In last night’s news feed I mentioned the recent release of a study of Islam and terrorism in the United States (pdf). The paper was commissioned by the Department of Justice and published on January 6th by Duke University in North Carolina.
The conclusions drawn by the study are predictable: there aren’t that many Muslims who have been radicalized, really. We need more inter-community understanding. Most importantly, profiling, bias, and discrimination must be resolutely avoided, or the radicals will only be strengthened. There should be more education, outreach, funding for recreation centers and day care centers and public health clinics and etc blah yak, we all know the drill.
The release of the study was blazoned in a predictable fashion in a CNN headline: “Threat of Muslim-American Terrorism in U.S. Exaggerated”. We are supposed to be reassured. Duke University, the Department of Justice, and the MSM are in full agreement: members of the public have nothing to fear. Despite appearances — despite the armed Jamaat ul-Fuqra camps spread throughout our rural areas, despite the Sudden Jihad Syndrome warriors who run people over and stab them and shoot them, despite Muslim husbands who behead their wives and murder their daughters for wearing tank tops, despite the Shoe Bomber and the Lap Bomber, despite the Killer Shrink of Fort Hood — despite all this, we must be calm. We should relax and return to our daily business, knowing that Islamic terrorism in the United States is nothing to worry about. Everything is A-OK, folks; just go back to sleep.
Based on its grant number (2007-IJ-CX-0008), this study was fathered by Michael Chertoff’s Justice Department, but its birth was midwifed by Eric “Let’s try the terrorists in NYC” Holder.
Does this mean that its sixty-four slickly-formatted pages are just standard government-issue boilerplate, done up in a style to please the advocates of the “law-enforcement model” of domestic terrorism in the current DOJ?
Or is this a true disinformation operation, wormed into academia and the government through all those little holes that have been so patiently drilled by the Muslim Brotherhood over the last thirty years?
The title of the study is “Anti-Terror Lessons of Muslim-Americans”, and the authors are David Schanzer (Sanford School of Public Policy at Duke University), Charles Kurzman (Department of Sociology at UNC in Chapel Hill), and Ebrahim Moosa (Department of Religion at Duke). The fiscal pedigree of their effort is listed in a little box at the end of the text:
This project was supported by grant no. 2007-IJ-CX-0008, awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
OK, so the DOJ may have paid for all this bumf, but that doesn’t mean it agrees with it. I’ll buy that. Why shouldn’t the federal government pay for things that it doesn’t agree with, and that might do it harm? After all, it has nothing better to do with my tax dollars.
So what about the authors? Do they have any opinions and predilections that our government may or may not agree with? I didn’t have time to research Drs. Schanzer and Kurzman, but I took a quick look at Ebrahim Moosa. The official bio for him included with the report says this:
Ebrahim Moosa is Associate Professor of Islamic Studies in the Department of Religion at Duke University. His interests span both classical and modern Islamic thought with a special interest in Islamic law, ethics and theology. Moosa is the author of Ghazali and the Poetics of Imagination, winner of the American Academy of Religion’s Best First Book in the history of religions (2006). He was named Carnegie Scholar in 2005 to pursue research on the madrasas, Islamic seminaries of South Asia.
There’s a lot of information compacted into that paragraph.
Islamic law, eh? Which school — Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki? Or does he devote his scholarly attentions to the ’Umdat al-Salik by Ahmad ibn Naqib al-Misri, which represents the Shafiite School? All four schools agree on all major points about the law of jihad, so perhaps Dr. Moosa chooses to stay away from the lot of them.
The description of Pakistani madrassas as “Islamic seminaries” is an ingenious feint, evoking as it does Western institutions in which science, history, literature, and art are studied in addition to theology and scripture. But “students” in madrassas memorize a single book, the Koran, and the only additional knowledge that is considered proper is derived from the sayings and commentary found in the hadith and the sunna. Nothing else goes on in madrassas. No ballet, no history club, no local chapter of Students for a Sustainable Future. Just the Koran, the hadith, and the sunna. The Five Pillars of Islam.
But maybe this really is just boilerplate. Dr. Moosa could be exactly what this describes, a devoted scholar of the Islamic imagination and Muslim poetry.
On page 39 of the study, the following statement is highlighted:
We are not against the government. We are not against America. We look at ourselves as part of the American people.
But is this true of Ebrahim Moosa?
- Professor at Duke University
- Co-chairs the Center for the Study of Muslim Networks
- “The world is in mortal threat with the United States being allowed to strut around like a colossus.”
And in more detail:
– – – – – – – – –
A religion professor at Duke University, Ebrahim Moosa co-chairs Duke’s Center for the Study of Muslim Networks (CSMN), a leftist organization that strongly opposes America’s war on terror. He joined the Duke faculty in 2001. Prior to his work at Duke, Moosa spent three years as a visiting Professor at Stanford University, and before that he taught at South Africa’s Cape Town University. In November 2002, Moosa stated, “The world is in mortal threat with the United States being allowed to strut around like a colossus.” In a March 2003 piece he wrote for the New Straits Times-Management Times, he referred to George W. Bush and Tony Blair — the two world leaders most vocal about the importance of ending Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime — as “the Christian Taliban.” Moosa characterized the war against Iraq as “unjust American atrocities on the Iraqi people.” Notably, Islamic fundamentalists in Moosa’s homeland, South Africa, attempted to kill him in a firebombing attack several years ago — after which Moosa took refuge in America and secured his teaching position at Duke.
The fact that Moosa found safety and opportunity in the U.S. has not diminished the zeal with which he condemns America and its role in world affairs. He writes, “Recent history has shown that everyone from yesterday’s Cold War allies and today’s terrorists like Bin Laden, to despots like Saddam Hussein and oppressive regimes the world over, can find favor with the U.S. ruling class, under the right circumstances…. No principle or vision is sacrosanct in Washington except its own security and self-interest. U.S. ‘national interests’ must be the single most catastrophic ideology of death and misery…”
This paints a picture of a radical lefty who hates the United States and the entire Western world. Unfortunately for him, he failed to be sufficiently Islamic, and was forced by the more zealous of his co-religionists to flee for his own protection to the Great Satan, from behind whose skirts he could safely continue to revile capitalism and the oppressive racist patriarchy.
And this is the man the Justice Department’s proxy picked to write a report about Islam in America. No wonder the DOJ feels the need to include a disclaimer.
With all this in mind, let’s take a look at Part 3, “Conclusions and Recommendations”, which begins on page 43 of the report. The highlighted talking points listed on each page are:
- The most significant positive trend … is the increased political mobilization of Muslim-Americans
- Americans are … seemingly unaware of the consistent and strong public denunciations of violence by Muslim-American organizations and leaders
- Law enforcement must demonstrate that it is capable of dealing with the problem of radicalization in a proportionate and sensitive manner
- [Muslim-American] communities are not defined by their faith alone
- Muslim-American communities desire collaboration and outreach with the government beyond law enforcement
- Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase public safety, and create a positive social environment for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in good faith, we believe these goals are achievable
So we are meant to see the “the increased political mobilization of Muslim-Americans” as something to be desired. Judging by the effects of Muslim political involvement in the Netherlands and Britain, I am unable to be so sanguine. Political mobilization is one more means through which the pressure on the host society to introduce sharia law is increased.
The “proportionate and sensitive” behavior of law enforcement is code-speak for never, ever considering the religion or ethnic origin of potential terrorists when tracking the behavior of suspicious people. In fact, as Maj. Hasan and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab have taught us, in practical terms being “proportionate and sensitive” usually translates into “give dangerous Muslims a free pass”.
“[C]ollaboration and outreach with the government beyond law enforcement” is a clear prescription for more agents of the Muslim Brotherhood in government positions or conducting “Islamic sensitivity” training at mandatory seminars for bureaucrats.
And as for Muslim-American communities not being “defined by their faith alone” — yes, this is quite true. Muslim-Americans speak a number of languages and have different preferred dress styles. Even in the United States, Pakistanis and Arabs often hate each other.
No, Muslims are not defined by their faith alone. But their faith comes first.
When any other defining characteristic conflicts with the tenets of Islam, then Islam must supersede it. This is a core religious injunction about which all major Islamic scholars — both ancient and modern — agree. As Ihsan Bagby, the General Secretary of the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) said at an ISNA conference in Columbus, Ohio, in August 2008:
We [Muslims] can never be full citizens of this country… because there is no way we can be fully committed to the institutions and ideologies of this country.
So, strictly speaking, the report’s statement is true, but it is a misdirection. Islam and sharia come first; America and the Constitution are second.
Which tells us the important question to ask: “If our law and Constitution conflict with sharia, which would you choose to obey?” Confront any believing Muslim spokesman with this question, and he will dodge, dance, and dissemble, because he would have to say “sharia comes first”, or else all the fatwas in the world would come down on his head. Fortunately for him, no prominent Muslim will ever be asked such a question in a public forum, since to ask it would display insensitivity, racism, and Islamophobia.
Now let’s look at the nitty-gritty details of the study’s conclusions. I’ll include the entire text, and then highlight and fisk the juicier portions. All the emphasis (except for the bold section headers) is mine:
This research project found that Muslim-American communities strongly reject radical jihadi ideology, are eager to contribute to the national counterterrorism effort, and are fiercely committed to integration within the mainstream of American social and economic life. As explained in Part 2 of this report, Muslim-American communities are taking a variety of positive steps that help prevent radicalization within their communities: 1) they consistently denounce terrorism directed at the United States; 2) they engage in self-policing by prohibiting radical sermons in their mosques and taking action against radical views expressed by outsiders or community members; 3) they are building strong institutions within their communities to direct their youth in a positive direction; 4) they are addressing their grievances through political mobilization; and 5) they are emphasizing their identity as Muslim-Americans. In addition, Muslim-Americans have developed strong working relationships with federal and local law enforcement agencies.
One of the things you’ll notice about Muslim spokescreatures is that they never denounce terrorism unequivocally. The usual formula is to denounce “all forms of terrorism”, and then trot out Timothy McVeigh when required. Denunciations are always qualified with the obligatory “but”: “I vehemently oppose all forms of terrorism, but…”
But we must recognize the legitimate grievances of the Palestinian people…
But it’s understandable that Muslims who hear their prophet insulted tend to react so strongly…
But as long as Muslims feel they are victimized by racism and Islamophobia, it will be hard to prevent…
Or whatever. There’s always a “but”.
Sadly enough, any denunciation at all of terrorism is fairly rare within the Muslim community. There’s a good reason for this: acts of violence towards infidels have sound backing in the Koran and the hadith, and anyone who argues with a devout Muslim against such actions will find himself on shaky ground. Crawling out too far into that quivering swamp leads to a charge of apostasy, so it’s no surprise that few Muslims want to go there — they know what happens to apostates.
So these prescriptions sound nice, and we would all breathe a sigh of relief if they were implemented, but you may as well suggest that the Hasidim in Brooklyn start eating bacon. It just isn’t going to happen.
Nonetheless, there is an uneasy tension in the relationship between Muslim-Americans and other Americans that causes concern. Whether it is from public opinion polls, media coverage, commentary by angry voices on the Internet and talk radio, or portrayals of Muslims in popular culture, Muslim-Americans sense an element of hostility towards both Islam and Muslims emanating from at least a portion of American society. Also, while Muslim-Americans accept the need for enhanced security measures, they also perceive many government counterterrorism, security, and immigration policies to be unfair and discriminatory in their application to Muslims-Americans. Finally, they have many disagreements with American foreign policy. These disagreements have been present for many decades, but due to 9/11 and subsequent events over the past eight years in the United States, the Middle East, and South Asia, these issues have become more relevant and the schisms more intense.
According to this logic, immigration policies are discriminatory and unfair if they take into account the Muslim background of any visa applicants. Since the First Commandment of Multiculturalism is “Thou shalt not discriminate”, we must ignore the religious background of anybody we admit into the country.
This means that we inevitably will allow yet more deadly terrorists to cross our borders and kill us. We are doing this consciously, deliberately, and with full knowledge of the consequences. But the resulting carnage will be a small price to pay, because at least we will be certain that we didn’t discriminate.
The presence of these tensions does not, in our view, imply widespread radicalization among Muslim-Americans or the potential for widespread radicalization in the future. However, isolated instances of radicalization may continue to occur in the corners of society because small groups or individuals who are vulnerable to radicalization or who are socially isolated may misinterpret and magnify the discontent and unease among mainstream Muslim-Americans.
This one hits all the grace notes in the Islamic Grievance Cantata. The “isolated instance” makes an appearance, just in time for Maj. Nidal Hasan and Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab.
Small groups and individuals are giving the vast majority of Muslims a bad name. We all know this; it’s been drummed into us 24/7 since September 11th by the newspapers, the TV, and every government representative who ever mentions Islam.
But small groups and individuals can kill a lot of Americans. It only took nineteen persons of the Muslim persuasion to kill 3,000 people on September 11th. It doesn’t take millions of Muslim terrorists to bring the United States to its knees; a handful will suffice. How many Muslim Brotherhood operatives are required to bring the necessary materials across the border with Mexico and detonate a dirty bomb in Los Angeles?
Unfortunately for mainstream Muslim-Americans, the fact that such an act may magnify their discontent will not engender a warm rush of sympathy from Infidel-Americans.
Our recommendations, therefore, have two goals: building on the successes of Muslim-American communities that are associated with low levels of radicalization in the United States and creating a more positive environment for Muslim-Americans so their anti-radicalization measures will continue to be effective.
1. Encourage Political Mobilization
The most significant positive trend we have identified is the increased political mobilization of Muslim-Americans. Participation of Muslim-Americans in political life has a number of positive impacts: 1) grievances are brought into the public sphere and clearly articulated so they do not fester and deepen, 2) disputes are resolved through debate, compromise, and routine political procedures, and 3) political mobilization leads to ever-increasing numbers of Muslim-American leaders speaking responsibly about difficult issues on both the national and international stages. The political mobilization of Muslim-Americans is not only a beneficial development in terms of stunting domestic radicalization, but it also demonstrates to Muslims around the world that Muslims do have a voice in America and are working to resolve their grievances through peaceful, democratic means.
The key word here is “grievances”. Other groups usually have interests, or concerns, or agendas, or policy proposals. But Muslims have grievances, and as long as they have to live among infidels, they will have little else.
Those grievances create “disputes” which theoretically may be “resolved through debate, compromise, and routine political procedures”. But the process of political resolution is just the back story — Muslim grievances are in reality resolved through lawfare, intimidation, and above all the implicit threat of violence.
The image of Theo Van Gogh with Muslim grievances impaled in his chest by a knife is lesson enough on how to “resolve” those grievances. Why else do you think the Mohammed cartoons never appeared on the television screens of America?
We believe that public officials should encourage the continued political mobilization of Muslim-American communities and take steps to further integrate Muslim-Americans and Muslim-American organizations into American political life. Both major political parties should organize to actively seek the Muslim-American vote as they do with other ethnic and religious groups. Public officials should attend events at mosques as they do at churches and synagogues. Muslim-American community groups should be invited to participate in community forums and events. It will be beneficial if these activities take place at both the national and local levels of government. We believe it is in our national security interest for members of both parties to appear publicly with Muslim leaders, attend events with Muslims, attend services at mosques, and promote Muslim candidates in elections.
President Obama has continued the tradition of holding an Iftar dinner at the White House which is a positive and important statement. He should make a special effort to hold other events with Muslim-Americans to address the disappointment many felt during the presidential campaign, in which the false claim that he is a Muslim was used by some as a political weapon and perceived as a political vulnerability.
Inclusion of Muslim-American organizations in our political system is also important and needs to be encouraged. We neither support nor oppose the agendas of Muslim-American organizations; we merely note that such groups play a valuable role in our political system and are one avenue for individuals to express themselves and gain representation for their views.
“We neither support nor oppose the agendas of Muslim-American organizations”. Why is it then that every significant talking point in this document echoes the major solutions proposed by CAIR, ISNA, etc.? It must just be a coincidence.
2. Promote Public Denunciations of Violence
Public opinion polls in the United States suggest that a significant minority of Americans are highly suspicious of Muslim-Americans and seemingly unaware of the consistent and strong public denunciations of violence by Muslim-American organizations and leaders.
We believe that these denunciations of violence are an important reflection of Muslim-American opinion and values. Muslim organizations at all levels should continue to issue these denunciations following incidents here or abroad, even to the point of redundancy, and vigorously publicize them. We recommend that local organizations and mosques do so as well. Public officials, who often comment on terrorism-related incidents or arrests, should include these denunciations from Muslim-Americans in their commentary. The media should routinely include these denunciations as part of their coverage.
If the American public is “unaware of the consistent and strong public denunciations of violence”, it must be due to one of three possible reasons.
|1.||Such denunciations are so rare and/or equivocated that they are drowned out by much more numerous and vocal calls to “behead those who insult the Prophet”.|
|2.||The mainstream American media — otherwise so compliant and solicitous of the good opinion of Muslims — inexplicably fail to publicize such denunciations.|
|3.||The American people are hard-hearted Islamophobes, or obtuse, or both, and are thus unmoved by Muslim denunciations of violence.|
3. Reinforce Self-Policing Efforts by Improving the Relationship Between Law Enforcement and Muslim-American Communities
This project identified initiatives by Muslim-Americans to police their own communities against radicalization. These efforts can take many forms. In one instance, mosque officials worked with law enforcement to identify a wayward youth vulnerable to radicalization, bring him back into the community, and assist him toward a stable, productive future. There are also examples, often underreported or ignored by the press, where Muslim-Americans provided information to law enforcement that led to surveillance, arrests, and prosecutions. On other occasions, individuals expressing radical ideas have simply been purged, thrown out of their mosques and rejected by the broader community.
Really? Where? Which mosques? Names, dates? We need details.
I didn’t see any citations for such incidents in the report, but it’s a long document, and I may have missed them.
The appropriate course of action to be taken when evidence is uncovered of possible radicalization will of course vary from case to case. There are costs and benefits to each of these different approaches. In general terms, however, we propose that Muslim-American communities and law enforcement agencies cooperate more closely to overcome mutual suspicions and achieve common goals. This will require affirmative steps by both Muslim-Americans and law enforcement, as well as renewed pathways for working together.
For their part, Muslim-American communities must recognize that simply purging radicalized individuals from their communities is not sufficient. Such action may push these individuals even further away from mainstream thought, accelerate the radicalization process, and possibly lead to violence. Muslim-American leaders must promote a culture where cooperation with law enforcement is not only accepted, but perceived as a duty, to both the Muslim-American community and the broader American public. In order to foster such cooperation, law enforcement must demonstrate that it is capable of dealing with the problem of radicalization in a proportionate and sensitive manner that does not always result in arrest and prosecution. It is a far better result from all perspectives if individuals heading towards radicalization can be — rather than arrested and prosecuted — deterred from their actions and have their lives re-directed. Law enforcement and Muslim-American communities need to discuss the type of interventions that might lead to such results and develop guidelines for determining when community intervention might be appropriate.
This is a real gem: when the police or the FBI discover a nest of terrorists in a mosque, they are obligated to find some method of dealing with them other than arrest or prosecution.
These mujahideen may be plotting to blow up a cruise ship or the Golden Gate Bridge, but the mandate of our law enforcement agencies is to show respect for diversity, engage in community outreach, promote educational initiatives, and foster a climate of dialogue so that hatred and violent extremism are thereby reduced in a non-Islamophobic manner.
I’m impelled to ask, “What are these people smoking?” But whatever it is, the Department of Homeland Security, the Justice Department, the Pentagon, the State Department, and the White House are already high on the same loco weed.
A second source of tension is the perception by Muslim-Americans that law enforcement has aggressively and inappropriately used informants in their communities on counterterrorism cases. Law enforcement agencies should recognize that these tactics may be counterproductive if the use of informants causes long-term harm to their relationship with Muslim-American communities. Muslim-Americans, for their part, should understand that the use of informants is an accepted, traditional law enforcement practice and may be necessary in appropriate cases to gather evidence on individuals who are a potential danger.
To address this issue, we propose a candid dialogue between law enforcement and Muslim-American communities about the handling of criminal cases and the use of informants. Law enforcement agencies should develop policies for when the use of informants in Muslim-American communities is appropriate and discuss these policies openly with community leaders. For this dialogue to be productive, Muslim-Americans must acknowledge that there is a continuing, albeit low level, problem of radicalization in their community. They need to be vigilant in their self-policing and continue to build a trusting relationship with law enforcement, which at times may require them to identify individuals within their community as deserving of law enforcement scrutiny. Turning a blind eye towards potential problems is a counterproductive and potentially dangerous path. An open dialogue on a full range of issues will help to reinforce the positive self-policing efforts by Muslim-Americans that we have identified in this project.
So how low is the “low level problem of radicalization”? What percentage of American Muslims has been radicalized? Just for the sake of argument, let’s accept CAIR’s figure of six million Muslims in the United States, and let’s designate a “low level” of radicalization as, say, one tenth of one percent. That’s six thousand terrorists right there, not a number to be sneezed at.
Or, to put it another way, that’s three hundred and fifteen 9-11s just waiting to happen.
And this is a conservative estimate. Our law enforcement and national security officials would be guilty of failing to do due diligence if they used such ridiculously lowballed numbers to estimate the danger to our country. Yet even that is an alarming level of danger.
As I said before, it won’t take that many hardened Islamic radicals to bring America to its knees.
Besides resolving grievances over use of law enforcement tactics, other positive steps can be taken to build a stronger relationship between law enforcement agencies and Muslim-American communities.
First, the relationship can be strengthened and solidified by hiring more Muslim law enforcement officers. A full range of affirmative steps need to be taken to accomplish this task, including recruiting at schools in predominantly Muslim areas and institutions.
The U.S. Army already seems to have taken up this idea in the wake of the Fort Hood massacre, doing outreach to recruit more Muslims into the military. It’s the institutional War-on-Terror version of homeopathy, a small dose of the disease agent to alleviate the disease itself. The hair of the dog, as it were.
By the same logic, we should hire drug addicts to help the DEA combat heroin smuggling. Or recruit convicted forgers for the Secret Service’s anti-counterfeiting task force.
This is madness, utter madness. And many thousands of otherwise normal-looking public officials seem to be infected by it.
Second, the FBI and local law enforcement agencies should increase their outreach efforts, which, in general, have been received positively. These agencies, however, must grasp the diversity of social groups within Muslim-American communities. Current efforts appear to focus centrally on mosques, but there is no single point of access to the Muslim-American community. Ethnic associations, neighborhood groups, youth groups, women’s organizations, and other sorts of social organizations are also representatives of Muslim-American communities. These communities are not defined by their faith alone. Successful programs such as the FBI’s Bridges Program and Citizen’s Academy should be expanded. We found positive reactions to these programs in Buffalo and other locations, and we recommend that similar programs be made available nationally.
If “[t]hese communities are not defined by their faith alone”, then why do we call them “Muslim” communities? What else defines them?
If “Muslim” is not their most important characteristic, then what is?
What happened to America as the melting pot?
Third, law enforcement agencies should recognize the diversity of ethnicities within Muslim-American communities, which ranges across many nationalities, from Arab, to African-American, to recent Chinese-Muslim immigrants. The continuous influx of Muslim immigrants not only adds to the size of the Muslim-American community, but also creates new challenges and opportunities. It is important not to approach Muslim-Americans with a single ethnic- and religion-driven template.
4. Assist Community-Building Efforts
Our research suggests that building strong community institutions helps to prevent radicalization. Strong communities can provide educational outreach to Muslims who are uninformed about Islamic principles opposing terrorism; they can identify those whose lives have gone in the wrong direction and are in need of assistance; and they can provide positive experiences for youth. Many Muslim-American communities have the resources to build community institutions without assistance; others do not. We recommend that all levels of government make additional efforts to offer disadvantaged Muslim-American communities such community-building resources as funding for recreation centers, day care centers, public health clinics, and courses in English as a Second Language. There is a special need for these resources in isolated immigrant communities.
We also recommend specific attention to one particular need for preventing violence: training to identify signs of mental illness. Most of those who have radicalized and plotted or engaged in violence are perfectly healthy, but there are some notable instances of Muslim-Americans who were mentally ill and became violent. A number of the respondents for this project mentioned that the signs of mental illness were not well understood in Muslim-American communities and that it would be valuable to provide training to recognize signs of mental illness.
5. Promote Outreach by Social Service Agencies
Muslim-American communities desire collaboration and outreach with the government beyond law enforcement, in areas such as public health, education, and transportation. Moving toward this type of engagement acknowledges that Muslim-American communities have needs and concerns in addition to contributing to the nation’s counterterrorism efforts.
Now we get to the bottom line: the shakedown. Muslim-Americans want a lot of stuff, and they want the taxpayers to pony up for it.
My response is, “Fall into line with the rest of us. You can have the same Obamacare that we get.”
If Muslims really are Americans like any other Americans, then they can take the same deal that the rest of us get.
We recommend greater efforts by government agencies at the federal and local level to direct resources toward Muslim communities to improve public health, education, and transportation. This kind of engagement is viewed as an opportunity for Muslim-Americans to become stakeholders in the general community. Recent immigrants, for example, may not be familiar with methods for accessing available social service resources. We believe that general engagement in these areas will contribute to counter-radicalization efforts by improving community integration and reducing the isolation of vulnerable populations.
If Muslim-Americans are to become “stakeholders”, they must become fully-functioning citizens, with all the responsibilities and civic loyalty that citizenship entails. If they can’t manage to do this, they don’t belong in America in the first place.
Recent immigrants should not get help “accessing available social service resources”, they should get jobs. And their fellow-countrymen who arrived here first can help them look for them.
Specific issue areas that could be addressed through education and other social services, with direct implications for the prevention of radicalization, include internet security (a major portal through which youth may become radicalized), identifying and diagnosing individuals with psychological and mental health issues, and integrating former prisoners into the community.
Integrating former prisoners into the community is all too often a job performed by the radical Muslims themselves. The typical new convert to Islam is a felon who experienced da’wa in prison and was initiated into Islam by an official state-sanctioned chaplain chosen for that position by the Muslim Brotherhood.
Oh yes, Islam is very skilled at integrating former prisoners into the community. Some of them are even integrated into jihad trailer-parks in New York State or Virginia and trained there in new skills involving explosives and automatic weapons.
6. Support Enhanced Religious Literacy
This research confirmed what has been observed in other studies of Muslim terrorists: most of those who engage in religiously inspired terrorism have little formal training in Islam and, in fact, are poorly educated about Islam.112 At the same time, we have observed, as have others, an increased religiosity among Muslim-Americans. This is to be welcomed, not feared. Muslim-Americans with a strong, traditional religious training are far less likely to radicalize than those whose knowledge of Islam is incomplete.
“[T]hose who engage in religiously inspired terrorism have little formal training in Islam and, in fact, are poorly educated about Islam.”
This is either a lie, or proof that this DOJ-funded study is one of the most incompetent documents about radical Islam that has ever been produced using federal dollars.
Radical Islamic terrorists are among the most educated men on the planet when it comes to Islamic law and the doctrine of jihad. They know what they are talking about, because they have read the Koran and all the words of the great Islamic scholars, and have taken those words to heart.
Nothing they espouse disagrees with the doctors of Islamic jurisprudence who are minted with such dismaying regularity by Al-Azhar University in Cairo.
Radicals are in the mainstream of Islam. They are well-versed in mainstream Islamic scholarship, and seek to implement through their actions the mandates of Allah as prescribed by texts that enjoy the full consensus of the scholars.
How much longer will it take us to get this simple fact into our thick skulls?
However, our research found a paucity of intellectual resources within the Muslim-American community to deal with a range of theological issues linked to violence, justice, and politics. Due to the levels of theological literacy among the religious and lay leadership of Muslim-American communities, Imams, leaders of community organizations, and professionals within the community were not always equipped to counter radical theologies peddled by more politicized members of the community.
It would not be appropriate for the government to play a leading role in this area. The Muslim-American community itself should invest in developing seminaries and programs for its own leadership. On-line education is a fairly inexpensive way to run courses that can be offered to Muslim leaders across the country. Foundations and universities may be willing to assist in the development of courses that address theological issues to assist in countering radical thought. Scholarship resources should be made available for graduate and doctoral work in these areas.
7. Increase Civil Rights Enforcement
There are already firmly institutionalized channels in place for addressing societal discrimination. Enhanced civil rights enforcement at local, state, and federal levels will contribute toward addressing Muslim-American concerns.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
In the eight years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, Muslim-Americans and government officials have acted to prevent radicalization and build a positive working relationship. Yet, there remains work to be done. Our shared goals are to enhance trust, increase public safety, and create a positive social environment for Muslim-Americans. With capable leaders acting in good faith, we believe these goals are achievable.
In the eight years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, we have learned nothing.
We have allowed the enemy to define the vocabulary we use, choose the terrain of the battlefield, select the weapons for the encounter, and set the terms of engagement.
We are being Islamized at an astonishing rate, and the genius of our adversaries is that they have helped us to staff the bureaucratic agencies that so devotedly accomplish their ends, and they have also induced us to pay for the entire process.
We are sheep to the slaughter. God help us.