of those forces would have to take place, eventually, on the basis of a process that was at least partly political. This in turn could not happen if the PIRA was seen by the British as a viciously sectarian murder gang, as it would have been impossible for the British government to negotiate with such a force. When loyalist sectarian killing flared up again in the late 80s, PIRA members were expressly forbidden from retaliating in kind for this reason. However, there were no similar restrictions on the behaviour of loyalist paramilitaries, who were fighting not to overturn a status quo, but to preserve it. For most of the conflict, they had little interest in presenting themselves as being a reasonably ‘civilized’ political force with whom one might do business, or for whom one might vote.

The third reason was that there was a strong strain of non-sectarian thinking in the PIRA and its supporters that, though not universal or always observed, was obviously widespread and genuine. The PIRA was fighting for a British withdrawal from Ireland, subsequent to which NI would be incorporated into a united Ireland. This would obviously entail the Protestant population of NI becoming the fellow Irish citizens of the rest of the Irish, north and south of the border, a development hardly likely to result in a harmonious state of affairs if Protestants had good reason to believe they would be subjected to homicidal antipathy by those fellow citizens. This is not to suggest that there was no sectarian feeling amongst PIRA members, only that an ideological opposition to sectarianism was a strong force amongst PIRA leaders. In contrast, the UVF and UDA were battling to keep NI in the UK and to keep Protestants in a dominant position therein. They were not trying to win friends amongst the Catholic population, and had no particular need to be esteemed by them.

All of these factors contributed, we can be reasonably confident, to the way in which the ruthlessness of the loyalist paramilitaries seems, on the whole, to have outstripped that of the IRA. The purely sectarian killing campaigns that the UVF and UDA launched in the early 1970s and that peaked around 1976 consisted largely of the killing of civilians identified as Catholics in whatever fashion. Though the paramilitaries in question often described their victims as ‘IRA men,’ to themselves and others, it was clear at the time that this was almost entirely a fig leaf for outright sectarian murder.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

In the light of the foregoing considerations, can we make any predictions as to the type and severity of the violence likely to be perpetrated by paramilitary organizations in our own conflict? We feel we can, though sadly none of them provide any grounds for optimism.

Two observations offer themselves at the outset: a) Muslims engaged in politically-motivated violence seem to have virtually no psychological barriers to the mass killing of civilians, and b) British paramilitaries will be in a position much closer to that of the loyalist paramilitaries during the Troubles than the republican paramilitaries, and must therefore be expected to be exposed to a similar set of incentives and pressures with respect to their own violent activities. Taken together, these two factors make it highly probable that any prolonged conflict between British and Muslim paramilitaries will descend, perhaps quickly, into the outright indiscriminate killing of those perceived to be on the other side.

During the Troubles, both sides directed their violence at adults, particularly men, when possible. Sectarian killings usually targeted men, and children were only ever injured or killed by bombings, which are indiscriminate by their very nature. Even the most notorious sectarian killings, in which workmen were taken off buses and shot (the Kingsmill massacre, carried out by the PIRA) or discos machine-gunned (the Greysteel massacre, carried out by the UDA), either killed men or targeted the type of establishment likely to be occupied by men (pubs, etc., which were a preferred target for ‘spray jobs’). Never did either side ever target a school, or a group of women. The Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), a small and exceptionally violent republican paramilitary group, did carry out a shooting at a Pentecostal church in County Armagh in 1983. However, this was apparently not sanctioned by the INLA leadership, and there were no other such attacks on churches by either side that we are aware of throughout the entire conflict.

British paramilitaries are largely of the same cultural DNA as the paramilitaries that were party to the Troubles and could be expected to conduct themselves similarly if faced with similar opponents. However, Muslims have a cultural DNA all their own, as we have already shown, and this bodes ill for our Muslim Troubles. Though it is probable that, in the early stages of the conflict, British paramilitaries will make at least some attempts to focus their attacks on adult Muslim males, any indiscriminate attacks on British targets that include large numbers of women and children will likely shred whatever restraint British paramilitaries may have felt inclined to exercise in this regard. We observe that the three reasons given for the greater ruthlessness of the loyalist paramilitaries above will all obtain in our Muslim Troubles: British paramilitaries will find it difficult to identify key figures in Muslim paramilitaries, British paramilitaries will not be aiming for a negotiated settlement with Muslims in which they must present themselves as being ‘civilized,’ and British paramilitaries will not be looking to a political future in which they and Muslims cooperate amicably subsequent to the creation of a new political reality. Rather, British paramilitaries will consider themselves, accurately in our opinion, to be resisting the dispossession of their people by a hostile, religiously-motivated tribe that can create only violence, savagery and madness. Psychological restraints on their violence will therefore be weak to begin with, and must be expected to disappear entirely if Muslims act in the way that they always seem to.

Coming up:

Part Four: The Military and the Paramilitaries


7. Strictly speaking, ammonium nitrate is an explosive in its own right, but is so insensitive as to make it virtually impossible to use on its own.
8. In principle, one could use primary explosives alone to do this, but one would have to use such large amounts as to create an unacceptable risk of untimely detonation.
9. TATP is apparently referred to as the Mother of Satan in Muslim terrorist circles due to its exceptional sensitivity and the great danger that therefore accompanies its use.
10. The UDA was a legal organization for most of its existence, unlike the UVF. However, its paramilitary arm, the Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), was proscribed. The UFF was essentially a badge of convenience used by that relatively small part of the UDA that actually carried out bombings and shootings. Writings on the Troubles will sometimes refer to an attack as having been conducted by the UDA and sometimes as having been conducted by the UFF, but they can be considered equivalent for our purposes, in that the UFF was a part of the UDA.

Previous posts by El Inglés:

2007   Nov   28   The Danish Civil War
2008   Apr   24   Surrender, Genocide… or What?
    May   17   Sliding Into Irrelevance
    Jul   5   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 1
        6   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 2
        8   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 3
    Aug   25   Identity, Immigration, and Islam
    Oct   4   The Blackhoods of Antifa
        26   Racists ’R’ Us
    Nov   25   Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
2009   Feb   16   Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe
    Apr   11   Pick A Tribe, Any Tribe — Part II
    May   18   To Push or to Squeeze?
    Nov   2   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 1
    Dec   5   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 2
        7   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
2010   Mar   25   The Death of Democracy
        25   Some Fallacies On the Subject of Crime — Part 1
        28   Reflections on the Civil War in Britain
    Apr   1   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part One
        2   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part Two
        5   On Vigilantism — Part One
    Oct   29   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 1
    Nov   1   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 2
        4   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 3
        2   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 4
2011   Mar   10   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part One
        11   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Two
        12   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Three
        13   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Four
    May   25   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part One: The Idiot Paradigm
        26   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part Two: The Chocolate Cake Diet

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/26/2011

Gates of Vienna News Feed 5/26/2011A key liberal Jewish donor to Barack Obama and the Democrats says that he will not contribute to the president’s re-election campaign nor help him raise funds. Billionaire Haim Saban says Mr. Obama’s antagonistic policies towards Israel have caused him to withdraw his support.

In other news, a Muslim Brotherhood leader in Egypt says that his organization will dominate the next Egyptian government. Meanwhile, the end of the oppressive Mubarak regime has allowed the Egyptian Nazi Party to come out in the open. It vows to play a part in the country’s politics.

To see the headlines and the articles, open the full news post.

Thanks to AC, C. Cantoni, Fjordman, Gaia, Insubria, JD, KGS, Nilk, Steen, Swenglish Rantings, Vlad Tepes, and all the other tipsters who sent these in.

Commenters are advised to leave their comments at this post (rather than with the news articles) so that they are more easily accessible.

Caveat: Articles in the news feed are posted “as is”. Gates of Vienna cannot vouch for the authenticity or accuracy of the contents of any individual item posted here. We check each entry to make sure it is relatively interesting, not patently offensive, and at least superficially plausible. The link to the original is included with each item’s title. Further research and verification are left to the reader.

The Religion of Rape

Cultural Enrichment News

We reported last year on the fact that culture-enrichers seem to have a monopoly on rape in Oslo. The latest figures have come in, and the situation hasn’t changed — for the past five years, in every single case in which the perpetrator could be identified, the rapist was of non-Western origin.

Let’s be honest: that means they were Muslims. The vast majority of non-Western immigrants in Oslo are Muslim, and I’d bet money that none of those rapists were Hindus, Buddhists, Baal-worshippers, etc. The victim interviewed in the news story below reports that her attacker told her that his religion allowed him to do what he did. Do you think he was a Mormon?

What’s more, virtually all the victims were women and girls “of Norwegian background.”

This trend is not centrally planned, organized, and directed, but it is systematic nonetheless. It is part of the system called “Islam”, and it’s what a Western country can expect when it imports Muslims en masse. The systematic rape of infidel women is part of the process of Islamization.

Many thanks to Kitman for translating, subtitling, and YouTubing this clip. The video and a transcript are below the jump:


00:01   In Oslo all sexual assaults involving rape in the past year
00:06   have been committed by males of non-western background.
00:10   This was the conclusion of a police report published today.
00:13   This means that every single rape assault in the last five years,
00:16   where the rapist could be identified, he was a man of foreign origin.
00:22   The young girl we are about to meet was raped about two years ago.
00:27   As she entered her apartment she was assaulted and endured
00:30   hours of the threats and violence and rape by a man unknown to her.
00:34   She will be struggling with this experience for the rest of her life.
00:37   I have found it difficult to go out shopping on my own because I felt anxious.
00:41   I was simply too afraid to go out the door, and had problems contacting
00:45   and speaking to friends and family and simply live a normal life.
00:51   In April a few weeks ago, four women were assaulted and raped on the same night.
00:57   None of the perpetrators has yet been found.
00:59   Today Oslo police presented the total figures
01:02   revealing how in the past year, all sexual assaults involving rape
01:06   have been committed by men of non-western background.
01:09   These are troubling statistics
01:11   From 2005-2010 a total of 86 sexual assaults involving rape were reported.
01:16   In 83 cases the man was described as having “non-western appearance”.
01:20   These are all the cases in which the perpetrator could be identified by the victim
01:25   Many of the perpetrators who commit these rapes are on the edge of society,
01:30   often unemployed, arriving from traumatized countries.
01:33   In the past five years it has often been asylum seekers.
01:37   This girl was raped by a man of Pakistani heritage.
01:40   She is an ethnic Norwegian as is almost all victims who are assaulted and then raped
01:46   “He said, that he had the right to do exactly as he wanted to a woman.”
01:51   Why? “Because that is how it was in his religion.”
01:55   “Women did not have rights or opinions, he was in charge.”
02:00   The way women are viewed is at least one of the questions we have to ask
02:07   in order to understanding the motive of the perpetrators.
02:10   It should not stand on its own, as a stigma,
02:13   but it is an element we must have the courage to address.

For a complete listing of previous enrichment news, see The Cultural Enrichment Archives.

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Our Muslim Troubles

Part Two: The Chocolate Cake Diet

“Though Muslim population growth in the UK will push us inexorably into violent conflict, our analysis must attempt to move beyond generalities and consider exactly how and when such conflict is most likely to break out. The pressure driving us towards conflict is steady and inexorable, but the escalations of that conflict will be discrete and sudden.”

This is the second of a five-part series by El Inglés comparing and contrasting the Troubles in Northern Ireland with the coming Muslim Troubles in Britain. The first part is available here.

The entire series will be made published as a single document in pdf format after the final part is posted at Gates of Vienna.

Once again, a caveat for readers who are new to El Inglés’ work: this paper is descriptive, not normative. None of us wants to live through what El Inglés is predicting, but we may very well have to.

Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland

by El Inglés

IV. The Focus on Terrorism

Before we launch into a discussion of the likely characteristics of our Muslim Troubles, we will take a minor detour to build on the previous chapter by further explaining why, though the likely severity of our Muslim Troubles can legitimately be debated, we consider some sort of violent conflict to be inevitable. Here, we will examine something that highlights just how hopeless the response of our political establishment has been to the problems that Islam and Muslims have created for us in Britain.

One of the most crippling problems to date with the debate on Islam in the UK has been the focus on terrorism. This focus is slowly shifting, but it still lingers, extending a baleful effect over attempts to deal with the real problem, which is the presence in the UK of large and ever-larger numbers of Muslims. Continued Muslim immigration into European countries will lead ineluctably to widespread, violent, tribal conflict that will rip those countries apart, and potentially result in the deaths of tens, if not hundreds, of thousands of people throughout Western Europe. Yet, in the UK, our ability to openly discuss these vital matters has been badly compromised by a stated desire on the part of those in government to prevent terrorism, which desire is itself largely insincere. It is too early to pass judgement on the Conservative-led government in this regard, but preventing terrorism was so far down the list of priorities of the Labour government as to astonish.

This is a strong claim, and one that can only be demonstrated through rigorous argument. Much rubbish is spoken about Muslim terrorism, but we shall cut a swathe through it all here and strip things down to basics. Given that most Muslim terrorism is, or is at least intended to be, suicidal in nature, let us assume that, to a reasonable approximation, all Muslim terrorists or would-be terrorists either commit one successful suicide terrorist attack (e.g. the 7/7 bombers) or attempt to do so and are then caught and incarcerated (e.g. the 21/7 bombers). The number of successful acts of terrorism perpetrated in the UK by Muslims every year therefore equals, by definition, the Muslim population of the UK (M) multiplied by the fraction of this population Approving of terrorism in the UK as a political tool (A), multiplied by the fraction of this population that Tries, with however much or little dedication, to conduct an act of terrorism every year (T), multiplied by the fraction of this population that Succeeds (S). If one wishes to reduce the number of such attacks, one must try and reduce some or all of these values. As we have defined the matter here, there is simply no other way of doing it.

The Number of Muslim terrorist attacks (N) taking place in a given year must then be:

N = M x A x T x S

So, in 2005, our equation would have looked something like this:

N = 2,400,000 x 0.1 x 0.01 x 0.00167 = 4

These four people were, of course, the 7/7 bombers responsible for the 2005 bus and Tube bombings in London.

Let us consider the four parameters in slightly more detail. A and T are in essence, psychological parameters that pertain to the way Muslims interpret the demands of their religion and events in the world around them. Virtually by definition, they are the hardest of the four to measure, to understand, or to adjust. Countless reams of excruciating guff have been written on the subjects of winning hearts and minds, of empowering the moderates to take on the extremists, of midwifing the Islamic Reformation, and of winning the debate between secularism and fundamentalism. However, despite the great cogitation that its creators presumably indulged in, Prevent, the flagship counter-radicalisation programme of the Labour government, has now been kicked to the kerb, derided by all and sundry as useless at best and counterproductive at worst. This is a crucial point: any attempt to mould people psychologically can have results quite the opposite of those intended, as the underlying psychological substrate of the human mind is simply not amenable to being manipulated in this matter. No even remotely rigorous or reliable method exists for altering the parameters A or T, and attempts to do so are the purest voodoo.

Parameter M, in contrast, has real and obvious meaning. Irrelevant debates about who is a ‘real’ Muslim to one side, it is clear that there are very many Muslims in the UK and that their numbers are growing very rapidly. The causes of this rapid growth are Muslim immigration and higher Muslim fertility. The latter of these two causes is difficult to control directly, but the former is straightforward in principle for a wealthy, technologically advanced island nation in the north-west of Europe. This means that M is a parameter over which the government can extend massive influence over, particularly in the long term.

Parameter S bundles together a number of different factors but derives most obviously from the competence and resources of the security establishment relative to the terrorist threat. A fixed-size security establishment will not be able to keep S (and therefore successful terrorist attacks) at zero year after year in the face of a growing threat (which we can consider to be equal to M x A x T). As S cannot be adjusted directly, but only by creating a security apparatus to try and keep it as low as possible, we take the Efficiency of the security apparatus as being E, and define S = 1 — E. Now, as long as E can be kept equal to one, no successful attacks will occur in any given year. As the terrorist threat mounts, keeping E equal to one will become harder and harder and require an ever greater degree of funding and expertise. Note that E will vary discontinuously from year to year as a function of luck, the competence of Muslim terrorists, and the competence of the security apparatus of other countries, and that N itself will therefore vary discontinuously.

We now have a basic grasp of our parameters. A and T cannot be measured, understood, or adjusted with any meaningful degree of control at all, and attempts to reduce them may well backfire. S can be adjusted only indirectly and without complete control through pouring resources into the security services, and hoping that they can keep the value of E from dropping below 1. M, on the other hand is subject to a very significant degree of what we shall call trajectory control, in that the actions of government (especially a ruthless government) can extend huge influence over its long-term trajectory, for better or for worse.

How then, did the Labour government attack the problem of Muslim terrorism? We have noted that, central to the entire government effort to prevent ‘violent extremism’ was Prevent, a desperate and embarrassing effort to reduce A and T by giving Muslim youth table tennis facilities and other such nonsense. Meanwhile, Blair and then Brown continued to allow Muslims to flood into Britain through family reunion and other mechanisms (which was actually expanded when they came to power in 1997), and be subsidized to have large families by the British taxpayer. This put Muslims (which is to say, M) onto a massively mushrooming trajectory, which they are only now starting to be dislodged from by the Conservative-led government. No mention of Muslim terrorism by anyone in the Labour government (or the police under their control) that we are aware of ever addressed this simple point. M was simply out of bounds, utterly beyond the pale. The Muslim terrorist threat, defined by us as M x A x T, was somehow unrelated to one of its three parameters, M. Trajectory control of M was relinquished to Muslims themselves, whose predisposition for importing close relatives to procreate with has been driving it up rapidly.

Let us consider the significance of this. If M doubles over a given period of time, then halving, say, A, results in N retaining exactly the same value as it had to begin with. In other words, the apparently impossible task of reducing by half the fraction of the Muslim population of Britain approving of terrorist attacks against Britain, even if achieved, would be cancelled out completely if the Muslim population had doubled over the same time period. M is currently thought to be about 2.9 million, up from about 1.8 million in 2001, and presumably from approximately 1.5 million in 1997, when Labour came to power. This is a near doubling of M over the 13 years of the Labour government, a development which would negate huge successes with respect to A and T even if they could be achieved, which they cannot.

What this means is that the only hope for preventing Muslim terrorism is to focus on keeping S as low as possible, which means keeping E at a value of 1. Certainly we must give thanks for a security service that appears, by and large, to do an extremely good job of preventing Muslims who want to kill us from killing us. But, as members of the security service would be the first to acknowledge, there is simply no way in which they can expect to reliably interdict every single such attempt in perpetuity. That the number of successful Muslim terrorist attacks in the UK so far should be so low stems substantially from factors inherent to the Muslim population of the UK rather than from the intrinsic brilliance of MI5 or Special Branch. Should these factors themselves evolve, and Muslim terrorists obtain any of the formidable strengths of the PIRA, we will be in a very different situation.

If, then, a government claims to be terribly concerned about Muslim terrorism, yet wilfully ignores the only parameter (M) it has any significant control over to focus on two parameters that it has no control over (A and T) and one that it has a hard-to-evaluate influence on (S), what are we forced to conclude about its sincerity other than that it has none? We do not claim here that individual Labour politicians did not care about the 7/7 bombings, or laughed them off as a minor inconvenience. We have no doubt that they were appalled by them and were desperate to prevent them being repeated, but only within the constraints of a program of mass immigration which they had created and to which they were still fully committed. Similarly, one could be desperately eager to lose weight within the constraints imposed by a nutritional program of eating an entire chocolate cake for breakfast every day. But what would an impartial observer make of such behaviour? How much importance would this observer conclude that a person eating a chocolate cake a day really attached to losing weight?

We are forced to conclude that, taken as a whole, the counter-terrorism efforts of the Labour government were about as meaningful as our hypothetical chocolate cake diet would be. Yet, ostensibly in the service of this pathetic charade, we have spent years being told that we must hamstring our ability to address the true nature of the problems created by the Muslim presence in our country. What have we been forbidden to discuss, highlight, or criticize so as not to push the moderates into the arms of the extremists, to use the hackneyed expression that has replaced the thought processes of so many?

We cannot discuss the intrinsically violent and oppressive nature of Islam, as to do so would marginalize Muslims in the UK and push the moderates into the arms of the extremists. We cannot oppose Muslim immigration, as to do so would marginalize Muslims in the UK and push the moderates into the arms of the extremists. We cannot draw attention to the rank criminality of Muslims, as to do so would marginalize Muslims in the UK and push the moderates into the arms of the extremists. We cannot demonstrate against anything to do with Islam (the EDL springs to mind, and has been explicitly, and disgracefully, criticized on these grounds), as to do so would marginalize Muslims in the UK and push the moderates into the arms of the extremists. There is simply no end to the self-censorship required of us.

What are people really saying when they say these things? Assuming they are sincere, they are saying that the imperative to keep the parameters A and T as low as possible (despite the fact that we have no control over them) is so overwhelming in the fight to stop otherwise ‘moderate’ Muslims from deciding to try and kill us (!) that we must turn a blind eye to every other pernicious effect Muslims are having on our country, thereby implicitly accepting that we will be thrust into a tribal conflict that will rip our country apart and kill thousands of people. And this from the same people that are happy for M to become arbitrarily high and celebrate its growth as the dawning of a new age of man!

That preventing acts of terrorism is not the only responsibility of government is clear. If the British state had simply withdrawn from Northern Ireland in 1972 (by far the most murderous year of the Troubles), then the IRA would have had no reason to commit terrorist acts on the British mainland. However, few British people indeed would have supported such a course of action. Similarly, few would condemn the immigration policies of the Labour government vis-à-vis Muslims if there existed some massive compensatory benefit to us of the Muslim presence in this country. But as we have established in earlier documents, and as is painfully clear by now in a purely intuitive way to boot, Muslim immigration into Britain has been a catastrophe for the British people quite irrespective of the terrorist threat Muslims pose, due to the criminality, parasitism, and general unpleasantness of Muslims.

Whether or not any particular criticism of the Muslim presence in the UK or Islam in general really increases A or T is a virtually impossible-to-answer empirical question. But the answer is irrelevant. We must speak out about what Muslim immigration is pushing us towards, which is a violent conflict that will make isolated terrorist attacks look like small beer in comparison. Is it not better to face this reality, and, perhaps, a greater short-term threat of terrorism, than to stay on the conveyor belt and be fed into the crusher? But this, not one single figure in mainstream British politics has yet done. This is the scale of the problem, and provides an insight into how hard it will be to turn this ship around before it smashes onto the rocks of a violent, tribal conflict.

V. Towards Conflict

Though Muslim population growth in the UK will push us inexorably into violent conflict, our analysis must attempt to move beyond generalities and consider exactly how and when such conflict is most likely to break out. The pressure driving us towards conflict is steady and inexorable, but the escalations of that conflict will be discrete and sudden. Attempting to predict in detail what these escalations will consist of would be an exercise in futility, but considering what general form they are likely to take is an endeavour well worth the effort.

Whatever form the flashpoints of violent conflict between British and Muslims take, they will obviously not take place in the Scottish Highlands, or in deepest, darkest Cornwall. Conflict will flare first and most obviously in areas where large Muslim populations live side-by-side with large populations of the British. This means that there are three main areas where this conflict can flare up, and where it will doubtless be concentrated thereafter: the north-west of England, the West Midlands, and the Greater London area. We argue here that there are two main types of events that are likely to constitute the key triggering and escalating events in our Muslim Troubles: riots and terrorist attacks. We will consider each in turn here.


Just as the crucial developments that led to the deployment of the British Army in NI were the rioting on the Bogside housing estate in Derry and the rioting in Belfast that was a direct response to it, we feel comfortable in stating that the most obvious stepping stones on the path to outright violent conflict will be more or less lethal riots in the key urban areas we mentioned above. In other words, our Muslim Troubles are likely to commence when specific towns and cities obtain such large Muslim populations that the tension that has been brewing in them for such a long time bursts to the fore in riots which the police cannot control, which result in serious injuries, deaths, and people being forced from their homes, and which are so severe as to make it clear that the Rubicon has been crossed, and that the divide between Muslim and Briton is total.

Of course, we have already seen severe riots in many Muslim-heavy towns and cities in the north of England, but the 2001 riots were insufficient to ignite outright conflict between Muslims and British for a variety of reasons. Firstly, these riots were prior to 9/11 and the rapid escalation of tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims throughout the West that has ensued. Secondly, they took place before the rapid recent growth of a pan-European consciousness that our countries are, quite simply, being colonized by massive influxes of rapidly-breeding Muslims who have failed utterly in the task of turning their own countries into places worth living in. Thirdly, the areas in question were simply not Muslim enough in 2001. If, in 2031, similar riots break out again in, say, the north of England, by which time the Muslim population will be much larger and an extra twenty years’ worth of hatred and fear will have been allowed to build, the results will certainly be very different. The key question is not whether such riots would push us over the edge into our Muslim Troubles, but whether we are even likely to get through to 2031 before they occur.

There are already a number of towns and cities in England whose Muslim populations are of the order of 20%. Bearing in mind that the demographic profiles of Muslims and Britons are quite different, with Muslim populations having younger median ages, let us assume that areas like this already have populations aged 18 and younger that are already 30%—35% Muslim. As our key assumption, outlined earlier, was that the British government will fail to display the will required to pre-empt the conflict, we are also assuming that Muslim immigration will continue largely as it is conducted at present. Accordingly, the Muslim populations and the young Muslim populations must be expected to continue to rise very quickly. Of course there is no scientific way of determining when we enter the danger zone for a complete disintegration of civil order, but the extreme tensions over the last couple of years in Luton and the emergence and growing profile of the EDL suggest that it is being approached fairly quickly in the UK, as in so many places throughout Europe. We will assume here that a 2:1 ratio of Britons to Muslims, and the approximately 1:1 ratio young Muslims to young Britons that will accompany it will certainly precipitate this situation (which is not to suggest that it could not happen earlier). Again, precise predictions are impossible, especially given that white flight is already accelerating the conversion of certain towns and cities in England into Muslim-dominated zones. Here we will, in a slightly arbitrary fashion, establish a time twenty years from now, in 2031, as being that point in time at which at least some towns or cities in England are tipping over into becoming majority-Muslim in their young populations, and in which riots of the sort we described above could happen at any time. In other words, we claim here that our Muslim Troubles must start by about 2031 at the very latest as long as our underlying assumption of ‘no change of course’ holds true.

Terrorist Attacks

The wild card in this consideration of how the conflict will start is the possibility of terrorist attacks, perpetrated by either side, against the other. Such attacks will act as sparks, setting alight the increasingly pitch-soaked fabric of 21st century Britain. This is not completely inconsistent with our above claim that rioting will be the trigger, as terrorist attacks could turn out to be what sparks the localized violence bitter enough to descend into permanent conflict. But they are nonetheless a distinct phenomenon in their own right, in that sufficiently appalling terrorist atrocities could plunge us straight into our Muslim Troubles years before they would otherwise have been caused by ‘normal’ rioting.

Though Muslims would have to be the odds-on favourites to commit terrorist attacks of this sort, it would be foolish in the extreme to rule out the possibility of British paramilitaries of whatever sort deciding to, for example, car-bomb a mosque. We will have a great deal more to say on such matters in subsequent sections. Let it suffice for the moment for us to observe that, as we will see in a later section, the record of the loyalist paramilitaries in NI during the Troubles provides little reason to believe that those British who consider themselves British (excluding therefore the PIRA and other republican paramilitaries) would refuse to engage in such ruthless and murderous activities.

Of course, we have already suffered terrorist attacks and attempted terrorist attacks at the hands of Muslims. British people were shocked and appalled by the 7/7 bombings in 2005, but they did not threaten to tip us over into any sort of civil conflict. The reasons for this include all the reasons that the riots in the north of England in 2001 could not do so, but include the following separate reasons as well: a) they were carried out against relatively impersonal targets in central London, and b) they did not target any one particular, geographically-rooted community which could feel as a consequence that its very viability was threatened and that would therefore be motivated to strike back. As demographic change proceeds and racial and religious tensions mount, the likelihood of British or Muslim paramilitaries targeting their neighbours and creating a situation reminiscent of the divide between the Protestant Shankill Road and Catholic Falls Road in Belfast will increase. Terrorist attacks on the religious, commercial, or residential hearts of specific geographic communities are far more likely to precipitate long-term violent conflict than repetitions of the 7/7 bombings.

*   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *   *

The 2:1 Protestant-to-Catholic ratio in NI in 1969 was a very long way away from anything that currently obtains in the UK with respect to its Muslim population, which is still less than 5% of the whole. This being the case, some will undoubtedly be inclined to think that trouble is therefore a long way off. But we should think hard about which geographical units are of most relevance to our analysis. Which areas should we be focusing on? Individual towns and cities? Areas such as the Midlands? England? Which populations should we be comparing?

To compare the current Muslim population of the UK (just under 5%) to the Catholic population of NI when conflict erupted (about 33%) would be to miss the point. Those parts of Britain undergoing rapid colonization by Muslims are, taken by themselves, only small parts of Britain. But NI itself is only a small part of Britain. It is the local population balance that seems to matter, and NI was a good example of this. Would we say that the 500,000-strong Catholic population of NI in 1969 was only a tiny minority of the whole of the UK, and that violent conflict could therefore not break out between it and some other part of the population? Obviously not, as it is a historical fact that such conflict did break out. Why could something similar not happen in, say Birmingham? Why could conflict envelop an area such as NI, but not a city such as Birmingham, whose population is of the same order of magnitude as that of NI in 1969, or an area such as the north-west of England, whose population is considerable larger?

If, in this context, there is any major difference between the Troubles in NI and our forthcoming Muslim Troubles, it will be that the Troubles were seen largely as being a foreign conflict in a foreign land by most of the population of the mainland UK. The tolerance on the part of the British public and political class for violence in NI was therefore relatively high. An awareness of this reality was one of the factors that led the IRA to start bombing England in the early 1970s, and to strike again repeatedly in London and Manchester in the 1990s. Nothing like this will be the case when British and Muslims fall into low-intensity war with each other in and around the three key conflict areas of the north-west of England, the West Midlands, and Greater London. Most of the population of England will be either in, or close to, one of these war zones, a reality which will instantly confer an edge to the conflict quite different to that of the Troubles,[6] even ignoring its much greater scale.

Coming up:

Part Three: An Explosive Situation


6. This is said from the perspective of an Englishman. The Troubles undoubtedly had quite enough edge already for those who happened to live in Belfast.

Previous posts by El Inglés:

2007   Nov   28   The Danish Civil War
2008   Apr   24   Surrender, Genocide… or What?
    May   17   Sliding Into Irrelevance
    Jul   5   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 1
        6   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 2
        8   A Crystal Ball for Britain: Part 3
    Aug   25   Identity, Immigration, and Islam
    Oct   4   The Blackhoods of Antifa
        26   Racists ’R’ Us
    Nov   25   Surrender, Genocide… or What? — An Update
2009   Feb   16   Pick a Tribe, Any Tribe
    Apr   11   Pick A Tribe, Any Tribe — Part II
    May   18   To Push or to Squeeze?
    Nov   2   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 1
    Dec   5   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 2
        7   On the Failure of Law Enforcement — Part 3
2010   Mar   25   The Death of Democracy
        25   Some Fallacies On the Subject of Crime — Part 1
        28   Reflections on the Civil War in Britain
    Apr   1   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part One
        2   A Consideration of the Criminal Investigation Process — Part Two
        5   On Vigilantism — Part One
    Oct   29   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 1
    Nov   1   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 2
        4   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 3
        2   Muslim Crime in the UK: Part 4
2011   Mar   10   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part One
        11   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Two
        12   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Three
        13   Muslim Immigration into the UK: Part Four
    May   25   Our Muslim Troubles: Lessons from Northern Ireland — Part One: The Idiot Paradigm

A Rosetta Stone for Ann Barnhardt, Part 8

Rosetta Stone: Ann BarnhardtThe latest installment of the Rosetta Stone for Ann Barnhardt are finally here. These versions took a while because Cyrillic encoding always presents special problems for Vlad the Subtitler.

Below are Russian-subtitled versions of Ms. Barnhardt burning the Koran (the originals, with a transcript, are posted here). To keep from triggering the Blogger Bug, I’ve put the videos after the jump, followed by the complete Russian transcripts.

Our languages to date:

Albanian German Portuguese
Danish * Greek * Russian
Dutch † Hebrew Spanish
Finnish * Italian * Swedish *
French Polish *

(* = assigned but not yet received; † = received but not yet posted)

Many thanks to Watcher for the translation, and to Vlad Tepes for the subtitling:

Part 1

Part 2

Part 1: Russian
Translated by Watcher

00:00   Здравствуйте. Меня зовут Энн Барнхардт
00:03   и похоже, что я являюсь одним из последних людей,
00:06   оставшихся в западной цивилизации,
00:08   у которых есть хоть немного
00:10   одновременно и мозгов, и смелости.
00:12   Я видела, что сенатор Линдси Грэм
00:15   был сегодня утром на “Face the Nation”
00:17   и сказал следующее, отвечая на вопрос Боба Шиффера
00:20   можно ли сделать что-нибудь
00:22   относительно американцев сжигающих Коран.
00:23   Цитирую: “Да… Хотелось бы найти способ
00:27   привлечь людей к ответственности.
00:28   Свобода слова — это отличная идея, но мы воюем.
00:33   Во время Второй мировой войны,
00:34   были ограничения на то, что можно было говорить,
00:35   если это могло вдохновить врага …
00:37   каждый раз, когда мы можем дать отпор здесь в Америке
00:40   таким действиям как это,
00:41   которые подвергают наших солдат риску,
00:43   мы должны это сделать.” Конец цитаты.
00:45   Линдси Грэм – Республиканец, и если
00:48   Джон Маккейн был бы избран президентом в 2008 году,
00:50   Линдси Грэм был бы сегодня Генеральным Прокурором
00:53   Соединённых Штатов.
00:55   Помните об этом пока я продолжаю.
00:56   Давайте разберём то, что сказал Грэм, предложение за предложением.
01:00   Первое предложение. Цитата:
01:02   “Да… Хотелось бы найти способ …
01:04   привлечь людей к ответственности.” Конец цитаты.
01:05   Привлечь людей к ответственности? За что?
01:10   За использование своего гарантированного Конституцией
01:14   и данного богом права
01:16   на свободу мысли,
01:17   свободу слова,
01:19   свободу самовыражения и свободу религии?
01:22   Эй, болван!
01:24   Ты что, не читал Первую Поправку
01:25   к Конституции Соединенных Штатов?
01:26   Вот. Позволь-ка мне прочитать её тебя.
01:29   “Конгресс не должен издавать ни одного закона
01:32   относящегося к установлению религии,
01:35   или запрещающего свободное её исповедание;
01:38   либо ограничивающего свободу слова
01:40   или печати;
01:42   либо право народа мирно собираться
01:45   и ходатайствовать в правительство
01:47   об удовлетворении жалоб.”
01:49   Так что то, что Линдси Грэм хочет сделать –
01:52   это вознести тоталитарную политическую систему,
01:56   маскирующуюся под видом религии называемой “ислам”
01:59   до статуса, который заменяет и отменяет
02:03   Первую Поправку к Конституции
02:06   и, следовательно, ставит её в положение
02:09   особо охраняемого правового превосходства,
02:12   в котором критика ислама или
02:15   неспособность оказать соответсвующее и достаточное уважение
02:18   и честь исламским текстам является преступлением.
02:23   Эй, Линдси, болван ты!
02:25   Ты знаешь как это называется?
02:27   Это называется “Шариат”.
02:29   Что, чёрт возьми, с тобой?
02:31   Я собираюсь здесь сейчас сжечь Коран.
02:34   Линдси, почему бы тебе не прийти и
02:37   не привлечь меня к ответственности, дружок?
02:38   Давай. Арестуй меня
02:41   за осуществление моих прав Первой Поправки.
02:43   Тащи меня в Конгресс и привлекай меня к ответственности.
02:47   Сделай это.
02:48   Ничто не сделаeт меня счастливее.
02:50   Я бы насладилась возможностью
02:53   объяснить тебе как именно
02:56   мы делаем это в Соединённых Штатах Америки.
02:59   Если тебе хочется драки,
03:00   то пожалуйста.
03:01   Но имей в виду, если решишь драться со мной,
03:04   единственный результат –
03:05   это ты, рыдающий в уборной.
03:08   Следующая цитата: “Свобода слова — это отличная идея,
03:13   но мы воюем.” Конец цитаты.
03:16   Свобода слова — это отличная идея?
03:19   Это основополагающий принцип
03:21   западной цивилизации и Соединенных Штатов.
03:24   Индивидуалы – это свободные,
03:26   независимые люди.
03:28   Индивидуалы не являются собственностью
03:30   или дронами государства.
03:32   Правительство не диктует народу
03:34   что думать и говорить.
03:36   Народ диктует
03:38   правительству что думать и говорить через
03:40   механизмы управления
03:42   представительской республики в соответствии с Конституцией.
03:44   Но что я подозреваю
03:46   так это то, что в действительности дело тут
03:48   в интеллектуальном снобизме и элитарности.
03:50   Линдси Грэм, ты смотришь на Терри Джонса
03:52   и видишь жлоба
03:54   с усами-рулём, говорящего
03:56   с южным акцентом,
03:58   не щеголяющего элитарным
04:00   образованием. И ты делаешь вывод, что
04:02   людям как он нельзя
04:04   доверить иметь свой собственный
04:06   интеллектуальный суверенитет согласно
04:08   Первой Поправке, и поэтому,
04:10   ты, находясь на более высоком
04:12   интеллектуальном уровне, должен
04:14   его обуздать. Слушай,
04:16   болван, так это не работает.
04:18   Первая Поправка применяется ко всем
04:20   американским гражданам одинаково.
04:22   Она не работает по
04:24   скользящей шкале в зависимости от
04:26   стоимости полученного образования,
04:28   уровня дохода
04:30   или от того прглашают тебя или нет
04:32   на светские вечеринки в Джорджтауне.
04:34   Но если ты хочешь играть в игры,
04:36   хорошо. Если хочешь
04:38   потягаться с человеком своего интеллектуального
04:40   уровня, тогда я – это то, что тебе нужно.
04:42   Дебатируй со мной.
04:44   Я твёрдо поддерживаю
04:46   Терри Джонса
04:48   и горжусь этим.
04:50   Следующее предложение. Цитата:
04:52   “Во время Второй мировой войны
04:54   были ограничения на то, что можно было говорить,
04:56   если это могло вдохновить врага.”
04:58   Конец цитаты.
05:00   Линдси, болван ты,
05:02   единственный запрет на свободу слова
05:04   во время Второй мировой войны и
05:06   и всех остальных войн относился к высказываниям,
05:08   которые могли оказать помощь и
05:10   поддержку врагу, а не
05:12   высказываниям, которые деморализовывали, расхолаживали
05:14   или деградировали врага. Ты когда-нибудь
05:16   видел плакаты времён Второй мировой войны,
05:18   изображающие японцев как
05:20   “япошек” и нацистов как
05:22   кровожадных животных?
05:24   Разве ты никогда не видел мультфильмы Warner Brothers,
05:26   да — именно — Looney Toons,
05:28   сделанные во время войны, которые безжалостно
05:30   высмеивали и деградировали
05:32   немцев, итальянцев и японцев?
05:34   Неофициальный запрет
05:36   во время войны был на
05:38   высказывания, которые были пораженческими или
05:40   примирительными по отношению
05:42   к врагу – именно тем,
05:44   чем ты и занимаешься,
05:46   ты глупый, глупый болван.
05:48   Следующее предложение. Цитата:
05:50   “Каждый раз, когда мы можем дать отпор
05:52   здесь в Америке
05:54   таким действиям как это, которые подвергают наших солдат риску,
05:56   мы должны это сделать.”
05:58   Конец цитаты.
06:00   Дать отпор?
06:02   Поскольку рассматриваемая свобода слова
06:04   практикуется преданным,
06:06   законопослушным американским
06:08   гражданином против
06:10   заклятого врага Соединенных Штатов
06:12   и его конституции, которой является ислам,
06:14   и вы, сенатор Грэм,
06:16   говорите о том, чтобы “давать отпор”
06:18   используя силу правительства
06:20   Соединенных Штатов,
06:22   то для меня это звучит так, как будто вы решили
06:24   что правительство Соединенных Штатов находится в союзе
06:26   с исламом против народа Соединенных Штатов,
06:28   который не проявляет
06:30   достаточного почтения и уважения
06:32   к исламу.
06:34   Сенатор Грэм,
06:36   вы можете взять ваш дхимми
06:38   и засунуть его себе в задницу!
06:40   И не смей обвинять
06:42   патриотических американцев, практикующих
06:44   права Первой Поправки в том,
06:46   что они подвергают наших солдат опасности. Единственное
06:48   что подвергает наших солдат опасности –
06:50   это самоубийственные, пораженческие правила
06:52   ведения военных действий, не дающие нашим
06:54   отважным солдатам
06:56   сражаться и
06:58   побеждать врага. Ты выставляешь наших
06:59   ребят на передавую,
07:00   а затем отказываешься дать им боеприпасы,
07:02   отказываешься разрешить им вступить в бой
07:05   без разрешения долбаного адвоката,
07:07   и отказаваешься разрешить им вести боевые действия против гражданских лиц
07:11   в то время как боевые силы, с которыми они воюют,
07:13   на 100% состоят из гражданских.
07:17   Да как ты смеешь обвинять нас
07:18   в том, что мы подвергаем наших солдат опасности?
07:22   Последняя цитата: “Так что я рассчитываю на сотрудничество с сенаторами Керри
07:24   и Ридом и другими
07:27   чтобы осудить это.
07:29   Осуждение насилия во имя религии
07:31   во всем мире.” Конец цитаты.
07:33   У меня только один вопрос:
07:36   какой акт насилия совершили
07:39   Терри Джонс или Энн Барнхардт?
07:42   Разве мы кого-то убили?
07:44   Разве мы совершили на кого-то нападение?
07:46   Разве мы отрезали кому-то голову?
07:47   Какй же акт насилия мы совершили?
07:50   Как может сжигание бумаги с чернилами не ней
07:54   быть актом насилия?
07:55   Как может предмет, сделанный из бумаги,
07:58   приравниваться к жизни человека?
08:01   Ты серьёзно утверждаешь,
08:03   что рвание и сжигание книги эквивалентно убийству и
08:05   обезглавливанию человека?
08:10   Что с тобой?
08:12   Ты знаешь почему мы, христиане, не
08:14   слишком расстраиваемся по поводу людей,
08:16   которые сжигают Библии или создают ужасные кощунственные картинки,
08:19   используя христианские символы?
08:21   Потому что мы понимаем, что Библия
08:25   может быть напечатана заново и что картинка –
08:27   это просто картинка.
08:29   Образ распятия,
08:31   погружённого в банку с мочёй
08:33   наводит на меня печаль.
08:35   Но печаль не потому что мы считаем что
08:37   это физически Иисус утонул в моче.
08:41   Это наводит на нас печаль, из-за
08:43   подразумеваемых ненависти, страдания и отчаяния
08:44   художника, который сделал такую вещь,
08:48   и покровителей, которые этому аплодируют.
08:50   Христиане не хотели убить Роберт Мэпплторпа,
08:53   когда он был ещё жив.
08:54   Мы хотели молиться за него,
08:56   чтобы он познал Бога
08:59   и был освобождён от своих очевидных мучений,
09:01   чтобы когда-нибудь мы все вместе могли бы быть на небесах.
09:03   Именно поэтому мы сжигаем Коран.
09:06   Потому что это манифест зловещей
09:09   тоталитарной политической системы.
09:11   И он порабощает человека в культуре страдания,
09:14   безнадёжности, извращения, отчаяния,
09:18   истинного насилия и противоестественной смерти.
09:21   И если вы не были таким монументальным болваном,
09:24   Сенатор Грэм,
09:26   и не тратили всё своё время на целование задницы
09:27   той самой политической системы,
09:30   которая перерезала бы ваше горло в мгновение ока,
09:32   может быть вы смогли бы это понять.

Part 2: Russian
Translated by Watcher

00:00   А теперь, главное событие.
00:04   Вот мой Коран.
00:10   Он напечатан на английском и арабском языках,
00:11   так что это вполне законный, официальный Коран.
00:16   Я сделала закладки нескольких цитат…
00:20   и цитаты, которые я заложила,
00:21   я заложила беконом,
00:24   потому что сырой бекон – это лучшие закладки для Корана.
00:28   Я просто пройду по ним,
00:30   читая их по порядку,
00:32   а затем, после того, как я их прочту,
00:34   я буду вырывать страницу из Корана,
00:36   класть её в чашу для сжигания и поджигать.
00:38   Первая, в сокращённом варианте.
00:42   Сура 2, стих 191:
00:46   “Убивайте неверных, где бы вы их ни встретили,
00:47   и изгоняйте их из тех мест, откуда они изгнали вас.”
00:51   Злодейское, злодейское чтиво.
00:53   И она сгорает,
00:56   сгорает в огне.
00:59   Возвращайся в ад, откуда ты пришла.
01:05   И я выброшу мою беконовую закладку сюда.
01:09   Следующая, Сура 2 стих 193:
01:18   “Сражайтесь с ними, пока идолопоклонничество не исчезнет
01:21   и не преобладает закон Аллаха.”
01:26   Злодейство. Вырываем это,
01:29   мусор, в огонь.
01:32   Гори, детка, гори.
01:36   Далее.
01:39   Вытаскиваю беконовую закладку.
01:40   Запах, кстати, божественный.
01:45   Так. Сура 4 стих 24.
01:50   “Также запретны для вас замужние женщины,
01:52   если только они не взяты вами в плен.
01:56   Таково предписание Аллаха.”
01:59   О чём это говорит –
02:01   это с кем мужчина может или не может заниматься сексом.
02:03   Иными словами,
02:04   это ратификация изнасилования женщин, захваченных во время джихада.
02:08   Прочту это ещё раз.
02:10   Это Сура 4:24.
02:12   “Также запретны для вас замужние женщины,
02:15   если только они не взяты вами в плен.
02:17   Таково предписание Аллаха.”
02:19   Ну, Аллах – это зловещий сукин сын,
02:21   так что он может отправляться в ад.
02:24   Следующая тоже из 4:24.
02:27   “А за удовольствие, полученное от этих женщин,
02:30   вознаградите их установленным приданым.
02:34   На вас не будет греха, если вы придете к обоюдному согласию
02:35   после того, как определите обязательное приданое.
02:37   Воистину, Аллах всеведущ
02:39   и мудр.”
02:41   То, что этот стих делает,
02:43   это ратификация проституции.
02:45   Если мужчина платит женщине приданое
02:47   или определенное количество денег,
02:50   он может заниматься с ней сексом без обязательств.
02:53   И конечно Аллах всеведущ и мудр,
02:54   Аллах – это зловещий сукин сын.
02:58   Хорошо, дальше.
02:59   Переходим к Суре в 4:34.
03:01   Это обращение к мужчине, с которым
03:06   одна из его многочисленных жён
03:08   отказывается добровольно заниматься сексом.
03:10   Это 4:34:
03:11   “Что касается женщин, которые непокорны,
03:14   увещевайте их.
03:16   Избегайте их на супружеском ложе.
03:18   Затем побейте их
03:21   и ложитесь в постель с ними,
03:23   когда они готовы.”
03:24   Таким образом, это санкционирует избиения вашей жены,
03:25   если она не хочет заниматься с вами сексом.
03:30   Злодейство, злодейство, злодейство.
03:31   И мы сожжём это,
03:36   потому что ему нет места
03:41   в цивилизованном обществе.
03:42   Дальше…
03:45   Это Сура 5:33.
03:47   Наказание для тех, кто воюет
03:49   против Аллаха и его пророка
03:51   Мухаммеда,
03:53   и стремятся сотворить на земле нечестие –
03:57   предать их смерти, или распять их на кресте,
03:58   и отрубить руку с одной стороны
04:00   и ногу с другой.
04:02   и ногу с другой.
04:03   Злодейство.
04:05   Гори, гори, гори.
04:12   Так, вынимаем закладку.
04:17   Дальше, Сура 8.
04:27   Это 8:12.
04:29   И Аллах сказал ангелам:
04:31   “Я — с вами.
04:33   Так окажите же поддержку уверовавшим.
04:35   Я же вселю ужас в сердца
04:36   неверных.
04:40   Так рубите же им головы
04:41   и все пальцы.”
04:43   Это призыв к обезглавливанию неверных.
04:45   Вот откуда это всё исходит.
04:46   И это злодейство, поэтому мы её сожжём.
04:51   Назад в ад, откуда ты пришла.
05:10   Так, что тут у нас следующее?
05:12   У нас… А! Сура 9.
05:17   Сура 9, стих 5.
05:20   Это – очень важный стих.
05:21   “Когда же завершатся запретные месяцы,
05:25   то убивайте многобожников, где бы вы их ни обнаружили.
05:28   Берите их в плен, осаждайте их в крепостях.
05:30   И устраивайте засаду против них
05:31   во всяком скрытом месте.”
05:35   Дальше.
05:40   Всё ещё в замечательной Суре 9.
05:46   Стих 29. “Сражайтесь с теми из людей книги,
05:48   которые не веруют ни в Аллаха…”
05:50   Кстати, иудео-христиане,
05:52   это мы. Люди книги.
05:53   “Сражайтесь с теми из людей книги,
05:55   кто не веруют ни в Аллаха,
05:57   ни в Судный день,
06:00   кто не считают запретным то,
06:01   что запретили Аллах и его пророк,
06:03   и не подчиняются религии истинной,
06:05   пока они вам дань платить не станут
06:08   в смирении покорном.”
06:10   Злодейство.
06:12   Хрен я им буду платить налог.
06:16   Гори, гори, гори.
06:17   Дальше.
06:21   Всё ещё старая добрая Сура 9.
06:24   Стих 80. “Будете ли вы просить
06:27   прощения для них или не будете,
06:30   Аллах все равно не простит их,
06:32   даже если вы попросите для них прощения 70 раз,
06:33   ибо они не уверовали в Аллаха
06:35   и его посланника.
06:38   И Аллах не указывают путь нечестивцам.”
06:41   Злодейство.
06:44   Дальше. Мы всё ещё в Суре 9.
07:07   Стих 123.
07:10   “О вы, кто верует! Убивайте неверных вокруг себя,
07:15   И пусть они найдут в вас суровость.”
07:19   В самом деле? Идите к чёрту.
07:24   Вот так.
07:27   Ну а сейчас – Сура 13, стих 42.
07:34   “Их предшественники
07:37   тоже замышляли козни,
07:38   Аллах же всеми хитростями правит,
07:41   ибо он знает что каждый творит.”
07:42   Здесь бог называется мошенником
07:46   и обманщиком,
07:44   что подразумевает, что в действительности,
07:50   Аллаха – это дьявол,
07:52   и я думаю мы все можем с этим согласиться.
07:56   Возвращайся в ад, Аллах,
08:05   откуда ты пришёл.
08:06   Дальше.
08:13   Сура 23, стих 1.
08:21   “Воистину, блаженны верующие,
08:22   которые в своих молитвах смиренны,
08:24   которые избегают всего суетного,
08:27   которые творят очищение,
08:29   которые не имеют сношений ни с кем,
08:32   кроме своих жён
08:34   и невольниц.”
08:35   Это санкционирует наложниц,
08:39   наложничество.
08:43   Злодейство.
08:44   Мы сожжём это.
08:45   Вот так.
08:52   Дальше.
08:53   Сура 47, стих 4.
08:57   “Когда вы встречаетесь с неверующими на поле боя,
08:58   рубите головы пока не разобьёте их,
09:01   затем, держите их в рабстве.”
09:03   Ага… Попробуйте только…
09:07   Вот так.
09:26   Дальше.
09:30   Сура 52, стих 24.
09:34   Это относится к сексу между мужчинами и мальчиками,
09:37   который очень ценится в исламе.
09:39   Это 52:24.
09:41   “И юноши, точно сокровенный жемчуг,
09:45   будут окружать их.”
09:46   Множество стихов
09:48   посвящено этой теме.
09:50   Извращение.
09:53   И я вскоре собираюсь написать эссе
09:57   о гомосексуализме и гомосексуальной педофилии
10:00   и гетеросексуальной педофилии в исламе
10:03   и гетеросексуальной педофилии в исламе.
10:06   Потому что это культурная норма.
10:09   Далее идёт Сура 56 стих 17.
10:13   “Вечно цветущие юноши
10:16   будут обходить их с чашами
10:18   и кувшинами.”
10:20   “Вечно цветущие” означет
10:22   вечное половое созревание.
10:24   И это то, что мужчина-мусульманин
10:26   учится находить сексуально привлекательными –
10:27   несовершеннолетние и достигшие половой зрелости мальчики.
10:30   Это совершенно, совершенно отвратительно.
10:33   Большинству мужчин, или большинству мальчиков,
10:38   в исламской культуре
10:39   не избежать детства
10:41   без анального или орального изнасилования мужчинами.
10:46   И потом они, в свою очередь,
10:48   продолжают цикл сексуального насилия.
10:50   И большинство мужчин в исламских культурах –
10:54   гомосексуалисты / гомосексуальные педофилы.
10:57   Так… Сура 65 – развод.
11:01   65:4. “Что касается ваших жён, которые потеряли надежду на менструацию,
11:04   и в случае, если у вас есть сомнения,
11:06   установленный срок ожидания
11:09   равен трём месяцам,
11:11   как и для тех, кто ещё не менструировал.”
11:14   Это санкционирует
11:16   секс с девочками не достигшими половой зрелости.
11:18   Прочту это ещё раз.
11:20   “Что касается ваших жён
11:21   которые потеряли надежду на менструацию,”
11:23   (имеются в виду пожилые женщины)
11:24   “и в случае, если у вас есть сомнения,
11:26   установленный срок ожидания
11:30   равен трём месяцам,
11:31   как и для тех, кто ещё не менструировал.”
11:33   Это санкционирует
11:36   секс с девочками, которым меньше 12-13 лет,
11:42   что является злодейством.
11:44   Другого слова для этого нет.
11:48   Это злодейство.
11:49   Поэтому, мы его сожжём.
11:53   И теперь, наконец,
11:55   последняя цитата –
11:57   Сура 76 стих 19.
12:04   “И вечно юные мальчики
12:06   будут ублажать их.
12:08   Взглянув на них, ты примешь их
12:09   за жемчуг рассыпанный.”
12:11   Опять же, мальчики в качестве сексуальных объектов.
12:16   Отвратительно.
12:18   Грязно, злодейски, дьявольски, отвратительно.
12:22   Всё это,
12:25   от начала до конца.
12:26   Я просто выбрала несколько.
12:27   Каждая страница имеет что-то подобное.
12:29   Там либо санкционирование изнасилования,
12:32   санкционирование секса с мальчиками,
12:35   или насилие, насилие, насилие.
12:36   Убивайте, калечте, обезглавливайте,
12:40   без пощады, и т.д.
12:42   Это злодейство.
12:45   Злодейское, злодейское чтиво.
12:49   И я преклонюсь перед этим дерьмом,
12:51   когда рак на горе свистнет.
12:56   Я призываю всех вас,
12:57   кто смотрит, которые разделяют мои чувства,
13:00   сделать что-то подобное.
13:01   Потому что мы должны сражаться здесь
13:04   и сейчас.
13:06   Мы не можем ждать 20 лет.
13:08   Мы не можем выждать поколение,
13:10   чтобы наши дети вели эту войну вместо нас.
13:12   Эта наша война здесь
13:13   и сейчас.
13:14   Либо мы сражаемся здесь,
13:15   либо всему конец.
13:17   Сожгите Коран.
13:18   Загрузите на YouTube.
13:20   Покажите миру, что мы не собираемся
13:22   отступать. Христианство
13:23   не учит отступать.
13:26   И неспроста церковь на земле
13:28   называется воинствующей церковью.
13:30   Можете преследовать меня, если хотите, ребята.
13:32   Можете преследовать меня.
13:33   Пожауйста. Для меня не проблема
13:35   отдать свою жизнь
13:37   за своих сограждан,
13:38   за таких же людей, как я
13:40   и за церковь.
13:41   Это для меня не проблема.
13:42   Попробуйте.
13:43   Но я не покорюсь.
13:44   Это не то, что Христос велит.
13:46   Есть времена, когда мы должны бороться.
13:49   Мы боремся со злом.
13:51   Мы боремся со злом в мире.
13:52   И это гадость является злом.
13:54   Меня зовут Энн Барнхардт.
13:56   Мой адрес 9175 Cornbrusk Circle
14:00   80124 в Lone Tree, Colorado.
14:03   Тот, кто хочет тягаться со мной,
14:06   пожалуйста, приходите и попробуйте.
14:07   Это касается Линдси Грэма,
14:10   кто-либо в правительстве,
14:11   кто думает, что это преступление,
14:13   или мусульман, которые хотели бы прийти и тягаться со мной.
14:17   Хватит с меня этого дерьма.
14:18   Я не собираюсь преклоняться.
14:21   Я не собираюсь подчиняться исламу,
14:23   никогда. Никогда.

Are Libyan Rebels Targeting Blacks?

There was a news report yesterday that the Libyan rebels had attacked and defeated a group of Sudanese mercenaries loyal to Col. Qaddafi in a battle near the border of Sudan.

According to the following article, incidents such as that one may be part of a general campaign by the rebels to drive black Africans out of Libya. If this story turns out to be true, you can bet that it will never see the light of day in the mainstream media, devoted as they are to the “Arab Spring” and the freedom fighters of Libya:

Libya: Habeshia: Ethnic Cleansing Risk for Black Libyans

(ANSAmed) — Rome, May 25 — Black Libyans risk an ethnic cleansing action in Libya because of the determination against them by Libyans of Arab origin that sympathise with the rebels, who attack them as though they were Gaddafi’s mercenaries. Such is the warning raised by don Mussie Zerai, an Eritrean priest who in Rome presides the Habeshia cooperation and development agency and who reported the “massacre of 800 Africans in Misrata alone”.

He pointed out that the massacre was directly reported to him by African refugees who landed in Italy. It is allegedly documented in a number of videos of the Habeshia agency website that depict “cruel episodes and fury on lifeless bodies”, which are “manifestation of deep held hate”. In Libya there are two ethnic groups not of Arab origin, said don Zerai, and the risk that they may become the victims of ethnic cleansing during the bloody clashes between Gaddafi’s supporters and the rebels is very high. The clergyman claimed that there is still indifference despite the previous warning.

Don Zerai thus asked for the attention of the international community so that “black Libyans are not massacred”, while “hundreds of thousands of Darfur Sudanese” also trapped in Libya, risk “being crushed by this intolerance that is spreading in the territories occupied by the rebels”. Because in his opinion the authors of these murders and violent acts are the anti-Gaddafi rebels. Don Zerai asked “What guarantees is Europe asking from the new lords of Libya freed from Gaddafi? We need at all costs to avoid another genocide in the African continent”. In the past other organisations reported that the risk is also being run by many other immigrants of African origin in Libya, which from the very start of the war have been mistaken for black mercenaries working for Gaddafi.

Hat tip: Insubria.